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This thesis examines the role of national defence in British parliamentary politics 
between 1794 and 1812. It suggests that previous analyses of the late eighteenth-century 
political milieu insufficiently explore the impact of war on the structure of the state. 
Work by J.E. Cookson, Linda Colley, J.C.D. Clark, and Paul Langford depicts a 
decentralised state that had little direct involvement in developing a popular “British” 
patriotism. Here I argue that the threat of a potential French invasion during the wars 
against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France provoked a drive for centralisation. Nearly 
all the defence measures enacted during the period gave the government a much greater 
degree of control over British manpower and resources. The readiness of successive 
governments to involve large sections of the nation in the war effort through military 
service, financial contributions, and appeals to the British “spirit”, resulted in a much 
more inclusive sense of citizenship in which questions of national participation and 
political franchise were unlinked. National identity was also affected, and the focus on 
military defence of the British Isles influenced political attitudes towards the regular 
army.  
 
By 1810, however, the nation was disillusioned by the lengthy struggle with France. The 
result of lingering political weakness was that attention shifted from national defence 
onto domestic corruption and venality. The aftermath of the Irish Act of Union, too, 
demonstrated the limits of attempts to centralise the policy of the whole United 
Kingdom. Significantly, however, the debates over the relationship between the centre 
and the localities in the 1830s and 1840s, and the response to a new French invasion 
threat in the 1850s and 1860s, revived themes addressed during the 1790s and 1800s. 
The political reaction to the invasion threats between 1794 and 1812 ultimately had more 
in common with a Victorian state bureaucracy than an eighteenth-century ancien régime. 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DEFENCE IN BRITISH POLITICAL DEBATE, 
1794-1812 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jacqueline Faulkner 
Pembroke College 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome 
of work done in collaboration, except where specifically indicated in the text. 
 
 
 
Jacqueline Faulkner 
23 January 2006 
 
 iv 
Table of Contents 
 
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ vi 
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................ vii 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 
Chapter One: The Structure of the State ........................................................................... 16 
Central government and local networks ................................................................. 20 
The cabinet: structure and stability ........................................................................ 28 
The king ................................................................................................................. 39 
Scotland and Ireland ............................................................................................... 47 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 53 
Chapter Two: Centralisation and its problems ................................................................. 55 
Limited measures and constitutional precedent: the 1790s.................................... 58 
The search for a permanent solution: the 1800s..................................................... 65 
Opposition to government policy ........................................................................... 84 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 103 
Chapter Three: Citizen-Soldiers and ‘Military Spirit’................................................... 105 
A shift in balance: Army versus Navy ................................................................. 106 
A commercial nation at war ................................................................................. 109 
‘Military Spirit’, conscription and the manpower problem ................................. 114 
Patriotism, the ‘Citizen-Soldier’, and the duties of citizenship ........................... 119 
Problems of adaptation ......................................................................................... 127 
Military versus civilian ........................................................................................ 132 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 143 
Chapter Four: Morale and the ‘national spirit’ .............................................................. 146 
Propaganda, trust and national involvement ........................................................ 149 
The impact of victory ........................................................................................... 162 
Financial policy and morale ................................................................................. 169 
Continental isolation ............................................................................................ 174 
The spectre of bankruptcy .................................................................................... 177 
A lack of trust: famine and insurrection ............................................................... 181 
The limits of participation .................................................................................... 186 
Morality and national sin ..................................................................................... 190 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 195 
Chapter Five: Ireland ........................................................................................................ 198 
Britain and Ireland before the Union: the ‘Sister Island’ ..................................... 200 
A drain on manpower ........................................................................................... 205 
 v 
A division of authority ......................................................................................... 210 
Britain and Ireland after the Union: the ‘United Kingdom’ ................................. 214 
Ireland’s defence policy after the Union .............................................................. 222 
Catholic Emancipation: a ‘real’ Union ................................................................ 229 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 235 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 237 
Appendix I: British Regular and Auxiliary Forces 1793-1814 ...................................... 250 
Appendix II: Defence and Recruitment Acts 1794-1813 ................................................ 251 
Appendix III: British Naval Logistics 1793-1815 ............................................................ 254 
Appendix IV: Offices with responsibility for the armed forces, 1794-1814 .................. 255 
Appendix V: Lords Lieutenant of Ireland and their Chief Secretaries, 1794-1814 ..... 257 
Appendix References ......................................................................................................... 258 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………….261 
 
 vi 
Abbreviations 
 
Auckland Correspondence: The Journal and Correspondence of William, Lord 
Auckland, ed the bishop of Bath and Wells (London, 1862) 
BL Add MSS: British Library Additional Manuscripts 
Castlereagh Correspondence: Correspondence, Despatches and Other Papers of 
Viscount Castlereagh (London, 1851) 
Colchester Diary: The Diary and Correspondence of Charles Abbot, Lord Colchester 
(London, 1861) 
Cornwallis Correspondence: Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis, 
ed Charles Ross (London, 1859) 
Correspondence of George III: The Later Correspondence of George III, ed A. 
Aspinall (Cambridge, 1967-8) 
Court and Cabinets: Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George III (London, 
1853-5) 
Dropmore MSS: Report on the Manuscripts of J B Fortescue, Esq. Preserved at 
Dropmore (London, 1905-10) 
Ehrman II: John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt: The Reluctant Transition (Stanford, 
1983) 
Ehrman III: John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt: The Consuming Struggle (Stanford, 
1996)  
Glenbervie Diaries: The Diaries of Sylvester Douglas, Lord Glenbervie, ed Francis 
Bickley (London, 1928) 
PD: Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time (London, 1812) 
PH: Parliamentary History to 1803 (London, 1818-20) 
Rose Diary: The Diaries and Correspondence of the Rt. Hon. George Rose, ed the 
Rev. L. V. Harcourt (London, 1860) 
 vii 
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the 
Cambridge Newton Trust, both of which have provided the funding that made it 
possible for me to research and write this thesis. 
For the writing itself I would like to thank my supervisor, Boyd Hilton, as 
well as my MPhil supervisor, Jennifer Ridden. In addition, I have received valuable 
advice from Jay Fedorak, Jennifer Mori, David Craig, Vee Barbary, and Kristian 
Coates Ulrichsen. John Ehrman was kind enough to answer a number of questions I 
had, particularly about the Additional Force Act and Pitt’s second ministry. John 
Mayne, Ed Brambley, and Miklos Reiter have also read some of my work from a 
non-specialist perspective.  
All the archives I have visited have been extremely helpful in response to all 
my queries, particularly Ipswich Record Office, where Angela Plumb and Hilary 
Ritchie performed miracles in conjuring up correspondence from the ether, and East 
Sussex Record Office, where Philip Bye provided me with all the information I 
needed to navigate the largely uncatalogued Sheffield MSS. Finally, I would like to 
extend my grateful thanks to Mr. Roy Davids of Oxford, who very kindly allowed 
me to visit his manuscript shop to view an important memorandum by Pitt in his 
possession. 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
On 27 January 1794 the Times reported ‘very great preparations at Havre de 
Grace, for a descent in this country’. Fifty thousand men were rumoured to be taking 
part in this expedition, which marked the beginning of a series of invasion scares that 
dominated the course of Britain’s war effort against Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France between 1794 and 1812.1 These were swiftly heightened by the long periods 
of diplomatic isolation during which Britain could neither count on the help of 
continental allies to repel assault, nor on a European campaign to distract the enemy. 
Without a regular army strong enough to defend the home base or prosecute the war 
abroad, and with the prospect of lengthy campaigns as far afield as India, Africa, and 
South America, the politicians were for many years unable to undertake any major 
offensives against France without leaving some part of the British Isles exposed to 
invasion. National identity, ideological assumptions, and the structure of the state 
were all affected by the long struggle which, until the Peninsular War started 
bringing in victories from 1809 onwards, remained almost entirely defensive for 
nearly fifteen years.  
Britain had entered the war in February 1793 because of an interesting mix of 
strong ideological convictions and pragmatic responses to French expansion.2 Since 
Britain was a monarchical power, she was as much threatened by the propagation of 
revolutionary principles as by France’s assault on the Austrian Netherlands. Edmund 
Burke, in particular, denounced the French revolution’s ‘spirit of proselytism’ and 
warned his audience against the ‘dry rot’ of reform and internal revolt. The ‘truly 
patriotic, free, and independent spirit’ of the British people, he urged, had to employ 
itself ‘in guarding what they possess, from violation’.3 Such an anti-revolutionary 
attitude saturated early political responses to the war effort. Initial domestic policy 
                                                 
1 Times, 27 January 1794, 3(a). 
2 MacLeod, A War of Ideas, pp. 2, 8, 201-4; Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution, pp. 143-4; 
Schofield, ‘British Politicians and French Arms’, 183-4, 191-4, 197-9, 201. 
3 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 265. 
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was accordingly geared towards halting the growth in Britain of French democratic 
principles, referred to in political parlance as ‘Jacobinism’. Originally a term which 
came from the name of Robespierre’s supporters in France, it acquired social and 
moral overtones as the war progressed.4 This flexibility of meaning meant that 
opposition to Jacobinism acted as a rallying-cry for people of a variety of political 
persuasions. Punitive measures such as the suspension of Habeas Corpus, the 
redefinition of the treason laws, the prosecutions for sedition, and the treason trials of 
the early 1790s, were justified by the fear that Jacobinism might have taken root in 
the hearts of lower-order Britons.5 Domestic unrest in the 1790s and 1800s, 
particularly the naval mutinies of 1797, the scarcity riots in 1795 and 1800, and the 
Despard conspiracy in 1802, provided evidence for such a belief. 
As the conditions of the war changed, however, British policy came to 
prioritise pragmatism over principle. Emma Vincent McLeod’s argument that British 
political life continued to be neatly divided between radical reformers and loyalists 
until 1802 is simplistic.6 The Pitt government was reluctant to call unequivocally for 
the restoration of the French Bourbon monarchy, and showed itself willing to bury its 
differences with the Directory when peace seemed attainable in 1795, 1796 and 
1797.7 It was not averse to harnessing the ideological debate for its own purposes, 
either by capitalising on the appeal of the monarch or by discreetly supporting the 
growth of Loyalist associations on the model of the Association for the Preservation 
of Liberty and Property, but both these expedients demonstrated the difficulties of 
relying on highly politicised symbols. The monarch could just as easily be used as an 
anti-ministerial symbol, while the Loyalist movement — which R. Dozier estimates 
may have involved between a quarter and a third of adult males at its peak — was 
                                                 
4 De Montluzin, The Anti-Jacobin, pp. 10-1. 
5 As Clive Emsley notes, there were fewer than 200 prosecutions for sedition and treason during the 
1790s: Emsley, ‘An aspect of Pitt’s “Terror”’, 174. Many more men were arrested, of course, but only 
one in three cases ever came to trial because of the paucity of evidence: Dickinson, British Radicalism 
and the French Revolution, p. 39. 
6 McLeod, A War of Ideas, pp. vii, 2, 4, 5, 8, 201, 202-3, 204. The same goes for J.E. Cookson’s 
bipolar division between Dissenters and Liberals on the one side and ministers and churchmen on the 
other: Cookson, The Friends of Peace, pp. 2-7,  11, 258. 
7 Schofield, ‘The Ideological War of 1793-5’, 183-4, 201. 
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too difficult to control.8 Although admired by individual ministers, Burke’s call for a 
royalist crusade against France was never whole-heartedly adopted by the 
government. This was probably because it realised that a general appeal to 
constitutional liberty was likely to catch more Britons in its net than the emphasis on 
one particular ideological position. 
Ideology sank even further into the background as the war became 
increasingly perceived as a struggle for survival. Despite active participation in the 
First Coalition campaign, along with her allies Austria, Russia, Holland, and Prussia, 
Britain never managed to get much of a foothold on the continent. She suffered a 
string of defeats in Flanders, Holland and in Toulon, where a short-lived Royalist 
revolt had placed the town in British hands. There were some costly successes in the 
colonies, particularly the West Indies, India and Egypt, and the British Navy did 
manage to gain some credit from the Glorious First of June in 1794, the Battle of St 
Vincent in 1797, and the Battle of the Nile in 1798, but these did not contribute to 
success in the continental struggle. As Britain’s allies dropped away, moreover, and 
after Holland became the French-controlled Batavian Republic in 1795, the prospect 
of an invasion of Britain became more likely.9 The first real fright came in December 
1796, when a French squadron of seventeen vessels broke out of blockade at Brest 
and made for Ireland. Only extreme bad weather prevented a landing in Bantry 
Bay.10 A report that the French fleet was subsequently sighted off Beachy Head was 
dismissed as a signalling error, but on 27 February 1797 a small detachment of the 
enemy managed to land at Fishguard in Wales. This was followed almost 
immediately by a run on the banks and the suspension of cash payments. The months 
that followed were filled with alarm as the First Coalition fell apart on the continent, 
peace attempts failed, and potential invasion forces were sighted everywhere.11 
                                                 
8 Morris, The British Monarchy and the French Revolution, pp. 188-94; Dozier, For King, 
Constitution, and Country, pp. x-xi, 25, 61-3, 70, 113-5, 170, 180. 
9 Times, 19 February 1795, 2(b-c). 
10 Times, 3 January 1797, 2(b). 
11 Times, 22 February 1797, 2(b); 11 April 1797, 4(a); 15 August 1797, 2(d); 14 November 1797, 
2(b). 
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Bereft of allies and facing the Armée d’Angleterre of over 200,000 men on the 
opposite shore, Britain was seriously exposed.12 
In May 1798, Ireland — always a magnet for unrest — burst into rebellion, 
which led to an effort to attach her more permanently to Britain under the terms of 
the Act of Union in 1801. These events took place against a backdrop of rumours 
that the French were, once again, planning invasion. Even the short-lived continental 
campaign of the Second Coalition, and the Peace of Amiens in 1802, provided little 
respite. Henry Addington’s government knew that one of France’s first priorities in 
the event of a new war would be to renew her invasion preparations, which was 
indeed exactly what happened when war broke out again in May 1803. In July 1804 
a memorandum estimated that a hundred and forty-five thousand men might come 
from Flushing, Boulogne, Brest, and Le Havre.13 The following year invasion 
seemed even more likely when the French fleets at Toulon and Rochefort broke out 
of the British blockade and joined forces with the navy of Spain, now France’s ally, 
at Cadiz. This campaign ended with the battle of Trafalgar in October 1805 and the 
destruction of Napoleon’s Franco-Spanish fleet, without which he could not 
guarantee the safety of the hundred and fifty thousand men he counted to bring onto 
British soil. Former first lord of the admiralty Henry Dundas, Viscount Melville, 
found it ‘impossible to calculate the manifold Benefits to this Country which He 
[Nelson] accomplished by his Dying atchievement [sic]’.14 
Did Trafalgar end the threat of invasion once and for all? Many historians 
have supposed this to be so. A recent article argues that ‘Trafalgar destroyed the 
naval power that gave any remaining credence to Napoleon’s invasion threat’.15 
Without Trafalgar, asserts another article, ‘there would have been little to prevent a 
French invasion of England and a crushing French domination of Europe’.16 Lacking 
                                                 
12 Wheeler and Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion of England I, 90. 
13 ‘Memorandum as to Defence’, 15 July 1804, Kent RO, Camden MSS, U840/O211/2. 
14 Melville to Mr. Thomson, 12 November 1805, National Maritime Museum, Middleton MSS, 
MID/1/54/8. 
15 Lambert, ‘Nelson, Trafalgar and the Meaning of Victory’, 56. 
16 Lichfield, ‘Chirac Meets his Waterloo’, 14-5. Apart from the above, see also: ‘The British Isles 
were finally safe’, Schom, Trafalgar: Countdown to Battle, p. 360; ‘Never again would Napoleon dare 
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the benefit of hindsight, however, contemporary opinion was less sanguine, and 
many saw no reason to modify their caution. The French fleet might have been 
destroyed, but there was always a chance that Napoleon would build another, and the 
collapse of the Third Coalition as a result of French victories at Ulm and Austerlitz 
had left Britain profoundly vulnerable: ‘We stand as on a little spot of elevated 
ground, surrounded with inundations’.17 Indeed, France’s naval defeat had so far 
limited her options that some believed invasion was her only chance to conquer her 
old enemy. At least one commentator expected that France would make ‘some 
desperate experiment upon this country’ around June at the latest.18 Exhausted 
politicians now placed the stress on survival rather than victory. If anything, the 
years that followed Trafalgar were even worse than those that had preceded it. The 
escape of the Rochefort squadron in 1808 provoked yet another panic, which 
escalated when the Times reported eight ships of the line fitting out at Flushing.19 As 
late as 1810 a British soldier travelling past Boulogne reported that ‘the Masts of 
Vessels laying in the Basin … appear’d over the Land like a Wood, not to be 
number’d’.20  
So long as France remained under Napoleon’s expansionist influence, and so 
long as Britain had no strategic foothold on the continent, the threat of invasion 
continued to hang over the heads of the policy-makers. They could be forgiven for 
                                                                                                                                          
to challenge us at sea,’ Fry, The Dundas Despotism, p. 261; Trafalgar ‘ended all possibility of a 
French invasion,’ Turner, Pitt the Younger, p. 271; ‘Fears of French soldiers on English soil 
subsided’, Semmel, Napoleon and the British, p. 63; ‘Napoleon never seriously contemplated 
invading Britain after 1805,’ Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 4. See also Jeremy Black’s 
conclusion that the French could no longer break out of blockade, in Britain as a Military Power, p. 
219; and Franklin Walker’s assertion that Trafalgar brought Britain security and a stronger place at the 
peace table, ‘The Grenville-Fox Junction and the Problem of Peace’, 56. These opinions are, however, 
offset by a few recent works, including N.A.M. Roger’s The Command of the Ocean, p. 543, which 
concludes that although Trafalgar allowed Britain to survive the war with Napoleon it neither won the 
war nor saved Britain from invasion. 
17 The Dangers of the Country, Quoted in the Anti-Jacobin Review, XXVII, 4 (August 1807), 370; 
memorandum by the duke of York, 14 January 1806, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland 
(PRONI), Castlereagh MSS, D/3030/2344; Hall, British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, pp. 117, 121. 
18 Speech by General Tarleton, 17 March 1806, PD VI, 457. 
19 Times, 26 March 1808, 2(d). 
20 Robert Brownrigg to Alexander Hope, 3 September 1810, National Archives of Scotland, Hope of 
Luffness MSS, GD364/1/1205. 
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believing that the danger they faced was entirely unprecedented, even though the 
Seven Years’ War and the American War of Independence had brought to the fore 
defence issues strikingly similar to those which were explored in the 1790s and 
1800s.21 The scale of the new conflict was difficult to compare with past experience 
for a number of reasons. France was aggressive, resilient, and fast expanding into a 
trans-continental empire, with a system of government that many considered to be 
incompatible with that of Britain. This conviction suggested a need for exertions 
beyond anything to which the nation had yet been accustomed. Politicians therefore 
spent much of their time devising new and effective ways of maximising military 
resources and preventing  imminent attack. 
The main problem which faced the string of governments controlling 
offensive and defensive policies during the 1790s and 1800s was how to arrange 
resources in a way that would protect both the home base and vital interests abroad.22 
A landing in Essex or Kent was an obvious fear, Jersey and Guernsey were close 
enough to France to offer a foothold, territories in the West Indies, North America 
and India remained vulnerable, and Ireland was a politician’s nightmare, perpetually 
poised on the brink of insurrection. The issue was manpower. At the start of the war 
in 1793 Britain had just under 48,000 regular troops scattered around the globe. By 
1814 this number had swollen to almost 320,000, but even these large numbers could 
not be wasted on a whim.23 Britain’s participation in continental warfare usually, 
                                                 
21 For example see Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, pp. 101-2, 156-8, for early 
invasion scares in the 1740s; McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745, pp. 3, 232-5; McLynn, 
The Jacobite Army in England, pp. 1-7, and Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain, pp. 289-91, for 
the Jacobite invasion scares and their impact on British identity; Anderson, The Crucible of War, pp. 
301-10, 380, for manpower issues during the Seven Years’ War; Middleton, The Bells of Victory, pp. 
107-12, 125, which deals with the administrative problems in the same period; and also for the later 
period Conway, The British Isles and the American War of Independence, pp. 164-5, 347, 353-5. The 
latter identifies a number of themes during the American War of Independence, including the 
manpower shortage, volunteering, and the development of ‘Britishness’, which I have identified in the 
period 1794-1812, although Conway fails to see the development of strong central power as a move 
away from the locality-based polity of the eighteenth century. 
22 Britain’s overseas holdings were not yet viewed as an empire: that term was largely reserved for 
describing the British Isles themselves, particularly before the Anglo-Irish Union of 1801. See, for 
example, Lord Lansdowne’s speech in 1798, which included Britain and Ireland but excluded India. 
Speech by Lansdowne, 22 March 1798, PH XXXIII, 1334-5. 
23 For statistics, see Appendix I. 
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therefore, focused on areas which were easiest to reach and which did not leave vast 
tracts of territory undefended. Holland, Germany, the Mediterranean, and the 
Spanish Peninsula were the most obvious targets. The last three of these also 
benefited from offensive aid provided by the Navy, which had grown from a hundred 
and thirty vessels in total in 1793 to over a hundred and fifty ships of the line alone 
in 1810.24 Blockades of continental ports and confidence in the ‘wooden walls’ 
helped many Britons sleep more soundly, but the frequent escapes of blockaded 
French ships, the activities of privateers, the assaults on trade, and the possibility that 
a single devastating storm could clear the channel long enough to allow a French 
assault, kept anxiety on the boil. 
In addition to the regular forces Britain also had auxiliaries. The number and 
variety of these bodies grew as the war progressed, but the most important were the 
militia and the volunteers. The militia’s original raison-d’etre, upon being formed in 
1757, had been to articulate the right of propertied citizens to bear arms. In practice, 
it had diverged from its mission statement, and any propertied men who were 
balloted into the militia usually paid for a poorer substitute to serve in their place. 
The volunteers followed a similar path away from an emphasis on armed property. 
Called forth by a government circular in 1794, they were initially composed 
primarily of wealthy gentlemen from the towns who could clothe and arm 
themselves as a police force in times of unrest. They were not, however, simply 
vigilantes, and were often much more socially diverse than the government had 
envisaged. A second more broad-ranging call for volunteers was made in 1798, and a 
third in 1803 at the height of the Napoleonic invasion scare, by which time they were 
more explicitly military in character. Their policing duties were largely left to the 
Yeomanry, who retained much of the character of the volunteers as they had 
originally been intended in the 1790s.25 
                                                 
24 For statistics, see Appendix III. 
25 As is demonstrated by a private memorandum by Pitt, possibly written at the time of the passage of 
the Volunteer Consolidation Act in early 1804, in which he envisioned the volunteer force acting in 
conjunction with the regulars while the yeomanry were to remain in their home counties to keep 
 8 
This proliferation of auxiliary bodies certainly provided large numbers for 
defence, but unfortunately they also obstructed recruitment into the regulars. What 
this conflict revealed was a perpetual tug of war between the needs of a nation 
potentially fighting for its life and of a nation accustomed to viewing itself as 
profoundly anti-militaristic.26 Increasingly, the balance tipped towards a stronger 
regular force subject to greater governmental control. Appendix II shows a list of 
defence measures passed between the Volunteer Act of 1794 and the Local Militia 
Act in 1808. Two points emerge very clearly: firstly, the extension of national 
involvement, particularly in 1803 with the call for volunteers and the passage of the 
Levy en Masse Act; and secondly, a move to bind the auxiliaries more closely to the 
regulars, including the use of semi-regular drafts of militia volunteers from the end 
of the 1790s onwards. Appendix I, which provides a basic account of the variety and 
size of the forces available for defensive and offensive operations, confirms the 
impression that the need for numbers, and control of those numbers, had begun to 
overcome long-standing political prejudices against both large military bodies and 
strong central power. 
All of this required a great deal of reorganisation, both within the central 
executive, and between the executive and the localities, particularly in the way these 
interacted. There was undeniably a movement towards a tightening of the system, as 
the ministers sought to bring local activity in emergencies more closely under their 
control. British society was built on a complex system of ties that linked the 
monarch, the gentry and the lower orders in a bond of mutual trust and duty. What 
the politicians hoped to do was not to destroy such a framework, but simply to make 
the local authorities more like what the centre would prefer: that is, mediators 
between the executive and the people, rather than independent bodies acting of their 
own accord. Such large bodies of men needed to be available at any point of the 
country at a moment’s notice, and their movements and control required the 
                                                                                                                                          
‘public tranquillity’ in the towns. Memorandum by Pitt, undated, in the possession of Roy Davids, 
Oxford. I wish to thank Mr. Davids for kindly allowing me to see the memorandum in question. 
26 For this struggle see Chapter Three. 
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government to have access to a great deal of information about the nation. By the 
1800s this was largely the case. The system of taxation was growing more complex 
— the first introduction of an Income Tax occurred between 1797 and 1799, for 
example — and even established systems of collecting information, such as the 
militia lists, could be used to give the government a much better idea of the state of 
the country. Two defence censuses in 1798 and 1803, a national census in 1801, and 
various new returns from military bodies such as the Supplementary Militia, the 
Army of Reserve, and the Local Militia, all added to the store of knowledge.  
In respect of the impact of the war on the structure of the British state, 
however, there is a surprising gap in the historiography. Certainly there is no 
shortage of secondary material on which to draw. The individual ministries between 
1793 and 1815 — Pitt’s first government (until 1801), Addington (1801-4), Pitt’s 
second government (1804-6), the Ministry of All the Talents under Lord Grenville 
(1806-7), Portland (1807-9), Perceval (1809-12), and Liverpool (1812 onwards) — 
have all received much attention from historians, without even counting the number 
of comparative studies of ministerial policy during the war.27 However, apart from 
these blow-by-blow accounts, and John Brewer’s Sinews of Power, which stops in 
1783, there has been little attempt to tie various themes affected by the war together 
— particularly the military impact of a long struggle, and its effect on the structure of 
the state and national identity. The result is a curiously disjointed, often contradictory 
picture of turn-of-the-nineteenth-century British political life.  
This was, after all, the period in which Linda Colley argues for a growth of a 
united sense of ‘Britishness’, and in which patriotism (as opposed to the more radical 
‘nationalism’) became a much more universal, less obviously politicised concept.28 
                                                 
27 For Pitt’s ministries, see, particularly, Ehrman II and III. For Addington, see Fedorak, Henry 
Addington, and Hall, ‘Addington at War’. For the Talents, see Harvey’s rather unsatisfactory article, 
‘The Ministry of All the Talents’, and, more especially, Jupp, Lord Grenville. For Portland, see 
Wilkinson, The Duke of Portland. For Perceval, see Gray, Spencer Perceval. For Liverpool, see Gash, 
Lord Liverpool. For comparative studies, see Hall, British Strategy in the Napoleonic War; Harvey, 
Collision of Empires; Glover, Britain at Bay and Peninsular Preparation; Muir, Britain and the Defeat 
of Napoleon; and the rather elderly Fortescue, The County Lieutenancies and the Army. 
28 Colley, Britons, pp. 4-6; Colley, ‘Britishness and Otherness’, 316-7, 326-7; Colley, ‘Whose 
Nation?’, 104-5, 115; Colley, ‘The Reach of the State, the Appeal of the Nation’, 181; Cottrell, ‘The 
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Larger portions of British society, particularly among the emerging middle classes, 
were becoming able to stake a claim on active citizenship.29 Vast amounts of 
manpower, and new kinds of armed forces, were called upon to fight the French 
threat at home and abroad.30 It was the period of the Act of Union with Ireland, 
which created the United Kingdom, rearranged political structures on both sides of St 
George’s Channel and prompted a new sense of British self-identification.31 Long-
term developments in the way the government operated had been progressing for 
some time, and acquired a significant boost from 1780 onwards. These included the 
consolidation of what Brewer has termed the ‘fiscal-military state’, or the central 
government’s acquisition of ‘growing powers’ as the result of a series of wars 
throughout the eighteenth century; a developing civil service which streamlined the 
government’s ability to make war; a much more up-to-date definition of the term 
‘state’ in which a stronger central executive played a role; and, last but not least, the 
growth of a second British empire around the globe, which would not have been 
possible without such developments at home.32  
And yet our understanding of the political context in which all this occurred 
has remained strangely static. Although the British state did face a number of 
challenges throughout the eighteenth century, such as the coming-of-age of lower-
class political societies, riots, famine, naval mutinies, and the growing demands for 
                                                                                                                                          
Devil on Two Sticks’, 260-1, 269-70; Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism, pp. 52-9, 163-7; 
Cunningham, ‘The Language of Patriotism’, 8-9, 12, 14-15; Dinwiddy, ‘England’, 54-5, 57, 64, 69. 
29 Wahrman, Imagining the Middle Class, pp. 35-6, 55-6, 138, 144. 
30 For work on the volunteers, militia and other auxiliary forces, see Cookson, The British Armed 
Nation; Gee, The British Volunteer Movement; Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition; and 
Western, The English Militia. 
31 For the Union, see Kelly, ‘The Origins of the Act of Union’, 263; Geoghegan, The Irish Act of 
Union, pp. 2-7; Jupp, ‘Britain and the Union’, pp. 203-4, 208. For the structure of Irish government 
see Johnston, Great Britain and Ireland, 1760-1800, pp. 3-7; Brynn, Crown and Castle, pp. 8-9, 158; 
Blackstock, ‘The Union and the Military’, 333-5, 338-41, 344-5; McDowell, Public Opinion and 
Government Policy in Ireland, pp. 79-80; and Macdonagh, Ireland: The Union and its Aftermath, p. 
33. 
32 For the ‘fiscal-military state’ see Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp. xi, xv, xvii-xviii, xx, 250-1, and 
Simms, ‘Reform in Britain and Prussia’, 86-7, 99; for the civil service, see Aylmer, ‘From Office-
Holding to Civil Service’, 91-7, 103-6, and Torrance, ‘Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation’, 60-
8, 70-2, 79-80. For the development of the ‘state’, see Steffen, Defining a British State, pp. 2-3, 7-8, 
97 158-9, 162. For the second British empire, see Bayly, Imperial Meridian, pp. 2-11, 14, 250-1, 256. 
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reform and retrenchment, Ian Christie’s ‘story of a nation’s survival at peace with 
itself in an age of wars and revolutions’ pervades the literature.33 J.C.D. Clark has 
even described the state as an ‘ancien regime’, confessional in its reliance on the 
Anglican establishment and rigidly hierarchical in structure.34 Such a contrast 
between the rapid politicisation of the populace and the essential conservatism of a 
‘federal’ state is, in some ways, only to be expected, since political reform was 
delayed till 1832, and extension of civil and civic rights to non-Anglicans until 1828-
9. To this extent, the mechanisms of the eighteenth-century state remained in place 
long after the end of the war.35 J.E. Cookson depicts a highly decentralised 
framework for national defence in which disagreements and misunderstandings 
between the politicians and the local gentry were often ironed out through an 
efficient, decentralised system of compromise and conciliation.36 Similarly, Colley’s 
growth of a united ‘British’ identity occurred despite, rather than because of, 
governmental interest in creating one.37 The governments that decided British 
defence policy, and that implemented the ‘British Armed Nation’, are depicted as 
decentralised, deeply dependent on local initiative, and operating with a blind lack of 
information about the nation they were supposed to defend.38 Such a picture fits 
uneasily with Brewer’s fiscal-military state or Bayly’s burgeoning British empire. 
Can it be possible that the British state changed not at all between 1793 and 1815, in 
spite of a threat described as ‘an emergency of great public danger’?39  
This thesis aims to correct that impression. It has much in common with the 
positions advocated by Brewer and Bayly, since it suggests that the circumstances of 
                                                 
33 Christie, Wars and Revolutions, p. 2. 
34 Clark, English Society, pp. 20, 25-6, 34. Henry Parris’s depiction of the state as traditional, rather 
than bureaucratic, until as late as the 1830s, fits in with this conclusion: Parris, Constitutional 
Bureaucracy, pp. 16-18, 23-7 33-9, 40-5, 164, 281-3. 
35 ‘Federal’ is the word used by Paul Langford and J.E. Cookson: Langford, A Polite and Commercial 
People, pp.688, 692-3, 697-8; Cookson, The British Armed Nation, pp. 4-7, 15, 215, 236, 261-3. 
36 Cookson, The British Armed Nation, pp. 5-7, 236. 
37 Kathleen Wilson sees the growth of political identity during the Seven Years’ War as a process in 
which the central government played little part. Wilson, The Sense of the People, pp. 11. 18-9, 440; 
Colley, Britons, pp. 93-4, 317-8. 
38 Black, The Politics of Great Britain, pp. 22-4, 120. 
39 By Grenville, in Times, 24 December 1800, pp. 2(d)-3(a). 
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a defensive war against revolutionary and Napoleonic France acted as a catalyst for 
change, both in terms of structure and self-identification. This process was facilitated 
by a growing conviction held by many British politicians that the danger they faced 
was unprecedented. It reflected a deep-seated uneasiness in the official mind about 
the way the conflict seemed to strike at valued political assumptions. Roger Wells’ 
argument that Britain was poised on the brink of insurrection at the end of the 1790s 
is extreme, but it does draw attention to the fact that the survival of the political 
status quo was by no means thought to be a certainty.40 During the course of the war 
it became apparent that the social connections underlying almost all politicians’ 
assumptions about the way the nation worked were unravelling, and many of the 
changes made to the way in which the state functioned were designed to address and 
correct their concern. 
Whereas Colley has seen the wars against France as encouraging in Britons a 
sense of self-satisfaction against a comfortably different ‘other’, a more significant 
truth is that it led to a profound questioning of what it was that made the nation 
great.41 In particular, the fight against a nation that proclaimed itself to be at the 
fountainhead of liberty forced the British to examine just what that concept — one 
that they were accustomed to thinking of as peculiarly their own — meant. As Stuart 
Semmel points out, Napoleon ‘blurred British conceptions of national identity’ and 
demonstrated by his effect on the French that national character was not by any 
means immutable.42 Yet the French example showed how dangerous it was for a 
country to change its character fundamentally. Rather, politicians sought a different 
                                                 
40 Wells, Insurrection, p. 262. See also Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, pp. 3-5, 10-11, 203-5, 
210-11, 221-2, and Western, ‘The Volunteer Movement as an anti-Revolutionary Force’, 603, for 
similar identifications of upper-class unease about the healthiness of relations within the political 
hierarchy. 
41 Colley, Britons, p. 6; Colley, ‘Britishness and Otherness’, 316; Cottrell, ‘The Devil on Two Sticks’, 
269. For other critiques of Colley’s definition of ‘Britishness’ and ‘otherness’, particularly with 
reference to Scotland and Ireland, see Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, pp. 54-5, 132-5, 173-5; 
Brockliss and Eastwood,  A Union of Multiple Identities, pp. 3, 19-6, 207; and Claydon and McBride, 
Protestantism and National Identity, pp. 7, 29. For a defence of Colley’s identification of 
‘Protestantism’ as the basis for such a concept of ‘otherness’ see Gibson, Church, State and Society, 
pp. 50-1; Gibson, The Church of England, pp. 1-3, 104, 182, 217-8, 244. 
42 Semmel, Napoleon and the British, pp. 16-7. E. Tangye Lean also draws attention to the 
attractiveness of Napoleon to a number of high-profile Britons in The Napoleonists, p. xii. 
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way of expressing traditional ideas of what it meant to be a Briton, with one eye on 
the need to strengthen the nation’s sense of hierarchy, and the other on the need to 
tighten central control over the mechanisms of national defence. The result was a 
surprising amount of flexibility. The fluidity identified by Semmel as a matter of 
dismay was in fact more often seen as a matter of defiance.43 The ‘nation of 
shopkeepers’ could become a ‘nation of soldiers’, as a newspaper article emphasised 
in 1803:  
We have been ridiculed by France, as une Nation boutiquière, a 
nation of shopkeepers; and Europe has in some measure assented to 
the sneer: too long, indeed, have we been looked upon by Europe as a 
people disposed to commercial pursuits, and [by] their concomitant 
affluence to slothful, luxurious, and unwarlike habits.44  
 
The French threat struck directly at the way government was viewed by itself and by 
others. This had consequent implications for national identity, and for the way in 
which citizenship and its duties offered opportunities to participate. The need to 
defend the nation, and the means by which this could be achieved, formed a prism 
through which existing ideas of British constitutional and political identities were 
constantly being refracted and reassessed. 
The thesis begins with an examination of the structure of the late eighteenth-
century British state (Chapter One). The latter was ancien regime only in the sense 
that it could be viewed as a hierarchical channel from the king down to his subjects 
via the aristocracy. Such a system of social connection, however, was not 
symptomatic of an absence of central control: as the governments recognised, it 
could also work effectively as a centralising agent. The main problem facing the 
executive was not how to harness such a mechanism, but the need to adapt to 
wartime conditions by creating new offices and moving responsibilities from one 
branch of the administration to another. There were serious clashes of interest as 
                                                 
43 As is recognised by Laurence Brockliss and David Eastwood in their Introduction to A Union of 
Multiple Identities, p. 196. 
44 Newspaper cutting, 31 December 1803, probably written by Hiley Addington, in the Sidmouth 
MSS, Devon RO, 152M/C1803/OZ/199. 
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departments found their responsibilities overlapping, and this naturally affected the 
degree to which an effective defence policy could be created. There were also 
constitutional prejudices to overcome if national defence was to be brought more 
closely under government control (Chapter Two). Moreover, as time went by, 
attempts to accomplish the necessary changes became less and less successful owing 
to the increased political weakness of governments, which affected their ability to 
command support in and out of parliament.  
The same measures that led to increased government control over defence 
also contributed to new definitions of citizenship, new attitudes towards commercial 
enterprise, and differing perceptions of the Army and Navy (Chapter Three). The 
need for more manpower led to the Army becoming more popular, as politicians 
sought to make military life more palatable to the ordinary man. The result of this 
policy was an emphasis on the cultivation of the nation’s ‘military spirit’. At the 
same time as this change in national identity was being undertaken, successive 
governments also sought a way to relieve the pressures imposed upon them by their 
own weakness and exacerbated by the unfavourable course of the war (Chapter 
Four). They were aware of the need to boost morale by calling on widespread 
involvement in defence, by putting a positive spin on financial problems, and by 
heightening the bonds of trust that underpinned traditional relations between 
governors and governed. Such efforts were, however, ultimately unsuccessful, as 
each government discovered in turn that a defensive war provided few opportunities 
to distract people from national woes. The example of Ireland, moreover, 
demonstrated the difficulties attending plans to simplify the defence of the British 
Isles as a whole (Chapter Five). The restrictions on the executive’s drive for 
centralisation were starkly exposed in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish Union of 
1801. The limitations of national participation and the redefinition of Britain’s 
identity were demonstrated by the failure of the attempt to incorporate Ireland, with 
all her special problems — her Catholicism, her poverty, her domestic unrest — into 
an explicitly British model. Crucially, her full integration was hampered by her lack 
of a common social structure with Britain. However much the politicians wanted to 
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do so, they could not create a United Kingdom-wide defence policy without this 
point being addressed. 
In the end, of course, neither revolutionary France nor Napoleon undertook a 
successful invasion of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless the threat hung constantly 
over the heads of its potential victims, and accelerated a slow but significant change 
in the way the state was structured and viewed. Although these developments did not 
last long beyond the end of the war, it is interesting to see that many ideas associated 
with the late nineteenth century — military patriotism, greater government 
involvement, pride in military victories, and so on — actually had their roots in the 
response to the threat of Napoleonic invasion. This thesis therefore reveals a very 
different facet of late-eighteenth-century British political debate from usual 
depictions. It argues that the structure of the state did not remain static between 1793 
and 1815, and that the defence threat had a profound impact, both on the way 
politicians viewed and represented Britain, and on the way in which the authorities 
wielded power. The war was not one between a mutating, revolutionary state and an 
unchanging ancien regime; nor was it simply a case of Britain reacting to an external 
and comfortably alien ‘other’. Far from a series of compromises with the powerful 
local authorities, the government showed how much it was willing to shape its 
behaviour in accordance with the extent of the emergency, even at the expense of 
long-held political beliefs. What follows is an examination of why the decision to 
centralise was made, what was done, and why it failed.  
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Chapter One 
The Structure of the State 
 
Historians have commented on the late eighteenth-century political system’s 
resistance to change in the face of overwhelming pressure. This is partly because the 
campaign for parliamentary reform and the growth of radicalism had very little effect 
on the status quo. Similarly, and more pertinently for this thesis, the military 
requirements of the twenty-two year war with France seem on the surface to have left 
the system unscathed. According to Ian Beckett, official ideas about manpower and 
defence stagnated due to ‘a generally unspectacular war effort’.1 Jeremy Black 
asserts that ‘the experience of the Revolutionary-Napoleonic crisis did not alter 
fundamentally the British state’.2 A.D. Harvey adds further that ‘compared to 1914-
18 and 1939-45 one may be astonished at how little Britain’s institutions reorganised 
themselves to meet the challenge of war in the years 1793 to 1815’.3 Even Linda 
Colley, who argues that Britain’s frequent wars with France and other countries 
between 1700 and 1815 impacted strongly on British political and social identity, 
agrees that the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars provoked no further 
political development. ‘There was no overwhelming need’ for such change: the state 
was already as strong as it needed to be in terms of manpower, taxation, policing, 
and colonial expansion.4 
Other historians concur in this general view, and emphasise the turn-of-the-
century state as static and locally-based. According to Paul Langford and others, it 
consisted of a variety of ‘federal’ interests competing with the central executive, 
which only infrequently interfered with the business of the county and parish.5 The 
                                                 
1 Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, p. 87. 
2 Black, The Politics of Great Britain, p. 120. 
3 Harvey, Collision of Empires, p. 187. 
4 Colley, ‘Whose Nation?’, 106; Colley, Britons, p. 1; Colley, ‘Britishness and Otherness’, 316. 
5 Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, pp. 692-3. 
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flexibility of this arrangement has been used to explain how the British political 
system weathered the storms of war and revolution with only minimal internal 
adaptation. Real structural legislation had to wait until the postwar resurgence of 
radicalism and party politics. If true, such a configuration had obvious connotations 
for the politics of defence. Likewise for J.E. Cookson, the squabbles between centre 
and periphery, particularly over the volunteers, demonstrated the influence of ‘the 
imperfect federation of local communities’ over its central counterpart. National 
defence ‘was inevitably localised because that was the world it encountered’.6 Austin 
Gee’s more recent work on the volunteer movement pushes Cookson’s argument 
even further. According to Gee, local networks kept Britain stable throughout the 
defence crisis: ‘the British state faced the threat of revolutionary ideology and mass 
armies not by itself reforming but by adapting existing institutions and employing 
existing local power structures’.7 Flexibility and superficial adaptation, rather than 
fundamental reform, allowed the ‘federal’ eighteenth-century regime, described by 
Langford, Cookson and Gee, to survive. 
That regime’s resilience in the face of the twin threats of revolution and 
invasion is undeniable. C.D. Hall remarks that ‘the period contrived to retain hidden 
depths of stability’.8 Stable, however, is not the same as static, and my research has 
more sympathy with Brendan Simms’ conclusion that the search for ‘fundamental’ 
change in British eighteenth-century politics has obscured less obvious but 
nonetheless significant developments in thought and practice. Simms argues that 
‘domestic change’ was ‘a direct result of external pressures’, and that these changes 
arose not only from the debates on reform but also from developments within ‘the 
decision-making apparatus’.9 This in turn echoes John Brewer’s argument that the 
threat and reality of war led to the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of the 
                                                 
6 Cookson, The British Armed Nation, pp. 236, 261; Cookson, ‘War’, 34. 
7 Gee, The British Volunteer Movement, p. 6. 
8 Hall, British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, p. 64. 
9 Simms, ‘Reform in Britain and Prussia’, 81, 86-7. 
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eighteenth-century fiscal-military state.10 Indeed, politicians frequently sought to 
safeguard the state’s stability with measures that often involved profound change, the 
most obvious example of this being the Anglo-Irish Union of 1801. The government 
was perfectly happy to manipulate the political structure of Britain for its own ends 
— a fact strongly exemplified by the issue of national defence. A new emphasis on 
the hierarchical ties that bound the nation together allowed the government to create 
a model for centralisation that adhered to, rather than departed from, established 
political traditions. 
Three terms that will be used frequently throughout this thesis require 
definition. These are ‘state’, ‘constitution’ and ‘central government’, each important 
and flexible terms that underwent constant reinterpretation by contemporaries. J.C.D. 
Clark, in keeping with his idea of an ancien regime headed by the monarchy, 
aristocracy, and church, argues that the term ‘state’ was the confessional equivalent 
of the more secular ‘kingdom’ or ‘realm’.11 Paul Langford, however, sees the ‘state’ 
as secular, represented primarily by parliament rather than the church.12 In the 
following chapters I shall follow Langford’s example rather than Clark’s by 
identifying the state as the embodiment of the political relations between the king, 
parliament, and nation. 
The eighteenth-century constitution has proved more problematic to define. 
Its flexibility was such that, according to Herbert Atherton, it became ‘a totem … 
invoked with little thought as to its meaning or content’, loosely suspended over 
concepts of monarchy and the rule of law.13 It was certainly a highly versatile 
political device, and one that could be harnessed in a variety of different ways. 
Whigs and tories emphasised different aspects of it in their ideology, although both 
relied to an extent on similar ideas of liberty and property, the rule of law, and the 
                                                 
10 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp. xi, 27, 64, 92, 250; Aylmer, ‘From Office-Holding to Civil 
Service’, 91-4. 
11 Clark, English Society, p. 4. 
12 Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, pp. 702-3. 
13 Atherton, ‘The British Defend their Constitution’, 4-5, 27.  
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predominance of an aristocratic system.14 The constitution also had religious 
significance. Talk of a ‘Protestant’ constitution echoed opposition to the full 
inclusion of Catholics into British political life, and a more Anglican emphasis 
further included Protestant Dissent in that tally.15 Radicals and reformers were also 
wont to refer to the ‘ancient’ constitution, in language that expressed their conviction 
that the Norman Conquest had ended a number of Saxon political liberties by 
introducing the reign of a corrupt aristocracy.16 
Such vagueness had become deliberate by the 1790s, when the government 
found a broad ideological position necessary to capture the middle political ground.17 
This meant an appeal to Edmund Burke’s idea of the constitution, in which whig 
principles of mixed monarchy were mingled with tory emphases on prescription and 
the centrality of an Establishment Church.18 However, the constitution’s versatility 
meant that the Foxite Whigs and the radicals could also claim to defend it against the 
ministry’s rapacity, incompetence and corruption. Finally, ‘central government’ has 
proved so problematic a term to define that Jeremy Black has abandoned it in an 
eighteenth-century context ‘because of its modern connotations’.19 Yet there was an 
administration appointed by the king with ultimate control over the social, 
diplomatic, and military departments of the war effort. These were kept informed 
about national developments through a system of local networks, which were 
improved and extended during the war years to ensure a constant stream of 
information. The highest point of that network is what I will refer to as the ‘central 
government’: the cabinet, and its connections with parliament and the monarch. 
                                                 
14 Dickinson, Liberty and Property, pp. 158, 308-9. 
15 Clark, English Society, p. 503; Cunningham, ‘The Language of Patriotism’, 67. 
16 Spence, The Birth of Romantic Radicalism, p. 26. 
17 Characterisation of Pitt as a ‘High Tory’ (by, for example, J.E. Cookson) is a simplification of the 
broad ideological position adopted by Pitt’s government, which allowed a variety of political beliefs 
to shelter beneath the aegis of governmental approval. Cookson’s definition of ‘High Toryism’, that 
order in society depended on controls operated through the state, church and aristocracy, could include 
most aspects of the ideology of the whig settlement of 1689, and was in any case adhered to 
dogmatically by only a few members of Pitt’s government. Cookson, The Friends of Peace, pp. 259-
60. 
18 Morris, The British Monarchy and the French Revolution, pp. 54-5; Dickinson, Liberty and 
Property, p. 301. 
19 Black, The Politics of Great Britain, p. 23. 
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This chapter will discuss the way in which the war with France acted as a 
catalyst for a rearrangement of the political structure that had been established in 
Britain during the eighteenth century. The circumstances of a long defensive war 
increased the central government’s need to gather information, impose its authority 
and implement policy, although local county meetings and petition campaigns 
remained the only real ways for parliamentarians to connect with non-voters.20 The 
result was not political change: the development of central authority was meant to 
protect rather than alter the state, and was not intended to have a massive practical 
impact. In practice, however, the issues raised by the requirements of defence 
touched on political relationships and questions of national identity. The importance 
of the executive’s need to be aware of, and to control, military and defence resources 
galvanised a process of centralisation that was not restricted to Britain and Ireland 
but, as C.A. Bayly has argued, also impacted on the government of the burgeoning 
British empire.21  
Central government and local networks  
The parish and the county reflected the importance of social networks in 
British politics, but the continuing importance of the localities did not necessarily 
mean that the central government was marginalized. Nor did it indicate that Britain 
remained an ancien regime, to use Clark’s term.22 If harnessed effectively, these 
factors could only limit, not prohibit, centralisation of the defence effort. The 
stability derived from a property-based social hierarchy linking ordinary men to the 
monarch via the church, gentry, and aristocracy engendered a confidence that 
explained the willingness to indulge in potentially dangerous experiments, such as 
the implementation of the British ‘armed nation’. In this somewhat paternalistic view 
of society, each level of the hierarchy had a reciprocal duty to the other: the labourers 
owed their superiors respect, obedience, and military service, while the aristocracy 
                                                 
20 Asquith, ‘The Whigs and the Press in the Early Nineteenth Century’, 264. 
21 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, pp. 116-21. 
22 Clark, English Society, p. 20. 
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owed their inferiors protection and good governance. ‘The connection which subsists 
between the various ranks and classes of men … and the division of property … 
render us less likely to be disturbed by internal commotions than other nations,’ 
declared William Morton Pitt, a prominent Dorset gentleman and defence theorist, in 
1797.23  
Local political networks formed the basis of the whig constitution, which 
stressed the connections that bound governors and governed and defined the 
aristocracy as the natural leaders of society.24 At the bottom of the scale was the 
parish, the most basic political unit. There were about 10,000 in Britain, and they 
were the nearest most people would experience to political representation.25 
Supported by a network of churchwardens, constables, and surveyors, the parish 
oversaw local welfare, maintenance, and police, which included a large proportion of 
the activity against radicalism in the 1790s. Above the parish was the county. The 
lord lieutenant, usually a prominent aristocrat appointed by the Crown, enjoyed the 
support of a deputy lieutenant and various other officials from the magistrate to the 
local sheriff. Property requirements concentrated the higher positions, such as 
Justices of the Peace, in the hands of the landowners. The county’s responsibilities 
included poverty relief and county policing, and a country-wide network of 
magistrates dealt with law and order issues. These were only too happily delegated 
by the central government, although the increased threat from republican principles 
suggested a greater need for control over the activities of suspected Jacobins. A 
Police Bill, which had been passed to this end in 1792, established a system of 
magistrates in the London area paid by and responsible to the government.26 In 
addition to this, the Alien Act of 1793 created an Alien Office within the department 
of the home secretary. During the course of the war it was not only closely involved 
                                                 
23 Morton Pitt, Thoughts on the Defence of these Kingdoms, pp. 60-2. 
24 A significant part of the Foxite justification for parliamentary reform was the need to restore the 
confidence of the people in the hierarchical system. Smith, Lord Grey, p. 11; Willis, ‘“An Handful of 
Violent People”’, 249; Black, The Politics of Great Britain, pp. 22-3. 
25 Frank O’Gorman estimates that fewer than one in ten included more than 1000 people: O’Gorman, 
The Long Eighteenth Century, p. 137. 
26 Sparrow, Secret Service, pp. 7, 19. 
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in the tracking of republicans and foreigners, but also developed a network of spies at 
home and abroad.27 Despite these developments, the lack of an official nationwide 
police force ensured the importance of local initiatives in the imposition of law and 
order. 
The important point was that these local political networks bound the 
landowners and the poor together within a common system, a fact that was strongly 
reflected in the traditional arrangements for national defence. The militia in 
particular, at least in the form established in 1757, carried the civilian connection 
between landowner and labourer over into the military context. Militiamen were 
drawn from the lower orders and officered by their local superiors.28 However, 
though rooted in the locality, the militia was not proof against central interference, 
which many believed was required to correct its defects. Originally an institution in 
which the rich had served while the poor were excluded, by the end of the century 
the militia had become a body in which the poor were conscripted, while the rich 
bought themselves out of direct service by purchasing a substitute. This reluctance of 
landed men to serve, which led to a relaxation of the property qualifications for 
office, suggested a deep-rooted problem within the social hierarchy.29 The bond 
between the rich and poor, supposedly reinforced by the militia, was in fact damaged 
by the ballot, since the substitute system meant the wealthy were not subject to it in 
practice. This taught the poor to think that the militia existed only ‘for the protection 
of property against an invasion’, and that it imposed ‘the burthen of defending 
property most heavily on those who have the least’.30 Seeking militiamen among the 
lower orders, however, did have one very important effect: it accustomed politicians 
to the idea of men without property or social standing bearing arms.  
                                                 
27 For more information on the Alien Office, see below, p. 67. 
Eastwood, Government and Community, pp. 47, 94-5, 99, 103, 107; Nelson, The Home Office, pp. 
95-6, 100-1, 107-8, 113; Sparrow, Secret Service, pp. 19-20; Ehrman III, 119. 
28A property qualification for office, which ran from a requirement of £50 for an ensign to £800 for a 
colonelcy, ensured that the correct hierarchical structure would be maintained. Beckett, The Amateur 
Military Tradition, p. 67. 
29 Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, p. 67; Western, The English Militia, p. 205. 
30 Sir John Mitford to Pitt, 26 October 1796, Kent RO, Stanhope MSS, U1590/S5/O3/5. 
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Although the role of the militia in political life was changing, it continued to 
be viewed by the local aristocracy in its original form, paid for and maintained by the 
gentry as a counterbalance to a standing army. Lord Carnarvon spoke for most 
militia colonels when he defined the militia as  
the Garrison of England paid by the Land occupier for his own 
domestick Security from local Invasion & rebellion & of course 
limited in its number & not transferable into service, commanded by 
officers of local qualification & stimulated by local Zeal & Interests 
not by Professional views.31  
 
The government, on the other hand, increasingly took advantage of the militia’s 
departure from its original principles by relying on it to provide trained manpower 
for the Army. In this way, despite rooted opposition from the localities, the militia 
began to acquire the status of a recruiting-ground for regulars. The government’s 
initial attempts to allow the militia to volunteer directly into the line in 1795 and 
1798 failed, but persistence eventually won out. In 1799 over 10,000 militiamen 
were drafted to Holland as part of the Second Coalition campaign.32 Thereafter, 
remaining resistance was slowly overcome. Between 1807 and 1812 74,000 men 
transferred into the regulars.33 This militarisation of the militia led to a further 
loosening of local connections. In March 1803, a clause in the Militia Officers Bill 
that allowed half-pay Army officers to take militia office without fulfilling the 
property qualification caused great acrimony in parliament.34 Similar protests were 
made against Windham’s 1806 proposal to replace the militia ballot with a 
recruitment bounty in the style of the line. Canning argued that such a measure 
would alienate the poor and undermine the local base of the militia still further: its 
‘main characteristics’ and ‘its connection with the property of the country, its local 
distinction will be entirely lost’.35 
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The government may have been eager to take advantage of the shortcomings 
of the militia’s local basis, but this did not mean that it considered the social 
networks to be unimportant. In a war against revolutionary principles government 
officials were just as worried about the loosening of paternalist connections as were 
local notables. This was part of the reason why the volunteers were so popular with 
politicians.36 The thought that the volunteer structure mirrored that of society was 
comforting to Grenville, who felt that social connections gave Britain its strength, 
and that training to arms would help maintain them by placing the lower classes 
under the natural command of their social superiors:  
There seems no subject in which division, arrangement, & a regular 
chain of subordination are so necessary, both to prevent evil, & to 
promote good, as that of training arms, in such a state of civil society 
as ours, the great body of a People: and I know not how these 
principles can be better pursued than by the gradation … from the 
Crown to its Lords Lieutenants, & from them to the principal Nobility 
& Gentry of the Counties, & so downwards to the leading inhabitants 
of the Parishes.37 
 
In practice, of course, volunteers were frequently officered by men of the artisanal 
classes, a fact that worried those who ‘wish[ed] to see the use of arms confined to 
those hands, which are under authority & discipline, & … [have] some property to 
defend’.38 Supporters of the volunteers sought to reassure the doubters by arguing 
that these ‘democratic’ units were aberrations. Everyone had a stake in the social 
order, as an article in the Anti-Jacobin Review explained: 
The rich and the poor, … the high and the low, the governor and the 
governed, the monarch and his subjects, the prince, the peer, and the 
peasant, have but one common interest, and must be found, if it be 
necessary to defend that interest with our blood, fighting in the same 
ranks, some in one station and some in another, as brethren and 
friends.39 
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Cookson’s argument, that the volunteers broke down the barriers between classes 
because of their predominantly urban and artisanal makeup, would have surprised 
politicians who saw them as the best way to bring the upper and lower orders into 
contact.40 As far as they were concerned, the volunteers had quite the opposite effect. 
Military prowess and social hierarchy would be achieved in one stroke. 
The government was so convinced of the value of cultivating the connections 
within society’s ranks that it tried to extend the same structure to the military. Most 
of the parliamentary Acts that focused on manpower after 1803 were inspired by the 
way in which the militia mirrored the hierarchy of the county. As a result, the 
manpower Acts emphasised the importance of maintaining the connection between 
those local bodies and the regular army regiments which, in turn, were attached to a 
particular area of the country. The Army of Reserve was made up of locally-
officered regiments on the militia model, and the Additional Force Act made use of 
‘Civil Agents’ with ‘Personal Property’ and ‘Local Influence’ to recruit men who 
were subsequently placed in new county-based battalions.41 Windham’s Training Act 
aimed to extend this reliance on local influence to boost recruiting by establishing ‘a 
connection … between the Army and the mass of the people’.42 The Local Militia 
Act went one step further still: an official Horseguards memorandum recommended 
that each unit adopt the local regular regiment ‘as part of itself’, in order to foster ‘a 
real and useful Connexion between the different Branches of the Military Force of 
the Country’.43 The local networks, which had originally given the militia its 
independence from central government, were now expected to answer the 
executive’s immediate need for increased manpower. 
None of this, of course, should be exaggerated. During the period of the 
French wars, governments wanted no more (in Pitt’s words) than ‘to connect the 
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different departments of executive authority, that upon orders issued from 
government to the lord lieutenants of counties, the people might be immediately set 
in motion’.44 They were well aware of the limits imposed on them by constitutional 
doctrine, as vaguely defined as that constitution was. Circumstantial factors also had 
an impact on available options. A very good reason was required to justify strong 
measures, particularly when the government was unpopular. ‘You must produce 
evidence of actual danger, or you will not prevail on country gentlemen to stir a step 
to assist you,’ Pitt was warned in 1796.45 The government was also reluctant to draw 
too much power to itself. Centralisation was all very well for mobilising the defence 
effort, but ministers were often quite happy to leave certain matters in the hands of 
the local authorities. Beset by internal divisions, and anxious to uphold the principles 
of free trade by interfering as little as possible with national markets, the Pitt 
government limited its response to the scarcity in 1800 to importing grain, regulating 
the amount of flour to be used in baking (the Brown Bread Act), and suggesting 
potatoes as an alternative to bread. At the same time the home secretary, the duke of 
Portland, emphasised the importance of local initiatives such as soup kitchens and 
relief subscriptions. Home Office correspondents got nothing more than a regretful 
but categorical assertion that everything that could be done, had been done:  
Every means that were thought practicable for obviating this Crisis by 
lessening the consumption and encouraging the importation have been 
resorted to under the sanction of the Legislature; and I am sorry to be 
under the necessity of adding that all resources therefore in the power 
of Government are wholly exhausted.46 
 
In times of scarcity, the government was more inclined to protest its impotence than 
grasp at power. 
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And yet some form of centralisation was necessary if only to control the 
number and variety of auxiliary corps spawned by invasion. The lack of central 
authority over matters pertaining to defence could be frankly embarrassing. In 1795 
Pitt’s government had been forced to dodge specific questions about volunteer 
logistics because the War Office only kept records for the small number of units that 
were not kept up by private subscription.47 Windham complained some years later 
that a decentralised defence effort delayed the response to an invasion because of its 
staff, which was often inexperienced and too concerned with local issues:  
To throw as much as possible upon individuals without the intervention 
of Parliament, they had set up their grand system of lord lieutenants, 
deputy lieutenants, lieutenants of divisions, inspectors of divisions, 
superintendents of parishes, etc etc, persons very proper to be 
appointed, and to be held in readiness, but very improper for much of 
the work on which they were employed, namely, that of getting the 
country into a state of military defence … at what rate must that 
business proceed, which had for its office a county?48 
 
  The many practical obstacles to centralisation sometimes had to be overcome 
in an emergency, and there were plenty of those between 1794 and 1812. A.D. 
Harvey’s statement that Britain ‘fought the war according to the principles of the 
market economy, without unified control, with all the relevant factors, all the 
participating sectors, left to find their own mutual relations’, underestimates the 
degree of centralisation that took place.49 As the scarcities of 1795 and 1800 showed, 
the government’s position on free trade was not dogmatically committed to laissez-
faire, and the same was true of its attitude to greater involvement at times of national 
crisis. Evidence of its conviction that an emergency warranted more government 
intrusion can be found as early as 1795, when treason was redefined to include plots 
against parliament, thus integrating the executive more closely into the state and 
making further centralisation possible.50 Political attitudes to poor law reform 
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similarly sought to move the spotlight more firmly on the centrality of government 
and parliament in matters that had formerly been left to local control. The stated 
purpose of Pitt’s short-lived attempt at poor reform in 1796 was to allow labour to 
find its own value ‘by unfettering the poor from their restraints under the present law 
of settlement’, and to allow them to take their labour anywhere around the country — 
effectively breaking the social, paternalistic ties that bound them to their locality, and 
placing the whole system under the inspection of parliament.51 Samuel Whitbread’s 
1807 poor law reform proposals also aimed to liberate the poor from the influence of 
parish relief. Whitbread proposed to restore their independence through a system of 
parish schools, saving banks, part-ownership of cows, and rewards for families that 
subsisted without parish help.52 Either measure would have emphasised parliament’s 
overseeing role and minimised the poor’s reliance on local paternalism. 
The process of centralisation was, however, complicated by much more than 
official reluctance or constitutional convention. The development of a network of 
information and control with its apex at Whitehall was hindered by the need to 
reconfigure the arrangement of offices within the cabinet and its associated 
departments. The government’s attempts to modify its internal structure reflected the 
difficulties it would encounter in its desire to establish greater control over the 
defence process. There were additional problems, too, which arose as a result of 
independent political circumstances, but which had important ramifications for 
policy. The cabinet squabbles of the 1790s were not merely personal, but had their 
roots in a situation that was to last for nearly the whole remainder of the war. 
The cabinet: structure and stability 
Nominally, the cabinet adapted swiftly to the demands of conflict. It grew 
from eight members prior to 1791 to fourteen by 1805, of whom seven — the home, 
foreign, and war secretaries of state, the first lord of the admiralty, master general of 
the ordnance, secretary at war, and commander in chief — had direct responsibility 
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over some aspect of national defence.53 Cabinet meetings also increased in 
frequency: between 1797 and 1800, 106 cabinet meetings were held, in contrast with 
only 66 between 1784 and 1790.54  This did not, however, reflect internal cohesion, a 
very rare feature in political circles after the mid-1790s. Despite the knowledge that 
the control of military and naval affairs was spread between several offices, official 
briefs were hardly ever specific enough to avoid confusion. Decisions on defence 
policy by the Home Office, for example, frequently required ‘references to the 
Ordnance, the War Office or the Admiralty’.55 Lack of communication, jealousy, and 
quarrelling created an atmosphere of incompetence that visibly damaged the 
credibility of the government in the formation of a central defence policy. 
Many of these problems could have been avoided by a stricter partition of the 
different defence responsibilities in cabinet, but this was complicated by questions of 
seniority. Richard Glover exaggerates when he argues that the prime minister was 
‘inevitably … chief Minister of Defence in wartime’.56 Despite the patchiness of his 
war record, Pitt had boosted the importance of the premiership by 1800, but this was 
the result of personality and not convention. Clearly someone had to dominate, and 
Dundas saw Pitt as the only member of the cabinet able to conciliate the variety of 
departments jockeying for power due to his ‘overriding ascendancy in the conduct of 
Publick Affairs’. The need for such an ascendancy was acute, in military and defence 
matters along with everything else: ‘Yourself as far as a General Superintendence is 
necessary must take that into your own hands’.57 In 1803 Pitt, with eight years of 
bitter wartime experience behind him, admitted ‘that there should be an avowed and 
real Minister possessing the Chief Weight in council, and the principal Place in the 
confidence of the King’, with ‘no rivality or division of Power’. If the cabinet could 
not agree on policy, ‘the Sentiments of the Minister must be allowed and understood 
                                                 
53 Aspinall, ‘The Cabinet Council’, 159. 
54 Ehrman III, 452-3. 
55 Hobart to the bishop of Durham, 21 September 1803, Buckinghamshire RO, Hobart MSS, 
D/MH/H(war office)/Bundle F/N41. 
56 Glover, Britain at Bay, p. 30. 
57 Dundas to Pitt, 9 July 1794, National Archives, Chatham MSS, PRO 30/8/157/1/160-7. 
 30 
to prevail’.58 The fact that Pitt needed to express such a sentiment reflected his 
experience in the 1790s, when he himself had not automatically prevailed. Pitt’s 
immediate successors after 1806 did not, in any case, follow his advice. As first lord 
of the treasury in the Ministry of All the Talents, Grenville hesitated to put pressure 
on either his followers or those of Fox with whom he was in cooperation. ‘I have no 
pretensions to be … the master of the Government I act with,’ he confessed.59 With 
no automatic or direct control over the military, the best any prime minister could do 
was to adjudicate between the disputes of rival departments. 
Given the large number of offices with military responsibility, quarrels of 
competence were frequent.60 On top of their own separate organisations in 
Horseguards and the admiralty, the Army and Navy also had cabinet contacts. The 
first lord of the admiralty, in charge of the Navy, and the master general of the 
ordnance, in charge of artillery and ammunition, both held cabinet office, as did the 
commander in chief until 1795. Not surprisingly there were clashes of authority, and 
the situation was aggravated by the fact that the boundaries of each position could 
change at a moment’s notice. As a result of his alliance with the Portland Whigs in 
1794, Pitt raised the secretary at war, responsible for military finance and the 
movement of men and materials, to cabinet rank.61 A new secretaryship of state for 
war was also created, which took some — but not all — of the foreign and home 
secretaries’ military responsibilities.62 This reflected both the need to find more 
cabinet seats for Portland’s followers and the increased importance of war policy in 
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cabinet affairs. However, the imperfect division between the duties of the war 
secretary, the secretary at war and the commander in chief, particularly with regard 
to the allocation of military resources and the disposition of the troops, elements of 
which came under the remit of all three offices, provoked a series of disputes in 
which the monarch himself occasionally became involved.63 Pitt thought the 
divisions were amply justified by ‘the different details arising out of an extensive 
War’ and ‘the internal state of the Kingdom’, but his Solomon-like solution caused 
friction and may in fact have been illegal under the terms of Burke’s 1783 
Economical Reform Act, which prohibited the proliferation of cabinet offices for 
patronage reasons.64 Even Dundas, the new war secretary, predicted ‘constant 
wrangling’ between ‘the various executive Boards’ in control of war policy, and 
proceeded to fulfil his own prophecy by complaining that the division of the home 
secretary’s powers had been made at his expense.65 Four years later, in 1798, he still 
felt ‘crippled on land in preparatory measures from the distribution of business 
between the Duke of Portland’s office and mine’.66  
The failure to simplify the formation of defence policy by splitting the 
secretaryship of state three ways was obvious from the official contortions over the 
militia and the volunteers. Officially these were under the remit of the Home Office, 
which was responsible for receiving militia and volunteer returns and for calling 
them into action. The creation of the War Office, however, with some control over 
military and defence policy, threw everything into confusion. No-one now knew 
which of the two departments had ultimate authority over the auxiliaries. Even the 
two secretaries of state themselves were unsure. Dundas, swamped with misdirected 
mail on the militia and volunteers, was furious:  
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I have no correspondence with the Lieutenants of any County nor with 
the Colonels of any one Militia Regiment, nor with the Commanders of 
any one Yeomanry or Volunteer Corps. From the name my Department 
bears many of them are daily led to write to me under any difficulty 
which occurs to them, & this error is of course much increased by their 
observing that I am in the habit of moving the Bills in Parliament on 
those subjects, not adverting that it is owing to the Duke of Portland 
being in the other House of Parliament. This confusion must be put an 
end to, & the publick responsibility must be fixt in some way or other.67 
 
He had a good point when he insisted that the responsibility for defence policy ought 
to be clear, particularly during a defensive war. As a result he was often angry at 
Pitt’s habit of taking advice on defence matters from members of the cabinet without 
a specific military remit, such as Lord Westmorland, the Lord Privy Seal.68 The 
problem had not been solved, however, by the time Dundas resigned in 1801. 
The question of divided responsibility over defence went into abeyance 
during the period of the peace of Amiens, but resurfaced after the redeclaration of 
war and the revival of the volunteer movement. An effort was finally made to sort 
through the mess in August 1803, when a circular to the lords lieutenant stated 
categorically that all ‘correspondence on the subjects of the Militia & Volunteers 
were in future to be addressed to the Secretary of State for the Home Department’. 
The result of cutting the Gordian knot was a great relief to Lord Hobart, Dundas’s 
successor as secretary of state for war, who described the volunteer business as ‘the 
greatest Plague & trouble that ever was inflicted upon Man’.69 Charles Yorke, 
Addington’s home secretary, on the other hand, was less pleased, and after a month 
asked for two extra clerks to deal with all the enquiries regarding the militia, 
volunteers and Yeomanry which had flooded in.70 Fixing responsibility for the 
volunteers, however, had only solved one of the difficulties that had troubled Dundas 
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and his successors. The duties of the secretary of state for war remained nebulous. 
Since 1802 he had been given responsibility for the colonies, in order to justify 
keeping the position during the peace of Amiens. Addington had told Hobart ‘that 
the business of the country he had no doubt would require a third Secretary of State’, 
but after the volunteers had been taken away from him there seemed to be little else 
for him to do.71 By 1804 the position was viewed as an unenviable task precisely 
because it was so ill-defined. Hobart’s successor Lord Camden complained that his 
only job of note was to keep ‘the different Departments over which the Secretary of 
State has not the controul, in good Humour together’.72 Camden felt that the war 
secretary had to have a greater power ‘in actually originating measures’, which 
suggested that Dundas’s worry about the office being superfluous had not been 
entirely unfounded.73 It was not until the prime minister himself stopped taking direct 
charge over important military policy that the war secretary truly came into his own. 
This was the case under Grenville and Portland, under whom Windham and 
Castlereagh respectively played a prominent role in the formation and 
implementation of defence measures. 
Although many of these problems could be traced to the lack of any marked 
distinction between offices, they were strongly aggravated by the rapid expansion of 
the cabinet under Pitt. The coalition with Portland in 1794, in particular, sowed 
lasting seeds of dissension among Pitt’s followers, which would affect the political 
scene for the next twenty years. Part of the problem was that Pitt himself had 
developed a habit of restricting major cabinet decisions to a small group of trusted 
colleagues. His attitude to cabinet meetings was simple: he preferred to avoid them if 
possible.74 The ‘Inner Triumvirate’ of Pitt and his secretaries of state for war and 
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foreign affairs, Dundas and Grenville, oversaw most of the wartime policy of the 
1790s, while the other cabinet members were only occasionally consulted.75 Prior to 
1794 the system had worked well enough. Each of the three ministers had his own 
small informal circle of contacts who helped him on a variety of different affairs.76 
After 1794, however, the informal cabinet system began to strain at the seams. 
Dundas continued to defend its existence because, being ‘a pretty large society of 
men’, the full cabinet was ill-equipped to make the kind of quick decisions a defence 
emergency required: ‘It is pretty obvious that on this subject as little as on any other 
it is likely we should not always agree’.77 The reality was, however, that the ‘inner 
ministry’ worked only so long as the men who composed it were able to form a good 
working relationship, and after 1794 this was rarely the case. Although on the face of 
it the Portland following integrated well, in reality they brought an influx of ideas 
about the war which exaggerated incipient rifts within Pitt’s inner circles.78 Boosted 
by the ideological preference of the Portlandites for a Bourbon restoration, Grenville 
increasingly favoured a continental war, whereas Dundas preferred a defensive, 
colonial struggle in diplomatic isolation.79 Pitt, meanwhile, had made little effort to 
involve the members of Portland’s following more than necessary: full cabinet 
meetings were usually badly recorded, and the minutes were only occasionally 
circulated.80 ‘I have never known distinctly what the sort of minutes were that were 
kept of the proceedings of Cabinet,’ Windham, a particular victim of Pitt’s neglect, 
complained in 1799.81 As a result, once the inner cabinet collapsed, there was 
nothing to fall back on because their other colleagues had already been alienated. 
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Addington recalled in November 1801 that ‘there never had been a more divided 
Cabinet’ than Pitt’s.82 
After the coalition with Portland, neither Pitt, nor any of his successors, was 
able to devote their whole attention to the war because of cabinet divisions and 
weakness. Pitt’s own vulnerability was masked by a strong performance in the 
lobbies. The 1796 general election had produced a strong majority of 424 supporters 
for the government, a gain of 182, set against 95 Foxites and 39 independent; 
moreover, as of 1797, the Foxites themselves seceded from parliament almost 
entirely in protest against the conduct of the war.83 These were, however, little more 
than numbers, and the same weakness which would become obvious after 1801 was 
already discernible behind the decline in Pitt’s reputation. Loss of confidence in the 
government as a result of failed peace initiatives, the invasion of Fishguard and the 
run on the banks provided an opportunity for alternative opposition groups to come 
forwards and claim the middle ground. In early 1797 Sir John Sinclair formed a 
Third Party with a platform targeted at disillusioned MPs: ‘1) to vote for Economy; 
2) For Peace; 3) Against Mr. Pitt’s Bank measures; 4) Against Mr. Fox’s motions for 
repeal of the Acts against Treason and Sedition’.84 Sinclair’s challenge to the 
government’s authority came at a time when Pitt was particularly exposed: the 
mercantile classes had lost faith in him since the bank crash, and before the end of 
April the king had received twenty-six petitions for a change of ministry.85 Lack of 
interest from the king killed the project, but the government may not have been 
strong enough to withstand a more concerted attack.86 The disagreements within the 
cabinet, both in its formal and informal guise, already foreshadowed the political 
havoc to come. 
When Pitt eventually did fall, these latent divisions broke open and created a 
confusing situation that affected the ability of all governments to legislate until the 
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end of the war. The debates over the peace of Amiens between 1801 and 1802 
revealed the instability inherent in the political scene. With Pitt refusing to exert 
leadership, his former followers scattered in several directions. Significantly, those 
who had been most vocal within Pitt’s ministry since 1794 formed a group apart 
from their former leader. Windham was one of the first to break, and Grenville ended 
up leading most of Portland’s following into open opposition to Addington (labelled 
‘New’ to distinguish them from the Foxites, now rechristened the ‘Old’ opposition). 
The result was political chaos, in the midst of which the government struggled to find 
a stable majority. The parliamentary layout could change at any time. ‘I long for a 
division in either House, that people may know where they are,’ Lord Harrowby 
wrote as late as January 1805.87 Sheridan referred in May 1802 to ‘the strange 
division of parties’ and reported rumours of twelve or thirteen different groups, 
possibly even more.88 In 1803 Fox reported ‘three, or rather four distinct Parties’, his 
own followers and those of Grenville, Addington, and Pitt.89 At the same time Pitt’s 
disciple Canning divided the opposition to Addington into four, not counting Foxites: 
Grenvilles and Windhams, followers of Lord Fitzwilliam, Pittites, and ‘Stragglers’.90 
At the outset of Pitt’s second ministry in 1804, Charles Long and George Rose 
estimated that, of 658 members in the house of commons, 79 were Foxites, 68 
followed Addington, 41 belonged to the Prince of Wales, 23 were Grenvilles, and 29 
were doubtful (which, excluding Pittites and ministerialists, was already a five-way 
split, with 240 against the ministry).91 The situation improved a little after Fox and 
Grenville consolidated their forces in January 1804, but the volatile political situation 
continued to have a strong impact on government policy and reputation. 
Indeed, the effect of these parliamentary contortions was so obvious that 
several politicians, mostly in opposition, feared the domestic situation would distract 
from the bigger issues of invasion and Napoleonic expansion. After the renewal of 
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war Britain had been threatened with a French invasion more or less constantly 
between 1803 and 1805, and again periodically between 1806 and 1810. Napoleon, 
virtually unopposed after 1806, had been making great strides across the continent. 
Political weakness could not have come at a worse time. Sheridan thought it 
‘lamentable’ to see the house of commons of 1802 ‘all split into miserable parties, 
when your great enemy is uniting every possible means of extending his power’.92 
Three years later, with Addington (now Viscount Sidmouth) and his followers on the 
brink of leaving Pitt’s second government, Lord Carlisle questioned the ministerial 
strategy of prioritising internal ministerial dissension over national defence:  
Instead of being employed in considering how the country was to be 
extricated from its difficulties, almost the whole time of ministers was 
known to be taken up in endeavouring to reconcile disputes which were 
continually taking place. … He could not meet a person on the street 
that he knew, but he was asked who’s in, and who’s out? – He could 
only answer I don’t know, but the Rochefort squadron have been out, 
have done great mischief to our West India possessions, and have 
returned home unmolested; the Toulon squadron is out, and gone God 
knows where, or what mischief it may do.93 
 
By 1806, in fact, government weakness had become so much a part of 
political life that cabinet instability was perceived even when the case was otherwise. 
Structurally sound governments, such as the Ministry of All the Talents, found 
themselves suffering in their attempts to gain political credibility because of 
widespread belief in their imminent collapse. The Talents’ awkward composition of 
Foxites and Grenvilles, who had only been in political cooperation for two years at 
the time of coming to office, made the ministry seem particularly open to internal 
dissension. The opening of negotiations with France in the spring of 1806 increased 
the speculation. Fox had called for peace several times in the 1790s, whereas 
Grenville had famously broken ranks with the Pittites on the issue in 1802. Surely the 
two allies could not agree now? ‘Rumours … are afloat, of existing differences in the 
Cabinet on the subject of peace with France’, The Anti-Jacobin Review reported 
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hopefully, but this was wishful thinking, for in fact the ministry was remarkably 
harmonious, discounting a few initial hiccoughs over patronage.94 Even so, further 
disagreements were foreseen between the Grenvilles and the Foxites after Fox’s 
death in September 1806, and it was difficult for the government to make a mark 
when its collapse was expected at every turn.95 The same was true of the Portland 
ministry which followed the Talents. The rumours about cabinet divisions were 
much more accurate in this case: the duel between Canning and Castlereagh in 
September 1809 was merely the most dramatic example of the disharmony within the 
ministry, and the parliamentary situation aggravated the problem. The 1807 general 
election produced virtually a hung parliament with 216 pro-government MPs, 154 
independents who tended towards government, 71 independents who were more 
against, and 213 opposition.96 The Perceval government similarly appeared unstable, 
an impression reinforced by several close shaves and a couple of defeats in the 
lobbies over the disastrous expedition to Walcheren in early 1810. Liverpool’s 
government in 1812 resigned and had to be re-appointed before forging ahead. The 
days when the government could confidently rely on a majority of between three and 
four hundred votes were long gone. 
Significantly, of course, none of these governments was in fact as weak as it 
seemed. In the same way that a huge majority had masked the Pitt government’s 
internal problems, those of its successors were exaggerated by their weakness in the 
lobbies. Of the six governments between 1801 and 1815 only one, Addington’s, fell 
because of parliamentary weakness.97 The important point is that, however stable 
they were in reality, they did not promote political confidence, which was lowered 
still further by the long, draining invasion scares and the inability to make headway 
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against Napoleon on the continent. Ministries which were constantly on the brink of 
extinction simply could not turn the attention required to the national defence. 
Sidmouth, who could reasonably claim to have headed what was, comparatively 
speaking, the most cohesive cabinet since 1794, had by 1810 given up hope of a 
strong government capable of defending the country. Union and authority were 
required ‘without which Government is but a Name’, but this was ‘hopeless’: the 
Portland and Perceval governments were a ‘Tragic Farce’.98 Ironically, however, it 
was the ideal to which Sidmouth and other politicians looked in the dark days of 
continental isolation and political vulnerability — the Pitt government of the later 
1790s — that had sown the seeds of the divisions that followed. Much of the cabinet 
chaos, political rivalry, official weakness, and resulting breakdowns in 
communication between governors and governed, could be traced to the problems 
which followed the Pitt-Portland coalition in 1794. 
The king 
On top of their own internal problems, all governments had another important 
element to consider in the defence process: the monarch, who retained considerable 
influence over the formation of war policy. As Jonathan Clark argues, over the 
course of the eighteenth century the monarchy had become ‘the keystone in the arch 
of the hereditary and providential system which churchmen had constructed’, and 
was also the focal point for portrayals of the social structure of the political state.99 
As such, the Crown was an important weapon in the battle against Paineism and, 
since the war had begun as a crusade against republican principles, the monarch 
automatically acquired a symbolic role in the struggle.100 Part of his role was to 
provide an opportunity for pageantry and a focus for patriotic fervour. George III 
played a pivotal role in the Thanksgiving services for victories and in the peace 
festivals of 1801-2, and the 1809 jubilee celebrations were likewise an excellent way 
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to parade royal splendour in front of the people.101 The connections which bound the 
lowliest peasant to the Crown were stressed at every turn through stories that 
reflected the king’s humanity, religiosity, and common touch. However, the king still 
had enormous political responsibilities and was much more than simply a national 
icon. Constitutionally, the Crown was invested with the power of calling out as many 
as three million men in case of invasion.102 Enshrined in the Levy en Masse Act of 
1803, which endeavoured to convert the principle into practice, Crown prerogative 
served as a basis for the Training and Local Militia Acts which followed, and indeed 
lay behind most of the defence proposals drawn up by government members and 
independent advisers from 1798 onwards. 
To most politicians, indeed, the Crown’s role in defence was axiomatic. ‘That 
it was the ancient prerogative of the Crown, to command the services of all who were 
capable of bearing arms for the defence of the country, could not be doubted,’ 
declared Yorke in 1803.103 Even Fox, one of the strongest opponents of excessive 
Crown prerogative, supported Windham’s Training Act, which used Crown 
prerogative as its basis.104 There were, of course, some problems of definition and 
interpretation. Pitt called the Crown prerogative ‘as old as the Constitution itself’, 
and some others cited Saxon precedents. Addington, however, traced it back no 
further than his own Levy en Masse Act of 1803, while several oppositionists argued 
that appeals to an ‘ancient’ prerogative were exaggerated or even totally fictitious.105 
Lord Carnarvon raged that ‘he would rather put a pistol to his head than submit’ to 
the Levy en Masse, and ‘denied’ the Crown’s ‘inherent right’ invoked in that Act.106 
These opinions were, however, very much in a minority. Crown prerogative 
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remained a very useful conceit for both government and opposition. For the 
government, it kept the spotlight firmly on Britain’s monarchical basis and centred 
the defence effort around the king himself, since the Crown was named as the only 
institution with ultimate power over the lives and allegiance of his subjects. For the 
opposition, supporting defence measures based on Crown prerogative allowed them 
to parade their support of the state while simultaneously withdrawing it from the 
government. 
The disadvantages of relying on prerogative, at least from the government’s 
point of view, was that it handed the king a direct as well as symbolic power in 
national defence. The fact that he traditionally had some influence in military 
appointments made this even more applicable. In 1807, Colonel Craufurd, one of 
Windham’s military correspondents and political supporters, declared that if the 
Crown was not permitted to give its opinion on how to defend the constitution, it 
‘would become a cipher, a mere dead letter of the constitution, and our legislature 
would no longer consist of king, lords and commons, but lords and commons 
only’.107 This complicated the situation for governments which were already trying 
to sort through their own internal divisions of authority in military matters. Involving 
the monarch too closely could be embarrassing. George III was bad enough: although 
he was not afraid of interfering to discomfit a ministry he did not like, for the most 
part he knew his limits in political matters and kept to them. Nevertheless, it was best 
for ministries to play it safe. Dundas warned Pitt against giving the king’s favourite 
son, the duke of York, the post of commander in chief in 1794, since this would 
automatically give the king a new channel for military interference: ‘Placing him in 
that Situation will entail a debt of incalculable trouble on you during the whole of the 
King’s life’.108 If Pitt could not stop the king’s direct interference in military matters, 
then he would be well advised not to extend it.  
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Dundas’s reluctance to increase the king’s leverage over military policy 
proved well-founded. The king was loath to relinquish the little control he retained, 
and he became more intractable the less he found his ministry agreeable to work 
with. This growing disillusionment with Pitt’s handling of affairs towards the end of 
the 1790s even led to an uncharacteristic attempt to thrust his oar into matters of 
strategy, which were technically not his domain. In 1800, when the cabinet was 
considering sending an expedition to Ferrol, the king objected to a cabinet minute on 
the subject on the grounds that he disapproved of the proposed use of the armed 
forces. A disgruntled Pitt considered ‘begging His Majesty to find servants whose 
judgements he can trust more than ours’. As a result Dundas sent the king a polite 
letter in which he reminded him that the ministers alone were ultimately responsible 
for the deployment of troops.109 The monarch’s influence in military matters was to 
be ignored at the government’s own peril. 
The king’s tendency to interfere against a disliked ministry in any area where 
he felt himself able to do so was most strongly demonstrated by his behaviour 
towards the Talents’ military policy in 1806. He took the most direct way of 
asserting himself by letting Windham know, in no uncertain terms, that he 
disapproved of the ministry’s military proposals for the recruitment and regulation of 
the regular army. Although he eventually gave his assent to the plans, rumours about 
his disapproval of them were rife throughout the first half of 1806.110 As far as the 
government was concerned, indeed, the king held his cards very close to his chest. 
During a conversation on defence and military administration with him on 1 
February 1806, Grenville pledged that the government would not force any measures 
on him so long as he, in turn, left them alone over matters ‘on which the safety & 
actual existence of the Country might … depend’. The only result was that ‘H.M. 
dismissed me, saying that the subject required farther consideration’.111 Windham 
saw the king on the same night, made the same offer, and met with much the same 
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response: ‘We battled this over & over again for near an hour, & as we got no farther 
He at last dismissed me’.112 Two days later, the king reasserted his ‘undoubted right 
of deciding on the measures which may be proposed to him respecting the military 
service, or the administration of it, both with reference to the prerogatives of the 
Crown, and the nature and expediency of the measures themselves’.113 This was, of 
course, a private political disagreement between the monarch and his ministers, but 
was widely publicised when the king sounded out the available Pittite alternatives to 
Fox and Grenville’s ministry. The effect on the Talents’ credibility was potentially 
disastrous. 
The outcome of this battle of wills was a triumph for the king, who 
successfully asserted his role in the defence process. To save face, the government 
had no choice but to give in to the monarch’s private irritation, particularly after the 
duke of York created public ‘difficulties … in some ways not very usual’, ostensibly 
in his father’s name.114 Fox, not unnaturally for him, saw the whole business as a 
dispute between the Crown and the authority of parliament, and thought that ‘if we 
give up [on Windham’s military proposals] I shall consider all as lost … If we yield 
… we shall never be free agents again’.115 In this case, however, Fox’s judgment was 
skewed by nearly thirty years of opposition. The king saw military issues as his turf, 
and meant his ministers to recognise it. He may also have been irritated by 
Windham’s rather haphazard attitude towards keeping him briefed on military 
affairs: ‘I have never talked to the King upon any of these points since our first 
communication … Is it necessary?’116 By persistent pressure, however, he made sure 
that Windham overcame this reluctance to keep him involved. When the king 
protested against the proposals to limit service in the Army to a renewable term of 
seven years, which he described as a measure ‘which may endanger the future 
existence of the State and cannot hereafter be recalled’, Windham responded 
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favourably and included a clause to extend limited service in wartime by two or three 
years, with additional benefits for longer service.117 These concessions were 
effectively an admission that the monarch did have a role in military affairs. 
Even worse than George III’s tendency to interfere in military policy, 
however, was his recurrent mental illness. This impacted even more on the 
government’s stability than the need to keep the monarch informed about matters 
that affected his prerogative. In 1801 and again in 1804, and finally in 1811, the 
question of a regency returned to disturb the political agenda when the king became 
too ill to govern. Because his apparent ‘madness’ did not inspire confidence in the 
longevity of his government, each mental attack added to the problems that already 
beset whichever ministry was in office at the time. As a result, the king’s health 
became a vital part of defence policy itself. International credibility and government 
stability played a part, but the fact that the fortunes of the nation had been so overtly 
bound up with the monarch’s person and prerogative meant that the importance of 
his state of health was clear at a time when invasion loomed large on the horizon. At 
the end of 1804 Charles Long wrote to Lord Redesdale that a privy council, intended 
to prorogue parliament until 3 January 1805, was much to be desired because it 
allowed the government to publicise the fact that ‘the K[ing] is perfectly well’.118 So 
long as the monarch was perceived to be so, then the political nation — and the 
nation at large — could also be portrayed as healthy. These considerations led some, 
such as Dundas (now Viscount Melville), to wonder whether the king should not be 
convinced to retire from all major responsibilities attached to his position. He wrote 
to Pitt in 1804:  
Every thing at the present moment depends on the Appearance of 
a steady and permanent Government, and is it possible that either 
this Country or foreign nations can have any such Feeling when 
they know the King at the head of our Government is at any 
moment liable to the severe Calamity which now afflicts him?119  
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Melville was not alone in his thoughts on the impact of the king’s illness. Camden, 
too, felt that the political scene would not stabilise unless the king was persuaded to 
take a lesser role. The problem was compounded in Camden’s eyes by the 
government’s political weakness, and by the lack of any prospect of a continental 
offensive to detract from it.120 The king’s potential to go mad at a moment’s notice 
certainly did nothing for his government’s strength. When he went mad for the last 
time in October 1810 the Perceval government had not yet managed to overcome its 
internal rifts and it was unclear for a long while whether or not the Prince of Wales, 
as Regent, would turn to the Pittites or the Whigs to govern. 
Solving the issue of the king’s health by appointing a Regent in his place, 
however, merely resurrected the old need to keep the monarch’s military interference 
to a minimum. With the prince regent, particularly, this was no easy task. As argued 
above George III had normally respected the grey area of responsibility between 
Crown and government, but his son was less discriminating. This made life even 
more difficult for the Perceval ministry, since the Prince had to be dissuaded from 
overstepping his boundaries without being offended. The delicacy of the problem 
became quickly apparent in 1811 when the Regent became involved in the long-
standing and still unresolved problem of the roles of the commander in chief, the 
War Office and the secretary at war.121 The overlap between these positions had 
never quite been sorted out, and the War Office was now accused of issuing orders to 
the Army directly without consulting Horseguards first. The conflict, small-scale as it 
was, probably would have been sorted out in the usual way had the prince regent not 
sought to settle it himself. He declared, in a long memorandum, that ‘the Powers 
vested in the Commander in Chief are supreme over the whole Army’, which was not 
strictly true, since control of ammunition, resources and finance lay elsewhere. The 
Prince insisted that the secretary at war ‘has been, and must always be deemed and 
considered subordinate to the commander in chief in all matters connected with the 
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Government of the Army’, and that he should stick to the financial details alone. As 
if this wasn’t bad enough, the Prince proceeded to criticise an Act passed in the 
previous parliamentary session which gave the secretary at war ‘a despotic power’ 
over the provision of military clothing.  
Perceval was deeply embarrassed. Not only had the Prince sent his objections 
directly to the War Office without bothering to notify the secretary at war (Lord 
Palmerston) first, but he had woefully misunderstood the complicated division of 
power between the military and civilian branches of the service, and — worse still — 
directly attacked an Act of Parliament. This was at best an implied snub against his 
government, at worst a breach of parliamentary privilege. If the memorandum could 
have been tactfully forgotten all would have been well, but the Prince had 
specifically asked for his views to be placed on record. ‘What am I to do with it?’ 
Perceval despaired of the memorandum. Eventually the method chosen to defuse the 
situation was to write to the Prince gently censuring whoever may have advised him 
to write the memorandum, although Perceval suspected such an adviser did not in 
fact exist.122 It was a tactful solution to a serious problem: the Prince was well within 
his rights in tackling a military matter, but had overshot the boundaries. The issue, 
however, exemplified the delicacy of involving the Crown in the military and 
defence process. Neither the monarch nor his representative could be edited out of it, 
no matter how much simpler life would be for the government without them. By 
insisting on Crown prerogative as the basis of the defence measures, the government 
had irretrievably connected the person of the monarch with the defence effort; nor 
could it afford to ignore him, since he could make its political life very difficult 
indeed. The best that could be hoped for in case of a disagreement was to limit the 
damage to the government’s reputation, and Pitt, Grenville, Windham, and Perceval 
could all bear witness to how distracting and troublesome that could be. 
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Scotland and Ireland 
Internal disputes over departmental divisions and the role of the Crown 
occupied much political attention, but ministers could never afford to forget the 
broader picture. Unfortunately, that picture was often broader than the government, 
with its close focus on England and the English social networks, liked to consider. 
As has been argued above, the structure of the English political system offered a 
means of centralisation by harnessing the county and parish networks, but England 
was only one part of Great Britain, and an even smaller part of what became, after 
1801, the United Kingdom. A defence strategy was required which would apply 
equally to all parts of the British Isles, including Scotland and Ireland. Unity was key 
in a war of survival against French principles, but what worked for England would 
not necessarily work elsewhere. The result was an attempt to strike a balance 
between three very different perspectives of the war. 
Both Scotland and Ireland had different defence mechanisms, and this 
complicated any attempts to cover their defence under legislation created for England 
alone. Neither country had a militia when war broke out in 1793. Ireland received 
one in 1793, Scotland in 1796. These militia forces generally served only on their 
own soil, although an interchangeable United Kingdom militia was recognised as a 
good way to strengthen the ties between the three countries. When a number of 
English militia regiments volunteered to serve temporarily in Ireland after the 1798 
rebellion, Castlereagh noted to Pitt how important it was to demonstrate that Ireland 
and Britain relied on each other for their security: ‘It is particularly fortunate that Gt. 
Britain is enabled at present to detach so large a force to Ireland, not merely as 
securing the British Interest in this Country, but as marking distinctly, that it is to her 
interposition we are altogether indebted, for our safety’.123 The problem was that 
each force was raised on slightly different principles. The Irish militia, for example, 
was mostly recruited by bounty, unlike its English and Scottish counterparts, since 
the country was considered too volatile for the implementation of a ballot. This 
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meant that the establishment of a united militia was highly unlikely without a serious 
reform of the system throughout the United Kingdom, although it was never given up 
as an ideal. 
One of the main reasons why the English, Scottish and Irish defence 
structures had to be kept separate was that neither Scotland nor Ireland had the kind 
of social network which was established in England. Without such a structure, the 
various defence Acts which relied on it for implementation could not be used. This 
became less relevant for Scotland, which was given a county and lord lieutenant 
structure more in line with its English counterparts during the course of the war.124 
Partly this was because Scottish interests were prominent right at the centre of the 
Pitt government through Dundas, who looked upon his role in the creation of local 
Scottish political organisation as one of his finest achievements: ‘I trust it has been in 
my Power in the Course of my Political life to be of Service to my Native Country in 
more particulars than one, but I value myself upon none more, than the Introduction 
in Scotland of that respectable and useful Office of Lieutenancy under the Crown’.125 
Despite his best efforts, however, Scotland lagged far behind England in the 
development of county networks. Though unquestionably better off than Ireland, 
both were targeted by a plan submitted to the duke of York in January 1804, which 
suggested that eight regiments of infantry might be raised for general service, two in 
Scotland and six in Ireland, with the subsidiary aim of cultivating social ties by 
placing ‘Men of Consideration & Influence in their respective Countries’ at the head 
of each. These men were to be chosen based on their influence rather than their 
military prowess, and if they were not already soldiers they were to be given 
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temporary commissions.126 The plan was not put into effect, but its political as well 
as military intentions were clear. 
It was Ireland rather than Scotland which caused the most problems in the 
search for a national defence policy suitable for the whole British Isles. Her social 
networks were markedly much weaker than anywhere else in the United Kingdom. 
Although based on the county, the Irish aristocracy was considered to be too 
scattered, and Ireland herself too poor and too Catholic, for effective networks and 
parish structures to be erected.127 Like England, Ireland had her own system of JPs 
and magistrates, but there the similarities ended. In Ireland they had a much lower 
reputation — they were, as an 1804 memorandum regretted, ‘too frequently partisans 
rather than judges’.128 The result was a reliance on central authority to an extent 
which did not exist in Britain. Because of the weakness of the local officers and the 
frequency of widespread disturbances, the central government was often supported 
by military rather than civil might. Not coincidentally, Ireland was also the only part 
of the United Kingdom in which martial law was actually enforced. Perceval was 
told by a correspondent in 1807 that only ‘the strong hand of the military’ could keep 
her quiet.129 Relying on military might to solve Ireland’s social problems proved too 
easy, and the possible consequences of tinkering with the system as it stood were too 
great. The Talents did make a small attempt to initiate a review of the Irish 
magistracy by requesting peers and privy councillors to report individuals considered 
unsuitable for the task, but only two counties had been dealt with by the time the 
ministry was dismissed. Thereafter little was done until 1817.130  
This reliance on Ireland’s central government meant that the lord lieutenant 
was expected to be extremely hands-on in his approach. ‘The Tranquillity of the 
Country is alone preserved even in the degree in which it exists, by the perpetual 
intervention of the hand of Government exercising the most Summary powers’, a 
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memorandum on the Irish situation declared.131 The viceroy’s position was not 
analogous to that of a lord lieutenant of a county, since he was effectively the king’s 
deputy in Ireland and, as such, invested with executive powers. He was essential to 
keep power out of the hands of the Irish aristocracy, who had as low a reputation as 
the county magistrates. The Home Office in September 1801 was informed by the 
lord lieutenant, Hardwicke, in no uncertain terms that  
the inevitable consequence of rendering the office of Lord Lieutenant 
inefficient will be the transfer of the powers of Government to some of 
the principal individuals or families in Ireland, whose local passions 
and interests particularly disqualify them, however honourable in 
character, from governing their countrymen.132 
 
Local influence in Ireland was simply too dispersed and too partisan. This, of course, 
made the collection of information much more difficult than in England. When the 
militia was reorganised in 1802 new quotas were considered for the Irish counties, 
but the only people who could be reasonably expected to give coherent information 
on the subject were assumed to be ‘the most intelligent Members of Parliament, who 
are Militia Colonels, or otherwise intelligent in county business’.133 This was in stark 
contrast to the case in Britain, where a wide variety of local notables, from the lord 
lieutenant to the parish constables, could be relied on for information. 
The low reputation of the Irish aristocracy was worrying to the policy-makers 
who laid such a stress on the need for healthy social networks. Without a respectable 
governing class, a coherent county structure on English lines was impossible. ‘How 
the country can ever be at rest & steadily governed while there is so little connexion 
between the Landlords & their tenants … I know not,’ Pelham despaired in 1795.134 
The Anti-Jacobin considered that the weakness of Ireland’s rulers was at the root of 
Britain’s problems with the sister island: the Irish were more susceptible to French 
principles because of absentee proprietors, as a result of which there was no ‘link and 
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connection between the Higher and Lower Classes of Society’.135 The government 
reacted to this aristocratic insufficiency by trying to foster respect for the upper 
classes through the militia and volunteer forces, in much the same way as these had 
been intended to strengthen already existing social ties in England. In March 1798 
Pitt urged Irish gentlemen ‘to aid the Military by their own Exertions’ and by 
establishing an Irish volunteer system, a goal he considered ‘more Political than 
Military’.136 Evidently the concern here was to show that, as had happened in 
England, the Irish upper classes were fulfilling their social role by taking the field 
against invasion in volunteer and other independent corps. Four years later, 
Hardwicke, Addington’s lord lieutenant, wanted to avoid dismissing the Irish militia 
after the signature of the Peace of Amiens because it offered ‘the advantage of 
bringing the gentry of Ireland into a more intimate connection with the lower classes 
of their countrymen, and creating a reciprocal good will between them, from the 
continual experience of protection on the one part and fidelity on the other’.137 
Hardwicke wrote to the attorney general that the militia had produced ‘the best 
effects … from the connexion of Interests & good offices between the description of 
persons composing the private Militia men, & the gentlemen of the Country’.138 Such 
high praise for the activity of the Irish aristocracy was, however, rare. Generally, the 
mood was more depressing, and attempts made to encourage them to take a more 
direct role in stimulating the loyalty of their tenants were frustrated by ‘the spirit of 
party which prevails between one set of gentlemen & another’.139  
Of course Ireland was not completely bereft of the kinds of social networks 
that the government wished to exploit. If anyone had mustered the courage to tap into 
Ireland’s religious networks, they would have discovered sturdy local connections 
through which to transmit information and enforce laws. The problem was, of course, 
that her particular sectarian problems made the government understandably reluctant 
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to call on these networks for help. This was not simply a reaction to the fact that 
Ireland was predominantly Catholic. The government also viewed the militantly 
Protestant Yeomanry with a jaundiced eye, despite the fact that, as Allan Blackstock 
points out, it involved obligations of military service that helped reinforce traditional 
ideas of community paternalism of the kind Pitt had hoped to foster through the 
volunteers.140 The difficulty was, of course, that the Yeomanry was only a partial 
solution to Ireland’s lack of a social network and ran the risk of alienating the 
Catholic community. Since the danger of Irish disaffection arose largely from 
Catholics and Protestant Dissent, a predominantly Anglican Yeomanry with close 
connections with the Orange order was not the ideal solution. 
Had the government dared to do so, it would have found that the Catholic 
Church itself provided a broad and fairly reliable social network. This was 
recognised even by politicians who were staunchly against Catholic Emancipation, 
such as Lord Westmorland, lord lieutenant of Ireland until 1794. Westmorland urged 
Pitt in February 1794 to confer a further step in the peerage on the Catholic Lord 
Kenmare, since ‘such a distinction to this Loyal & meritorious old Gentleman would 
very much gratify all the respectable Catholics, & would be very useful at this 
time’.141 Westmorland’s successor, Lord Fitzwilliam, went much further, and argued 
that the active support of the Catholic hierarchy could be used to keep the peace in 
Ireland: ‘The whole united strength of the higher [orders] may be necessary to 
controul & keep the lower in order & due allegiance’.142 There were, however, 
serious disadvantages to relying on a Catholic local structure, precisely because of 
what it was. According to the opponents of Catholic Emancipation, giving the 
Catholics a stronger political voice was dangerous because their church 
establishment gave them ‘a more absolute & more extensive power of acting as one 
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Body than men of any other religious persuasion’.143 The idea of a Protestant 
government having to rely on Catholic loyalties was anathema to those who doubted 
that the king had replaced the pope at the top of their hierarchy. So long as Ireland’s 
special religious problems could not be laid aside, Catholic networks could not be 
used to their full potential, and without them it seemed that Ireland would never 
break out of the cycle of rebellion and martial law, which many were prompt to 
ascribe to her lack of social structure. Without Irish participation, centralisation of 
the defence effort remained necessarily incomplete. Small wonder, therefore, that the 
politicians preferred the comparatively unproblematic task of dealing with England’s 
defence, rather than legislating for the United Kingdom as a whole.144 
Conclusion 
Historiographical opinions of the stability of the British polity between 1793 
and 1815 should not obscure the impact of war on the state. Survival in the new 
conditions of post-French Revolutionary Europe required adaptation, and the British 
state was well structured for limited evolution to be permissible. Such evolution was 
often far from obvious, given the survival of so many ancient jurisdictions and local 
power struggles, but this was all to the good, given that what was being sought was 
flexibility rather than revolution. The immediacy of the invasion threat meant that 
compromise between the centre and the localities was not a viable option; the central 
government had to manoeuvre itself into a position in which it could be as free from 
local interference as possible in an emergency. This required very little that was 
novel in the make-up of the British state. Instead of the county lords lieutenant all 
sharing responsibility for defence with the government, the social structure was 
subtly altered so as to become a vertical chain of command from the people in the 
parish to the monarch at the top, with the parliament, and the government, acting as 
intermediaries. Though limited by government instability, the overlap of 
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departments, and the unsolved problem of how to include peripheries such as 
Scotland and Ireland, the practical result of such a reconfiguration was to assert the 
government’s primacy in all matters which affected defence. 
The fact that no deep-seated change took place, therefore, did not mean that 
the British state was incapable of adapting to new circumstances, or that the need for 
such adaptation was considered unnecessary. The amount of ground the government 
had to give up to opposition to its strengthened authority should not be over-
estimated.145 In his overview of the eighteenth-century polity, Jeremy Black makes a 
startling statement about the limitations of the central government working in a 
highly decentralised political milieu. It ‘lacked the mechanisms to intervene 
effectively and consistently in the localities,’ he argues. ‘The reality of power was 
decentralised’, and therefore, ‘consensual’. The smooth running of the political 
system was ensured by giving local notables ‘the instructions that they wanted’.146 
As the next chapter will show, however, Black’s analysis is clearly inapplicable to 
the 1790s, when the pressure of Britain’s defence requirements stimulated by a 
rethink of the operation of the social and political networks, led to a stronger 
assertion of central control. The reason such alterations were so subtle, however, and 
even on occasion abortive, was to be traced to the conservatism of the public and 
political mind, the adverse circumstances of a war fought primarily on a defensive, 
and a series of ministries torn apart by internal divisions. The experiment was more 
limited in scope than the politicians had initially hoped, but, significantly, it was 
nevertheless made. 
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Chapter Two 
Centralisation and its problems 
 
 If Britain’s social structure offered opportunities for a tightening of political 
control, then an increasingly defensive war provided the motive. The prospect of a 
French invasion first seriously arose in January 1794.1 An attempt was made to land 
in Ireland in December 1796, followed two months later by an actual descent in 
Wales. A further invasion in Ireland following the Irish rebellion in 1798 in hindsight 
proved the last French assault on the British Isles, but to contemporaries the threat 
only seemed to escalate. 1803 witnessed the beginning of the worst invasion scare of 
the whole period. The failure of the Third Coalition left Napoleon in full possession 
of the continent, with nothing to distract him from an assault on British soil, and even 
Trafalgar did not significantly heighten the mood. Only a successful continental 
offensive or an impenetrable barrier of domestic defence measures could guard 
against the dangers, and since Britain was isolated on the continent, only the second 
option was available. 
A sound defence policy, therefore, was vital for any government which 
sought to deal with a threat regarded as unprecedented. The character of the enemy 
seemed very different from any which Britain had faced during the long, war-torn 
eighteenth century. A conviction that France was more determined and ideologically 
committed led to a surprising degree of willingness to bend the rules among stalwart 
opponents of constitutional change. Looking back in 1803 on the achievements of 
Pitt’s first ministry, for example, Lord Camden admitted that ‘events without 
precedent’ had ‘oblig’d Government rather to make new [constitutional 
arrangements] than follow those which cou’d not answer times unknown before’.2 
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Camden still felt the need to apologise for what he referred to as ‘trifling alterations’, 
but by 1803 the threat of invasion had rendered adaptation absolutely vital in the 
minds of many politicians. Pitt himself noted that  
the scale of our exertions could not be measured by those of former 
times … Some system far more vigorous and effectual … would be 
found necessary, both in our finance, and in the preparations for 
national defence.3 
 
By this time the length of the war and Napoleon’s consolidation of a new French 
dynasty suggested that the temporary crises of the 1790s had become a permanent 
condition, and that ‘it is obviously necessary that in Peace, as well as in War, we 
must place our chief reliance on a large regular Force’.4 In other words, national 
defence policy could no longer be formed on the basis that war might only last a few 
more years. Long term safety was required. Such attitudes persisted until 1811, when 
successive Peninsular War victories finally dispelled the fear of invasion. 
The perceived length, urgency, and novelty of the threat suggested that 
appropriate policy responses would have to depart from the norm. John Brewer’s 
‘fiscal-military state’ was at least a century old by this time, but it now became more 
ambitious and uncompromising in response to continental isolation and repeated 
invasion attempts.5  Sir George Shee, an Under-Secretary in the Home Department, 
wrote that  
a Contest with a powerful Nation of Conquerors situated almost at 
our doors and under a Government purely military … exhibits a 
new case — if our preparations to meet the difficulties incidental to 
that case should not pass beyond the limits of old Routine we may 
have to lament when too late that we had disregarded the salutary 
lesson which the Fate of our Neighbours had afforded.6 
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A ‘methodised and combined Plan’ was required, and for this the government needed 
to acquire more control over the nation’s varied manpower and material resources.7 
This became increasingly urgent as the British defence force expanded. Dundas 
stressed that Britain’s ‘Salvation’ relied on the various ‘Descriptions of force being 
speedily collected, arranged, and distributed so as to form one general Combination 
of efficient Strength’.8 New information networks had to be found, and the existing 
ones had to be tightened, to make this possible.  
The fundamental question was not whether the government could become 
stronger, but how this could be achieved, and how far it could go, and there were of 
course limits beyond which politicians were loath to explore.9 The war had initially 
been justified in part by the need to uphold the status quo at home and abroad, and 
politicians were acutely aware of the constitutional boundaries within which they 
operated. Many of the stronger defence measures depended on particular 
emergencies and were unenforceable when these lapsed. Especially after 1801, 
governments were often too weak to pursue harsh measures, although that did not 
prevent them from trying, and the same weakness in turn sharpened the need for 
greater control — hence the palpable sense of urgency shown by most politicians in 
national defence whenever the role of the central authorities was challenged. In an 
emergency insubordination could not be tolerated, and the official tone became more 
and more strident. ‘To destroy the confidence of the people in their rulers, in their 
armies, or in their resources, were the very worst species of treason,’ declared a pro-
government pamphlet in 1803.10 The ‘compromise’ that J.E. Cookson suggests 
existed between centre and locality would have worried men who felt that France 
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could only be defeated by a nation that had observed the mechanisms of her success, 
and resolved to imitate them.11 
Limited measures and constitutional precedent: the 1790s 
Admittedly, the government had not always been so fixated on increasing its 
control, and the threat from the French loomed larger as the war itself lengthened. 
During the first few years of the war the Pitt government’s attitude to defence was 
conditioned by an assumption that hostilities would be short-lived. At this stage 
Britain still enjoyed strong continental connections through the First Coalition, and 
was more concerned with overseas offensives than defence. Between 1794 and 1796 
the official reaction to the threats of French invasion and domestic unrest followed 
traditional political patterns, firmly rooted in precedent and designed to meet 
temporary requirements as they arose. Ministers sought to preserve the status quo, 
and, while they acknowledged that many of their law and order measures 
undermined traditional British liberties, they justified them as regrettable necessities 
of short duration. The suspension of Habeas Corpus from 1794, the Two Acts of 
1795, and other measures designed to boost Britain’s defensive and offensive forces, 
all followed the same pattern. Not until the collapse of the First Coalition in 1797, 
and the onset of forced British diplomatic isolation, did a change occur in political 
perspectives on the nature of the war and the measures proposed to deal with it. 
While radicals denounced the government’s emergency measures against 
insurrection, and coined the phrase ‘Pitt’s Terror’ to describe them, Pitt and his 
ministers were extremely anxious to distinguish their policies from those of the 
Jacobin Republic. France was tyrannical, despotic, violent, in other words everything 
that was contrary to the British character. Ironically in view of later events, one 
government supporter castigated the French levee en masse as a system which would 
‘disturb the happiness of every private family … involve all the inferior classes of 
the people in misery and ruin … suspend every act of honest industry … and … 
expose all who remain in the country, to the complicated calamities of indigence and 
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famine’.12 Pitt echoed the point: French military successes were ‘the result of a 
system of restraint and oppression, the most terrible and gigantic that has, perhaps, 
ever existed’.13 The steadiness of the Briton, buttressed by a political system that 
guaranteed him liberty and property, contrasted strongly with the impoverished, half-
starved French conscript who fought for false principles. Put simply, the difference 
between the two countries was liberty: France had none, and Britain had plenty.14 It 
would obviously not benefit the government to propose measures that were 
incompatible with British constitutional liberties.  
Pittites, therefore, stressed the temporary nature of their early policies as well 
as the necessity, and took care to ground them firmly in historical precedent. During 
the mid 1790s, most of the stronger defence measures were designed to lapse with 
peace.15 Practical as well as constitutional boundaries limited what the government 
felt capable of doing. Pitt’s healthy majority over the rump of the Foxite opposition 
meant that he neither needed, nor wanted, to be too creative. However, the 
government’s sizeable parliamentary support did not translate automatically into 
assent for all proposals, and the excuse of ‘necessity’ could only be used sparingly.16 
John Ehrman points out that measures which Pitt sponsored personally often failed (a 
notable example of this being his poor relief bill of 1796), as a result of which he 
often preferred not to introduce anything too daring.17 As long as there was a 
prospect of the war ending, sticking to the rules was often the wisest option. When 
the impetuous Windham declared in 1795 ‘that ministers were determined to exert a 
vigour beyond the law … as exercised in ordinary times and under ordinary 
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circumstances’, he did his government no favours.18 The opposition picked up on the 
phrase with relish, as did many of the newspapers, and Windham spent much 
precious time explaining it away. 
The government’s reluctance to tamper with constitutional precedent showed 
clearly in its attitude to the suspension of Habeas Corpus from 1794 onwards. 
Proposed to deal with a suspected republican conspiracy, the interruption of one of 
the most fundamental British liberties, the right to immediate trial by jury, was 
undoubtedly one of the stronger measures adopted in the 1790s, yet it was hardly 
innovatory, and was also by its nature temporary. The government was more keen to 
stress the limitations of suspension than it was to exert the powers it had acquired 
through such an expedient.19 It was justified by the circumstances of the times, and 
because it was a way to deal with the dangers of domestic distraction at a time when 
the major emphasis was on the war abroad. Automatically limited in scope, it was ‘a 
measure of safety to the State, and such as the times exacted’.20 The emphasis was 
very much on the six-monthly renewable aspect of the measure, and both Pitt and 
Addington were eager to reassure their audiences that it would cease on the coming 
of peace.21 They also strained to establish the measure’s orthodoxy. Dundas pointed 
out that the Habeas Corpus Act had been suspended nine times between the 
revolution of 1688 and 1794, and Pitt reminded the house of commons that it was by 
suspension that ‘the House of Orange, in the first instance, and the House of 
Brunswick in the second had been maintained upon the throne’.22 
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The Seditious Meetings Act and the Treasonable Practices Act, known 
collectively as the Two Acts and passed in November 1795, operated under similar 
constraints. They were introduced in response to a spate of food-rioting following the 
failure of that year’s harvest, and also to an alleged assassination attempt on the king 
during the opening of parliament. The continental background was also relevant, 
since Britain’s increasing isolation was forcing her to look to her own security. 
Admittedly, T. Philip Schofield argues that the Acts were viewed in a strictly internal 
context because by 1795 the war had largely lost its ideological slant, and because 
domestic sedition could no longer rely on French assistance, but this seems unlikely. 
The First Coalition was breaking up, and there had been a spate of invasion scares 
over the months preceding the passage of the new legislation. Surely the government 
must have taken these factors into account when assessing the degree of 
‘emergency’. Accordingly, the Acts were a little more innovatory than previous 
measures, since they expanded the meaning of treason to include plots against 
parliament, but both measures still remained temporary and subject to renewal after a 
fixed term.23 The Times stressed that, far from encroaching on liberty, they simply 
extended the scope of networks that already existed for the apprehension of the 
state’s enemies. Parliament acquired ‘no additional power whatever’, and the Two 
Acts would automatically lapse once ‘that spirit of sedition and treason’ which had 
called them forth ‘shall have subsided’.24 Later, in October 1796, Pitt too stressed 
that ‘they were passed in a moment of alarm and turbulence; and have been found 
admirably calculated to meet the emergency of the time.’25 Such language did not 
point towards a desire to undermine the nation’s liberties in the long term, but rather 
indicated a willingness typical of this early stage of the struggle to tackle problems as 
they arose. 
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This ad hoc approach can be illustrated by reference to other measures, for 
example the government’s attempts to tackle the growing manpower problem 
through short-term recruitment boosts. Thus the Quota Act of 1795 was designed to 
provide the means to raise a large body of seamen in a short time: twenty thousand 
men were to be taken from merchant vessels and ten thousand men via a levy on the 
parishes under pain of a fine.26A second Act in 1796 was passed to find a further 
15,000 for both naval and military service.27 Opposition spokesmen denounced both 
as yet more nails in the coffin of British liberty. The Morning Post thought 
Robespierre himself could not have been prouder.28 Like many of the measures 
passed at that time, however, the Quota Acts did not introduce anything particularly 
novel to the recruitment process. They simply extended the old practice of the naval 
impress to the inland towns and imposed a quota. They were in any case temporary 
expedients and proved deeply unsatisfactory because of the low quality of the men 
produced, most of them being county vagrants.29 Nor did the government have any 
ulterior motive when it decided to target different sections of society from those 
normally affected by impressment. Extending the reach of naval recruitment inland 
was a reflection of necessity rather than premeditation, and Pitt was anxious to avoid 
controversy as much as possible. As a result he was prepared to be flexible. When 
merchants complained that the Act of 1796 affected their livelihood, Pitt took notice 
and a compromise was reached.30 
The government’s initial decision to call upon an auxiliary force of gentlemen 
volunteers at the height of the invasion crises in 1794, 1797 and 1798 was likewise 
conceived in terms of temporary expediency. Whatever the volunteers were to 
become later, from 1794 until 1798 they were deeply traditional in concept. Dundas 
argued that they ought to ‘have a View chiefly to the internal security of the Country, 
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and must be formed on that basis’. To him, the volunteers were needed most in large 
towns, and ought preferably to be subject to property qualification: they were 
effectively to be a propertied complement to the militia.31 Such an emphasis on 
wealth and status was indeed crucial at this early stage. J.H. Rose claims that Pitt did 
not ‘call the nation to arms’ before 1798 because it was too dangerous to arm 
potential troublemakers, but this is misleading.32 Many of the older politicians who 
advised Pitt were in fact optimistic about the loyalty and ability of the lower orders in 
an emergency. Dundas, for example, had little problem with arming the people, 
partly because he remembered ‘the late contest in America where the choicest 
Troops in the World were baffled by the armed Burghers & Peasantry of the 
Country’.33 The main reason for holding back from widespread arming as in France 
was more practical. While the threat from French invaders remained only one part of 
a wider European struggle, it would be inexpedient to take men from their normal 
pursuits, and so ruin ‘all our trade, all our commerce, all our manufactures’.34 
The Pitt government in the mid-1790s was, then, keen to restrict itself to 
temporary measures well-grounded in political precedent. Despite the apparently 
dangerous novelty of the character of revolutionary France, the government’s 
reaction to the threat remained guarded. Habeas Corpus suspension and the Quota 
Acts were justified not only because of the extraordinary circumstances, but also 
because of the fact that they were temporary and had established historical pedigrees. 
The main focus of attention was elsewhere: so long as there was a prospect of 
defeating France on the continent, invasion scares were worrying but not yet overly 
alarming.  
The maintenance of constitutional norms only worked, however, so long as 
there was an immediate prospect of an end to the struggle. The instability of France’s 
government at first held out hopes that the war might end swiftly, but by the time the 
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First Coalition collapsed this hope was faint, and the attitude of British politicians 
began to change considerably. In 1795 one MP’s warning that France had ‘become a 
great and warlike nation, and is likely to remain warlike for ever’ had been 
disregarded, but by 1797 the government was beginning to agree with his point of 
view.35 As Pitt was told by the bishop of Llandaff, ‘I am in the present situation of 
the country an Enemy to palliates & temporary expedients’.36 With the rise of 
Napoleon in 1799, politicians fully embraced the possibility of a state of warfare 
which might last for generations, and placed the emphasis on measures which would 
permanently alter the fabric of political relations. Lord Minto argued in his notes for 
a speech in support of Habeas Corpus suspension in 1799 that the constitution had to 
be flexible to survive:  
If the Crown were in permanent possession of all those powers 
which the exigence of extraordinary occasions requires they would 
be too strong for liberty; & if the Crown is limited to those powers 
which are safe in ordinary times, they will be too weak for defence 
in moments of temporary peril. … An exception is indeed no part of 
the rule from which it is an exception, but it forms no less than the 
rule itself, part of that larger rule in which the particular rule is 
included.37 
 
Even the treaty of Amiens in 1802 did not change this opinion that relations with 
France might never be fully peaceful again. Before the redeclaration of war in 1803 
Sir George Shee urged that if defence measures could ‘not be accomplished without 
trenching on constitutional principles, the principles of the Constitution ought, as far 
as they affect the case, to be changed’.38 Government policy now sought to realign 
existing political networks in order to channel as much control as possible to the 
centre. 
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The search for a permanent solution: the 1800s 
The peace of Amiens in 1802 and its aftermath confirmed the impression that 
tension with France might be permanent. Britain surrendered all her conquests in 
India, South America and the West Indies except for Ceylon and Trinidad, whereas 
Napoleon used the peace to consolidate his hold on Holland, Italy and Switzerland.39 
So long as France continued to dominate the continent Britain’s peace establishment 
had to be maintained at strength. ‘The question of our internal defence and 
preparation must indisputably be very different from what it was formerly’, 
explained Charles Yorke, who was first Addington’s secretary at war and then his 
home secretary.40 This conviction was reinforced by Napoleon’s immediate 
escalation of invasion preparations along the French and Dutch coasts following the 
redeclaration of war in May 1803. As continental coalitions and peace initiatives 
alike failed, Addington, Pitt and their successors heralded the need for ‘some great, 
general, and permanent system, equal, not only to the present danger, but equal to 
that danger which may continue to threaten us, and which may not be terminated by 
the present war’.41 By 1806 politicians had almost ceased to distinguish between the 
states of war and peace, at least as far as the armed forces were concerned. Sidmouth 
warned Windham after the collapse of the Third Coalition ‘that in Peace, as well as 
in War, we must place our chief reliance on a large regular Force’.42 Even Fox 
acknowledged that there was ‘no rational prospect of any peace that would exempt us 
from the necessity of watchful preparation and powerful establishments’.43 Without 
any possibility of a continental campaign all politicians could do was strengthen the 
home base and hope for the best. 
Ironically, considering how different the two nations were supposed to be, the 
best model for a British defence effort came from France. In 1794 she had 
successfully repelled an allied invasion, a fact which intrigued the politicians 
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responsible for framing Britain’s defence policy. ‘It is only by taking a lesson even 
from our Enemies … that we can expect absolute Security,’ Dundas was told in 
1796.44 Instead of simply expressing disgust at France’s despotic methods of 
conscription, politicians began to be fascinated by them to the point of emulation. 
A.D. Harvey argues that they were oblivious to the resemblance between the French 
measures and their own, but this is to underrate their perception and misunderstand 
their motivation.45 In fact, they were highly conscious of the parallels, and did not 
shy away from them. The French levee en masse which had been so deprecated in 
1794 was used as the conscious model for the Levy en Masse Act of 1803, and the 
need for more manpower to satisfy both defensive and offensive requirements moved 
British policy closer and closer to conscription. Windham noted in 1803 that, 
although the physical force of the country had been used by France to subvert other 
nations, Britain would harness hers ‘for a very opposite purpose’, that is to preserve 
her own identity intact.46  
This change of emphasis from temporary to permanent defence measures was 
facilitated by an increase in the extent of information at the government’s command.  
As established in Chapter One, most historians of the late eighteenth century argue 
that Britain’s lack of bureaucratic structure made political centralisation difficult if 
not impossible. It would certainly have been awkward to command the growing 
variety of defence forces, or to implement the widespread arming of the nation, 
without reliable information about manpower and resources. However, the 
government did have a number of means by which it could acquire statistics, and it 
lost no time in providing itself with new means to suit new needs. Contrary to 
Jeremy Black’s assertion that the eighteenth-century state operated in ‘an 
information void’, by 1815 the means at its disposal had in fact become quite 
sophisticated.47 From traditional methods such as militia lists to the novelty of a 
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national census, by the end of the war the government possessed an impressively 
broad picture of the country it governed acquired from a wide variety of sources. 
The acquisition of information was most obviously helped by the 
establishment of a government-sponsored spy network. The Home Office, Post 
Office and Foreign Office all liaised to keep tabs on domestic radicals and suspicious 
characters, and after 1793 the Alien Office kept track of foreigners resident in, 
entering and leaving the British Isles. After 1798 foreigners were subjected to an 
even stricter arrangement of licences and passport controls.48 The Alien Office was 
also the hub of a system funded by the Home Office with agents all around the 
world, described by Elizabeth Sparrow as ‘the prototype from which modern secret 
service has evolved’.49 Of course it took time for this to gather momentum, and even 
members of Pitt’s first government doubted the efficiency of their own intelligence 
services. George Rose, former under-secretary of the Treasury, complained in 1801 
to Pitt that ‘the Miscreants on the other side of the Water know what we are doing 
just as well as we do … while we are in considerable ignorance of their motions’.50 
Rose was not, however, au fait with Addington’s arrangements, and certainly the 
government’s secret service record after 1802 was — with the exception of the 
Emmett insurrection in Dublin in 1803 — extremely successful. Its intelligence 
network caught Colonel Despard and his conspirators in December 1802 after having 
tracked them patiently for several months, and kept a close watch on the French 
naval armaments from 1803 onwards.51 The development of this secret service was a 
good example of the way in which the government felt a certain degree of 
centralisation, however surreptitious, to be necessary in the fight against 
revolutionary France. 
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More transparent methods of acquiring information for defence purposes 
included the use of existing militia lists and taxation records. Legislation of 1762 had 
required each county to submit annual returns to the privy council of all men aged 
eighteen to forty-five for the fixing of the militia ballot.52 These lists provided the 
government with a reasonably accurate picture of the nation’s manpower potential. 
Further up-to-date lists were drawn up under the terms of the Militia Act of 1802, the 
Training Act of 1806 and the Local Militia Act of 1808.53 Registration and tax 
returns were also a good way of acquiring information, and the government was not 
shy of using such means to their fullest extent. In 1794 Pitt admitted that the tax on 
births and burials ‘had been imposed … more with a view to information than 
revenue’.54 Similarly, the Triple Assessment in 1797 was proposed in part as ‘a 
General Inquisition into the state of every man’s dealings and affairs’, a principle 
followed by the Income Tax a year later.55 The government could put out feelers to 
find out not only how wealthy its taxpayers were, but also other useful information 
which might have been considered intrusive if collected through other means.56 
Militia and taxation records were certainly useful for gauging national 
resources, but the data that could be drawn from them was fairly restricted. As a 
result, the government often preferred to create its own methods of collecting 
specific information when traditional means fell short. Part of the General Defence 
Acts of 1798, for example, involved a mini-census of Britain’s available resources, 
including wagons, carts, horses, and other means of transportation in preparation for 
moving the nation’s people, goods, and food inland in case of invasion. Bakers were 
required to give detailed accounts of the amount of bread they could produce to 
provision the armed forces which would be needed to combat the enemy.57 ‘The 
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object of the bill is to have the power of knowing, in the case of emergency, who are 
ready to appear in arms … and to enable those who are so inclined, to be put into that 
situation which may be most answerable to giving effect to their inclinations,’ 
Dundas explained.58 The information collected under the terms of the Act could 
easily be expanded as necessary: in 1803, for example, the Transport Board 
recommended that an additional list be kept of vessels offered for government 
service by merchants and owners of private craft, in case they should be needed.59 
The gathering of these statistics was an essential prerequisite if the politicians were 
to achieve their aim of establishing an armed nation under central control. 
By far the most valuable source of information acquired by the government, 
however, was the national census, which first took place in 1801. This had originally 
been proposed as a means to monitor the state of grain and other provisions 
following the scarcity of 1800, but when Charles Abbot presented Pitt with the idea 
the prime minister quickly spotted ‘its ulterior uses in matters of War and Finance’.60 
The census established more reliably than ever before that there were eleven million 
Britons in 1801, a number which rose to twelve and a half million by the time of the 
second census in 1811 (with an additional five million in Ireland).61 It was now 
possible to make tolerably accurate estimates of potential numbers that could be 
mustered against an invasion, and politicians were not slow in harnessing these facts 
to back up their defence proposals. Melville told Castlereagh to check against ‘those 
Tables of Population which contain a Statement of the number of Males of every 
Age from One to One Hundred Years’ when forming his defence plans of 1808.62  
None of the information available to the politicians was, however, quite 
flawless, and some of it may have been incomplete or falsified. This particularly 
applied to taxation records, which were obviously most likely to be misleading. Fox 
pointed out that Pitt’s use of Window Tax records to set quotas for each coastal 
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parish under the terms of his 1795 Quota Act was an ‘extremely fallible’ way to 
implement such an important measure.63 Deliberate non-compliance was also 
common, and several counties never returned information under the terms of the 
Defence Acts of 1798 and 1803. In mid 1804 three Scottish counties and two Welsh 
counties had not yet responded to the government’s queries.64 This sort of behaviour 
was not always deliberately obstructive: a Chelmsford meeting in 1796 decided that 
it was unnecessary to undertake a required inventory of local cattle and livestock 
because ‘the farmers and other inhabitants on the coast were so zealously disposed to 
remove’ them in case of an invasion anyway.65 Without the means to check every 
single record submitted, the government had to take their accuracy on faith. Despite 
these setbacks, however, the information at the government’s fingertips by the turn 
of the nineteenth century was vast. Even if several returns were missing, inaccurate 
or deliberately falsified, the government faced French invasion from 1800 onwards 
with a reasonably confident picture of the country’s resources. Its reaction to the 
invasion threat was thus liberated from the constraints of guesswork. All that now 
had to be decided was whether the situation was serious enough to unleash Britain’s 
maximum force. 
A change in attitude towards the ‘armed nation’, the volunteers, and the need 
for a means of controlling the auxiliary forces provided the first hint that the 
requirements of defence were changing. As argued above, the volunteers in the mid-
1790s had largely consisted of a body of independent gentlemen who largely clothed 
and armed themselves. By 1798, however, the force was becoming more inclusive 
and more widespread. Partly this was because the threat of republican revolution had 
become less immediate, but it seems likely that the politicians would have wished to 
trust the people with weapons in any event. Some argued that it made no sense to try 
to save Britain from invasion if she was rotting from the inside anyway: ‘If there be 
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any danger in [arming the people], all plans will be equally futile’.66 Inflated 
numbers, however, meant an increased need for central control, particularly if the 
volunteers were to be brought together swiftly to meet an invasion. As a result, the 
volunteers of 1803 were very different from their predecessors in 1798 or 1801, let 
alone 1794. They were much more numerous (450,000 at their peak in 1804), and 
much more varied in background. More importantly, politicians now took a direct 
interest in the way they were raised, clothed, paid, and deployed, whereas before 
many of these decisions had been left in the hands of the localities. Castlereagh noted 
that the ‘authority of the Crown’ and the ‘interposition of Parliament’ in volunteer 
affairs was justified and necessitated by statute.67 A series of confusing and often 
contradictory political Acts and decrees governing their behaviour was succeeded in 
March 1804 by the Volunteer Consolidation Act, which definitively laid down the 
rules for the force. It was evident to many that the only way the volunteer system 
could meet the new circumstances of the war was by their being subsumed under the 
authority of the Crown. Unfortunately this made it difficult to distinguish them 
clearly from more regular bodies such as the militia or, even more ominously, the 
Army. 
This change in the way the volunteers were conceived was clear from the 
attitude of two of their foremost political supporters. Addington was in power in 
1803 when the volunteers were reformed and had significant input into the new 
arrangements. Pitt, although out of office, had presided over their 1790s incarnation, 
and latched onto their cause with relish from 1803 onwards. Both men agreed that 
arming even a broad cross-section of the people was perfectly safe, and that the 
volunteers ought to be capable of fighting alongside the regular force in case of 
invasion.68 Their methods of implementing this vision, however, differed markedly. 
In part this was because of their different experience: Addington was dealing with a 
wartime situation for the first time, whereas Pitt had already faced the 
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disillusionment of forcing deeply unpopular measures past uncooperative local 
bodies. As a result, Addington was more likely to emphasise cooperation, personal 
zeal, and limited government intervention, whereas Pitt was much more 
uncompromising. His vision of the volunteers was positive, but hinted at the 
direction in which government policy would move after Addington’s fall in 1804; 
that is, away from voluntary service, and closer to compulsion. As Pitt himself 
explained, although ‘voluntary services were certainly preferable to any which were 
to be obtained by compulsion in any shape’, a mixture of both was the only way to 
make the volunteer system permanent.69 Even more than Addington’s, Pitt’s vision 
of the volunteers was of a hybrid body, part regular and part civilian, which would 
make a much greater sacrifice of its time and independence than had been the case in 
the 1790s. ‘Under the command of proper officers and with a proper degree of 
discipline’, the volunteers would form a force he described as ‘great’, ‘respectable’, 
and ‘useful’.70 It was partly because he felt that Addington’s government was not 
doing enough to legislate for the volunteers that Pitt emerged into open opposition in 
1803. Of course he also had other political reasons, but his choice of issue reflected a 
growing conviction that volunteering by itself was not an adequate way to repel an 
invasion. 
That the volunteers were too widely dispersed, too undisciplined, and too 
ephemeral to deal with a Napoleonic invasion had become apparent to many other 
politicians, although Pitt would not have gone so far himself. Many felt that they 
could not be relied on because they had offered their services out of a momentary 
enthusiasm, which meant that they could withdraw them at any time.71 Dundas, for 
one, continued to see the system of the 1790s, independently funded and commanded 
by local gentry, as the ideal, and thought the only real permanent volunteer 
establishment ought to be limited in numbers and based on property.72 As the 
prospect of a long-term invasion threat became increasingly likely, the political 
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pendulum swung more firmly against the volunteers and in favour of a more 
permanent professional force. Windham, as secretary of state for war in 1806, placed 
the thrust of defence policy back on a combination of the regular army and a 
reinvention of the Levy en Masse. He allowed the volunteers ‘to relax their 
discipline’ and removed their source of state funding, which effectively returned 
them to their 1790s position.73 When Castlereagh succeeded Windham he too was 
reluctant to rely on a force that he described as ‘a fleeting and inapplicable mass’.74 
Although he initially pledged ‘to revive the Zeal and discipline of the Volunteers’, 
this was mainly because the failure of the Training Act meant there was no 
significant defence body to rely on other than a much-reduced militia.75 His 
subsequent defence policy showed that his attitude to volunteers was, in reality, little 
different from Windham’s. 
The growing need for an effective, centralised and long-term defence plan 
united the friends and the opponents of the volunteers. Whatever one felt about over-
reliance on them, something needed to be done to strengthen Britain’s ability to 
withstand an invasion both now and in future. This conviction accelerated the move 
towards a mixture of voluntary service and compulsion, in stark contrast to the 
defence policy of the 1790s. Pitt may not have spoken for everybody when he 
expressed faith in the volunteers, but he echoed a growing concern when he declared 
that it was  
impossible to trust continually to the operation of the volunteer spirit 
… The volunteer system was founded upon the conviction of 
immediate danger; if that cause should cease, it is not at all 
extraordinary that the effect should cease also. If that is the case, it 
becomes the duty of Parliament to do that for the country which 
spontaneous zeal cannot do.76 
 
Instead of focusing on the prospect of an immediate French assault, new legislation 
had to be able to cope with all eventualities, including the reopening of offensive 
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opportunities on the continent. Five measures were passed with this view in mind: 
the Army of Reserve Act and the Levy en Masse Act in 1803, the Additional Force 
Act in 1804, the Training Act in 1806, and the Local Militia Act in 1808.77 In the 
time it took to pass these Acts, four different ministries had come and gone, each 
strongly aware of what its predecessor had not achieved and of the difficulty of the 
task that lay before it.  
Planned to provide a force of 50,000 men ‘for the Defence of the United 
Kingdom, as well as for the Systematick Recruiting of the Regular Infantry’, the 
Army of Reserve was designed to be more controllable than the volunteers and to be 
a source of long-term recruitment into the regulars.78 It was not, therefore, as some 
thought, simply a way of providing a large disposable army, although Hobart 
exaggerated when he said the Reserve would be ‘wholly defensive’.79 To many 
politicians, the measure was particularly popular because it allowed the soldiers of 
the Reserve to volunteer into the regulars, a clause that allowed the new force to 
adapt to a change in international circumstances. Melville called the Reserve ‘the 
very best expedient ever devised for keeping up the regular army through the 
medium of a ballot, which it cannot be in any other mode’.80 Despite a promising 
start, however, the force never reached its full potential, and had produced only 
37,000 effectives by May 1804. It was hampered, too, by the much-criticised 
decision to exempt volunteers from its ballot. Although a template for future 
measures that experimented further with the new ideas about the relationship 
between defensive and offensive bodies, in the first instance the Army of Reserve 
was considered to have failed. 
The Levy en Masse Act, passed around the same time as the Reserve, was 
more defensive in intention but more vital in asserting the central government’s role 
in defence. The Act vested the ultimate responsibility for summoning and deploying 
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the maximum military and civilian force of the nation in the monarch, who was 
enabled to use ‘his ancient and undoubted prerogative, in commanding the assistance 
of all his subjects fit to bear arms, for the purpose of repelling an invasion of a 
foreign enemy’.81 It was bold and novel in several respects, mainly because of its 
explicit commitment to arm the whole nation, and it served as the basis for nearly all 
subsequent legislation. Ironically, the Act itself was never put into operation, since it 
included a clause by which it was automatically suspended if enough volunteers 
came forward to make it unnecessary. This clause had been intended to frighten 
volunteers into offering their services, but some were disgusted by such blackmail. 
Lord Sheffield was scandalised by a measure which, he felt, could only be meant ‘in 
terrorem & never could have been carried into execution’.82 In any case, making the 
Levy so explicitly dependent on volunteering seemed to perpetuate the idea that the 
emergency would be of short duration, and by 1803 such a belief was out of date. 
Like the volunteers, the Levy was, as Melville pointed out, ‘more calculated for the 
pressure of the moment, than as a digested system’.83 Ultimately, the combination of 
the volunteer system, the Army of Reserve and the Levy en Masse proved 
unsatisfactory. Something stronger, more unequivocal, and more long-term, was 
required. 
The measure which was proposed to answer these requirements was the 
Additional Force Act, which, although ultimately unsuccessful, demonstrated the 
shift away from volunteering and towards greater control from above. It was the first 
measure with the word ‘permanent’ as part of the official title, and its parallels with 
the regulars were even starker than those of the Reserve.84 One of Pitt’s friends 
informed him that he liked the plan because it provided ‘a home defence as well 
officered as any part of the Army’.85 The Act created a new ‘Additional Force’, 
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whose members were encouraged to volunteer into local battalions affiliated to 
regular army units.86 The sharp focus on regular forces was further demonstrated by 
the reduction of the British militia to 48,000 men and the integration of the Army of 
Reserve and Supplementary Militia into the new force. The Additional Force’s 
aberrant departure from the system of balloting, however, and its reliance instead on 
a quota of men to be raised on pain of a £20 fine, proved its downfall. As was the 
case with the Quota Acts in the 1790s, this policy simply meant that the parishes 
picked the worst men or preferred to pay the fine. The Act’s reputation was not 
improved by the slowness of its implementation. After his death Pitt’s supporters 
tried to justify the Act by claiming it had not been in effect long enough to succeed, 
but this argument simply underlined the dislocation between the need for a 
permanent measure and one that would meet immediate requirements. 
Unfortunately this problem was not addressed by the Training Act, another 
measure described as ‘permanent’ and designed to operate over a long period of 
time. It divided the nation’s able-bodied men into three classes and provided for the 
balloting of two hundred thousand men to be trained by rotation over a three-year 
period. Though the Act included elements from several of its predecessors — it kept 
the second battalions created by the Additional Force, and was described by 
Windham as ‘a new edition’ of the Levy en Masse87 — it broke new ground by 
placing the emphasis on recruitment into the regulars rather than defence. It came as 
part of a package that aimed to create a new, revitalised regular army by introducing 
limited service for renewable terms of seven years, a rise in soldiers’ pay, and better 
pension schemes for veterans and widows. The Act was politically unpopular, 
however, partly because Windham took the opportunity provided by his restructuring 
of Britain’s defence system to attack the auxiliary forces. His proposed 200,000 
strong ‘armed peasantry’ was intended to replace the volunteers in their role as 
assistants to the regulars in the event of an invasion. The Act also reduced the size of 
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the militia, and Windham’s proposal to do away with the ballot and replace it with a 
limited bounty more or less turned it into a regular army on home service.88 It all 
made for too great a step, and was approached too bluntly. Indeed, the fact that the 
Training Act was intended to provide long-term rather than immediate results sealed 
its fate, and without a visible improvement in either recruitment into the regulars or 
in the size of the defence force the plan was abandoned by Windham’s successors. 
His failure to produce anything but a new list of men eligible to be balloted after a 
year suggested that, as with the Additional Force, one imperfect system had simply 
been replaced by another. 
The first initiative to be acclaimed as a true success was Castlereagh’s 1808 
Local Militia Act, which continued to move away from a locally-based volunteer and 
militia system towards a centralised defence network. It was the first measure that 
managed to meet both temporary and future needs, and was thus probably also the 
first that fully deserved the epithet ‘permanent’: ironically, it did not use it. Its 
purpose was simply to make ‘more effectual provision’ than the Training Act for 
educating the nation in the use of arms.89 Castlereagh attacked Windham’s ‘armed 
peasantry’ as ‘a disarmed Rabble, too numerous and too undisciplined to be made 
use of in the existing Regiments with effect, and wholly incapable in itself of 
rendering Service’.90 He proposed instead to provide for a force of 200,000 men 
balloted to serve for four years, a proportion of whom would be encouraged to recruit 
to the regulars in return for a bounty.91 Like Windham, Castlereagh placed the stress 
on providing a body of men from which the regulars would be able to recruit.92 The 
Local Militia could thus trace its ancestry directly from the Army of Reserve and the 
Training Act. The plan’s main asset was that it could be altered according to any 
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future change in circumstances. Indeed, despite some flaws, such as its tendency to 
draft into the regulars overlarge numbers of men who could not easily be replaced in 
a hurry, the Local Militia adapted well to the new conditions that opened up after the 
Peninsular War began in Spain and Britain regained the offensive. It remained in 
force until the peace in 1814 and was thus the most long-lived, and successful, of all 
the defence measures. 
Even more importantly, the Local Militia marked one of the most significant 
changes in government defence policy. Until 1808 drafting from the militia into the 
regulars had only been resorted to on a temporary basis, and even then was 
smothered in floods of apologies. The fact that Castlereagh had openly made it the 
basis of his Act signified the culmination of the route from a combination of 
volunteers, militia and regulars to a centralised system closely bound to the Army. 
Indeed, his vision of the ultimate defence force was of a Local Militia combined with 
a body ‘composed in a greater Proportion if not entirely of second Battalions of the 
Line’.93 Historians have fallen into the trap of taking the term ‘local militia’ at its 
face value and, given Castlereagh’s reputation as a reactionary, have characterised 
his Act as ‘a conservative riposte’ to radical views.94 Castlereagh himself lent 
credence to this belief, since he went to great lengths to justify his measure as a 
return to a more familiar structure of British defence. He announced that  
he had … avoided every thing that appeared mighty ingenious, 
because he knew very well, that on all subjects, and especially on 
military subjects, these ingenious and complicated theories, though 
they might look extremely well on paper, were found to be sadly 
deficient when attempted to be put into practice.95  
 
One should not, however, take his words at face value, intended as they were as a dig 
at the Training Act and meant to reassure those listeners who disagreed with it. Any 
measure which codified the use of the militia to feed the regulars was hardly 
conservative. In any case the Local Militia Act was not really a militia in the 
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traditional sense. Nor was it designed to replace the militia that already existed. 
Castlereagh meant the two forces to be distinct, and referred to the new force in his 
notes as ‘an additional militia’.96 Like the Army of Reserve, the Additional Force, 
and the Training Act before it, the Local Militia created a body of men who were 
explicitly linked to the regulars rather than to the existing militia; like them it also 
aimed to bring the implementation of defence plans more closely under central 
control.  
These developments were devastating to the old auxiliary forces. Although 
the volunteers had experienced a spectacular revival during 1803-5, the withdrawal 
of state funding in 1806 led to a decline hastened by Castlereagh’s reluctance to do 
anything further for them after 1807. The militia, too, suffered greatly. Unlike the 
volunteers it continued to exist, but its role changed significantly as a result of the 
government’s attitude. Once portrayed as the constitutional buttress of the nation and 
a guarantee against a strong standing army, the tide of political opinion had turned 
towards the need for a significant armed body under the control of the executive. 
Militiamen were balloted and trained for up to five years with a reasonable amount 
of discipline, and it therefore made sense for the politicians to look to the militia to 
provide large trained drafts of men in emergency situations. By 1803 the original 
militia principle had already become seriously outdated, and subsequent drafts of 
men into the regulars further compromised its integrity. The Local Militia Act of 
1808 legalised a practice which had long chipped away at the concept of a 
decentralised militia. 
Prior to 1808 the draft had been problematic because the militia’s deep 
political and symbolic significance meant that any attempts to transform it into a 
recruiting ground for the Army encountered resistance. ‘The word “Militia” in its 
operations on Lord-Lieutenants & Country Gentlemen is like the fabulous effect of 
music on persons stung by the Tarentula [sic]’, wrote Lord Auckland wryly.97 The 
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Pitt government was understandably reluctant to force a show-down, particularly as 
many of the militia colonels were, in Cornwallis’s words, ‘formidable as a political 
as well as a Military body’.98 In 1794, 1796 and 1798 Pitt made sure to meet up with 
lords lieutenant, magistrates, mayors and officers to discuss legislation that had the 
potential to affect the constitution of the militia.99 As its military needs escalated, 
however, the government was more inclined to adapt it to the new wartime 
circumstances willy-nilly. By the time of the passage of the 1798 Defence Act, 
political fortunes had begun to swing against a decentralised force based in the 
counties, and relations between the government and the militia colonels began to 
strain. The dispute over a proposal to form special ‘flank companies’ commanded by 
regular officers forced a wedge between the government, its military advisors, and 
the militia colonels, all of whom wanted different things from the force as it stood. 
Dundas reported to Grenville that several militia officers were strongly against it, and 
that Pitt was undecided, while the military men were ‘all clamorous on the subject’. 
He further complained about ‘the disagreeable state in which Government is placed 
by any measure in Parliament relative to militia’.100 A compromise was eventually 
hammered out, but the need to fight off attacks from the government’s own 
supporters was not appreciated at a particularly delicate juncture of the war. 
If having to stand up to militia colonels was bad enough, then caving in to 
their demands was worse. The reaction of several officers and county lords lieutenant 
towards even the smallest of ministerial concessions was to act as though a moral 
victory had been secured. In the wake of the dispute over the ‘flank corps’, one of the 
lords lieutenant, Carnarvon, concluded that the government always backed down 
when faced with a considerable and organised opposition. Dundas had ‘respected the 
minority who opposed him so much, as to renounce’ a previous project: ‘He will now 
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do the same, if he is met with firmness & unremitted perseverance’.101 The 
impression that unpopular measures would be discarded if a reasonable amount of 
extraparliamentary pressure was organised was exactly what the government wanted 
to avoid. Carnarvon’s tactics did work with the flank companies, and Dundas agreed 
to restore them to their original regiments, but ministers were not willing to submit 
so easily again.102 After 1798 ministers were increasingly unwilling to sacrifice the 
broad picture in order to placate local criticism. Small wonder, therefore, that 
Addington’s government was often less likely to compromise than Pitt’s. In 1803, 
when the duke of Gloucester reported the city of Liverpool’s belief that government 
had neglected its defences, the duke of York testily replied that Gloucester should 
‘impress upon the mind of the Public that view of things which the exigency of the 
State may render necessary or which the Opinion of the Government may deem most 
wise’.103 Similarly, although Addington’s attempts to establish a reciprocal militia 
between Britain and Ireland in 1804 drew another impassioned protest from 
Fitzwilliam, Carnarvon and several other lords, the urgency of the need for 
manpower had made the government more daring about interfering with the 
militia.104  
By the 1800s, in any case, the character of the militia had changed.105 The 
government’s attempts to connect it to the regular army — with which it was often 
bundled in official statistics — was partly due to the impression that it had diverged 
from the ideals that had led to its creation in 1757.106 Windham argued that ‘the word 
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Militia was now a mere term, which had in it nothing but its original signification’.107 
Substitution, which allowed the rich to pay their way out of the militia ballot, had 
ruined the original idea that the militia should be a force of armed gentry. The Militia 
Act of 1802 had set the seal on this deviation by confirming its legality. Since 
substitutes were usually the kind of poor, workless men targeted by recruitment into 
the regulars, and since governments sought to end the competition between the two 
branches of the armed services, it made sense to see the militia as a nursery for 
soldiers. By 1803 Pitt, wiser no doubt after his years of painful diplomacy with the 
county officers in the 1790s, declared that too many men were swallowed up by the 
militia when a more flexible, less purely defensive force was needed to deal with any 
emergency at home or abroad. ‘A war that should be completely defensive, would, in 
his opinion, be both dishonourable and ruinous’; as a result, the most effective 
defence body would be one which could meet either need.108 The only way this could 
be achieved with the militia would be by introducing the draft, which had been 
illegal since 1767.109 This, like all attempts to bring the militia closer to the regulars, 
promised to be an acrimonious affair. 
Drafting was the only viable way to make the militia the kind of flexible 
force the war required, short of abolishing it completely, which no-one in charge of 
defence policy was prepared to do.110 Short-term attempts were made to draft bodies 
of men from the militia to the regulars in response to specific crises in 1798, 1799, 
1805, and 1806, but these temporary shifts were unsuited to the growing need for 
permanence and usually passed with great difficulty in the teeth of heated opposition. 
Some ministers thought it was simply not worth the effort. Addington complained 
that the draft was ‘entirely contrary to the liberty of the subject, and the feelings of 
the nation’.111 Weak governments were, moreover, unsure about provoking 
backbench rebellions on the issue. When he proposed to transfer 17,000 men from 
                                                 
107 Speech by Windham, reported in the Times, 24 March 1803, 2(b). 
108 Speech by Pitt, 6 June 1803, PH XXXVI, 1578. 
109 Western, The English Militia, p. 265. 
110 Memorandum on the regular force by Castlereagh, March 1803, PRONI, Castlereagh MSS, 
D3030/1769. 
111 Speech by Addington, 23 June 1803, PH XXXVI, 1623-4. 
 83 
the militia to the regulars in 1805, Pitt passed it off as a militia reduction rather than 
a draft.112 Melville, however, felt that a militia draft was the answer to the 
government’s manpower problems: ‘let it never be forgot when I brought forward the 
measure of admitting Volunteers from the Supplementary Militia, it produced in the 
course of three Months, not less than 33,000 excellent Recruits’.113 To be beneficial a 
draft had to become a regular and expected process, and by the time Melville wrote, 
in 1804, this had already begun. The Army of Reserve, the Additional Force and the 
Training Act all paved the way for the Local Militia, which enshrined drafting as part 
of the government’s policy for securing manpower. By the time of the Local Militia 
Act, resistance to it had been worn away by the scale of the emergency, and to an 
extent by custom.  
There were still, of course, some who thought drafting was a step too far on 
the road to direct conscription into the regular forces. As it happened they need not 
have worried, because the process of centralisation stopped short of it. This may 
seem surprising since the conscriptive principle was enshrined in the ballots of the 
militia and Army of Reserve, and the compulsion of the Levy en Masse and the 
Training Act.114 Several European countries including France and Prussia used it, the 
Royal Navy had long relied on it, and a sort of military impressment had already 
been resorted to in Britain between 1702 and 1712, over 1745 and 1746, 1756 and 
1757, and even as recently as 1778.115 It would have been the ultimate expression of 
central power, and would have solved all Britain’s manpower problems at a stroke. 
And yet it was a road which few politicians were prepared to take. A full discussion 
of the issue, however, properly belongs in the next chapter.116 
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Opposition to government policy 
The fact that no government in power during the war with France 
implemented direct conscription is a reminder that none of them was independent of 
political realities and so did not have an entirely free voice in defence. Although 
measures became stronger and more far-reaching as the war dragged on, 
governments had to react to domestic developments as well as to events abroad. 
Unfortunately, between 1801 and 1812, none was able to establish itself on stable 
grounds.117 Addington, Pitt, Grenville, Portland, and Perceval all suffered in this 
way, and in all cases the perceived weakness of their defence policy became an 
acceptable stick with which to beat them. By 1806 defence and military reform had 
become, as Grenville acknowledged, ‘among the very first [measures] which our 
duty would require from us’, and this imperative remained at least until there was a 
positive chance of offensive action in the Peninsula.118 Ministers were constantly 
torn between demands for strong-arm measures and criticism whenever they 
proposed any. Advice, solicited and unsolicited, flooded in from all quarters. The 
official correspondence of ministers more directly responsible for defence issues 
overflowed with memoranda drawn up by concerned soldiers, experts, politicians, 
militia colonels, and local notables. In parliament, politicians from all sides pushed 
for a more comprehensive defensive system and advanced their own ideas on how it 
should be managed. 
The most obvious challenge came from the parliamentary opposition, but it 
was unable to press its advantage despite government weakness. This did not of 
course mean that it was completely impotent, and Christopher Hall surely 
exaggerates when he argues that the Whigs were ‘never able to project themselves as 
a credible alternative to those in power’.119 Obviously, this had been the case before 
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Pitt’s resignation in 1801, since the Pitt-Portland coalition in 1794 had left Fox at the 
head of a ‘lobby group’ of only forty or fifty supporters, very loosely directed.120 
Quite apart from their numerical weakness in the division lobbies, which eventually 
led to their decision to secede from parliament, the Foxites could not agree on just 
how great the danger was. Fox himself was openly scornful: ‘All this story about an 
invasion is a mere pretence to gain the consent of the people to’ the government’s 
measures, and to mask the deplorable internal state of the country.121 Sheridan, on 
the other hand, often supported the government on matters of national urgency, such 
as the naval mutinies of 1797 and the Defence Act in 1798.122 All in all, the 
parliamentary opposition seemed incoherent and irrelevant. 
Between 1802 and 1806, by contrast, the opposition played a vital role in 
challenging the official line on defence and other matters. Following Pitt’s 
resignation, Grenville, Windham, Spencer, and others split off from their former 
leader and emerged into open opposition to Addington on the issue of the peace of 
Amiens. The resumption of war in 1803, and evidence of Napoleon’s palpable 
intentions to invade, enabled both the ‘New’ and ‘Old’ oppositions to put past 
disagreements behind them and start afresh. Fox and Grenville formed a 
‘cooperation’ in January 1804. This not only meant stronger numbers in the lobbies, 
but also an accession of expertise on defence policy, particularly in the person of 
Windham. As a result, the newly-coalesced opposition was able to propose a 
coherent defence platform that heavily undermined the Addington and second Pitt 
ministries. All of a sudden the government could no longer claim exclusive control 
over national defence. The opposition had officially staked its claim to govern 
through the presentation of an alternative agenda. 
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Moreover, several opposition MPs went to great lengths to associate 
themselves with the issue of defence, with Windham the most obvious example. 
Building on his past experience as Pitt’s secretary at war, he consciously set himself 
up as an expert from the opposition benches. He was prominently involved in 
organising resistance to invasion in his parts of Norfolk, spoke frequently in 
parliament, and authorised an edition of his speeches on defence to drive home the 
point.123 When he took office under the Talents in February 1806, the Anti-Jacobin 
Review declared that his appointment to the War Office was ‘perfectly appropriate; 
his mind has been directed of late years, in a particular manner, to military affairs’.124 
Windham’s success in associating himself with defence led to him being allowed to 
set the opposition’s agenda. Between 1803 and 1805 he detailed a number of ‘spear-
head’ proposals (such as limited service for regulars and the training of the 
population to arms) that represented the germ of the Training Act in his mind.125 Fox, 
for one, much approved of the three main components of Windham’s plans: the 
dislike of the volunteers, the preference for a rising en masse, and the wish to 
diminish the militia in size. These accordingly became the hallmarks of the 
opposition’s defence agenda from 1803 onwards.126  
Another of the most significant planks of their platform was the call for the 
establishment of a council of Britain’s foremost military minds to oversee war 
policy. This proposal had originally been mooted in March 1795 by Lord Suffolk, 
and had been the subject of an independent motion by Colonel Wood in 1797.127 
Although Fox and Sheridan had spoken in support, the opposition did not adopt it as 
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official policy until 1803, when its front-benchers backed a series of motions by 
Colonel Craufurd in July, August and December. Craufurd proposed a council 
presided over by the commander in chief and comprising the master and lieutenant 
general of the ordnance, as well as  
officers of great experience and acknowledged abilities, who would 
devote the whole of their time to the mature investigation of every 
means, that might be proposed by others, or should occur to 
themselves, for increasing our military strength, digesting and 
combining the whole into one great and comprehensive system.128 
 
There were after all many precedents for the creation of such a body, starting with 
the fact that Queen Elizabeth had ordered one formed ‘of the most intelligent and 
experienced military and naval officers’ at the time of the Armada.129 A military 
council was not, however, as innocuous as it first sounded, and the government was 
not duped. Craufurd’s proposals effectively accused the government of being unfit to 
transact military and defence policy. It was also a slap in the face of the duke of 
York, then commander in chief, and the other professional soldiers with whom the 
government corresponded.130 As the Times indignantly pointed out, such a council 
‘would have taken the military regulations out of the hands of the Executive 
Government’.131 This versatility of purpose, however, was what made the military 
council so valuable for the opposition. On the one hand, it allowed a dig at 
government policy. On the other, it was a statement that the opposition had a serious 
contribution to make to defence.  
As an opposition argument the idea of a military council was all very well, 
but it proved nearly impossible to enact in office. Because of the implied attack on 
the duke of York, Fox, Grenville and Windham could not hope to propose it as a 
serious part of their policy when in government, unless they were strong enough to 
overcome the king’s wrath, which was certain to be roused by any attack on the 
integrity of his son. That the Talents had originally intended to implement their 
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council policy was evident from the way Windham insisted on ‘a military council for 
the conduct of military operations & arrangements for defence’, even before taking 
office.132 Once installed, however, the ministry did not have the strength to dismiss 
royal opposition. Rumours flew among the Pittites that the king had initially refused 
to deal with Fox and Grenville because of their previous insistence on this very 
issue.133 Whether this was the case or not, the Talents never did insist on the point in 
office. 
As the Training Act showed, however, forcing through the most unpopular 
aspects of a platform first formed in opposition could have disastrous consequences 
for a government. Its passage and delayed implementation, along with the more 
general failure of the ministry’s military policy abroad, fatally damaged the Talents’ 
reputation. Over-focused as they were on defence, their overseas ventures in the 
Mediterranean, Turkey and South America appeared little more than random, 
opportunistic expedients.134 This strategy reflected the fact that continental 
involvement was out of the question following Prussia’s defeat at Jena in October 
1806, but its lack of success even given such narrow objectives was damning, and 
gave Grenville’s followers a bad name in military matters that followed them back to 
the opposition benches.135 Although they secured an extremely strong position in the 
general election of 1807, they were never able to reconstruct the commanding 
position they had occupied in opposition from 1803 to 1806, despite — or perhaps, 
in the wake of the Training Act, because of — the presence of Windham in their 
ranks. 
These major setbacks, and the decline in the opposition’s effectiveness after 
1807 must not, however, obscure its prominent role in the defence debate between 
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1803 and 1806. Defence was not only topical: it was also the only question on which 
ministers could not afford to dismiss opposing arguments. The Talents’ subsequent 
experience in office only reinforced the fact they had themselves discovered, that 
attacking government defence measures was of benefit to an opposition that might 
otherwise have been divided and purposeless. With their own defence agenda 
worked out, oppositionists could not easily be dismissed as meddlers with dubious 
motives. On the contrary, the onus was now on the government to propose a better 
plan. Handled well, the question of national defence hit vulnerable ministries where 
it hurt. 
Even more worrying for the government than the attacks of the parliamentary 
opposition was the need to cultivate the support of the military and naval 
professionals. The advice of these men, usually current or former officers, was highly 
prized and was also needed in order to give the defence policy formulated by civilian 
politicians credibility. A.D. Harvey argues that the ministries between 1793 and 1815 
hardly ever sought such guidance, but this is certainly an exaggeration founded on 
his belief that the cabinet ought to have approached military men officially as a 
body.136 What Harvey seems to forget is that cabinet meetings were not the only way 
to make official decisions, since there were a number of alternative routes for the 
government to consult military expertise. The most obvious was for individual 
ministers with defence responsibilities to correspond with the commanders of 
Britain’s various military districts. These not only had specialist local information 
but could also give broader tactical advice as well. Other more personal contacts 
were equally valuable. Dundas received much feedback from friends and family such 
as General David Dundas and Sir Alexander Hope, and Windham had connections 
with Colonel Craufurd, General Money and a variety of other military men. Many 
members of the cabinet — not just those with military duties — had also served in 
the armed forces. Lord Chatham (master general of the ordnance over three 
ministries), Lord Mulgrave (foreign secretary in Pitt’s second ministry), and Lord 
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Hobart were only a few of the ministers who had seen active service. Nor were 
politicians shy about calling on professional advice to buttress their arguments in 
parliament. When Pitt proposed his motion to indict Lord St Vincent’s naval 
administration in March 1804, he tried to get Captain Sir Home Popham specially 
elected for the occasion. Addington, on the other hand, could count on the arguments 
of Sir Edmund Pellew to repel Pitt’s attacks in the house of commons.137  
The support of these men was the more particularly to be sought because their 
opposition, backed up as it was by a wealth of experience, could be damning. The 
problem was that, although ready to give advice if approached, many professionals 
had little confidence in the politicians’ military sagacity. Cornwallis criticised the 
various theories bandied about in parliament over the summer of 1803: ‘Pitt wants to 
make the volunteers more of soldiers than their constitution can possibly admit; and 
Fox on the contrary, so little of soldiers as to be entirely useless’.138 Professional men 
did not, as a rule, share the same agenda as the politicians, and they often failed to 
appreciate the politics that underlay some decisions, especially on matters which 
touched on the militia and the volunteers.  
Understandably, the military men had a much better opinion of the regulars 
than the militia or the volunteers, whom they felt to be unreliable. The government, 
therefore, had to implement the advice they were given in a way that would meet 
both military and political needs without angering its supporters or the advisors 
themselves. It was a delicate balance to strike, and inevitably, if a military man went 
into obvious political opposition, the government would have a very knowledgeable 
and dangerous opponent to contend with. Sometimes such opposition was traceable 
to party, as was the case with the duke of Richmond, an ex-soldier who had once 
been Pitt’s colleague but had since fallen out with him politically, and was now 
highly critical of his defence measures.139 The same was true of Windham’s foremost 
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military contact, Robert Craufurd, who opposed the Addington and Pitt ministries on 
the subject of the Army of Reserve, the Volunteer Consolidation Act, and Ireland.140 
Other more independent attacks could not, however, be tarnished with a party label. 
The thorn in Windham’s side on military matters was General Banastre Tarleton, a 
former Foxite, whose blistering attack on the Talents’ military measures was 
buttressed by a career which dated back to the American war in the 1770s.141 This 
independence, along with his military standing, gave Tarleton’s arguments a cachet 
the civilian politicians lacked. 
Conflict between ministers and their military advisers on the matter of the 
volunteers and militia, as well as other topics, echoed the broader problem that, as 
the government’s defence plans became more and more stringent, it moved further 
and further out of touch with the opinions of the men who normally supported it in 
parliament. The attempts by government to centralise the defence process often 
encountered obstacles created by well-meaning individuals who, acting from a local 
or independent perspective, tried to push official policy down an opposite path. Most 
notably, the government disagreed with many of its correspondents on the role of 
individuals in the creation, as well as the implementation, of defence measures. As 
far as the government was concerned, policy formation was one thing that ought to 
be under complete central control: ‘all questions … of this nature were supposed to 
originate with His Majesty’s Ministers’.142 Grenville, whose opposition behaviour 
was tainted by his nearly twenty-year long experience in government, emphasised 
that in matters of national urgency right ideas ‘should be executed, & to talk of their 
being unpopular would be disgraceful & unmanly’.143 As far as everyone else was 
concerned, however, the message given out by the policy of arming the nation was 
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more mixed. ‘This war is the war of the public’, an anonymous pamphleteer declared 
in 1804 in an open letter addressed to Windham.144 Several of the public agreed: ‘A 
British subject is warranted by the Constitution to give his Sentiments upon publick 
affairs. In certain exigencies he is in some degree bound to do so … and in 
proportion as his Country appears to be in danger that duty becomes imperative’.145 
The expectation that all men would come forward to defend their king and country 
seemed to give the public a licence to deliver their unsolicited opinions on national 
defence. 
In principle this did not have much of an impact on government policy, and 
most of the letters from all directions that caused the ministers’ private letter boxes to 
overflow were probably little more than an annoyance. Occasionally, however, 
genuinely disturbing opinions were expressed on the relationship between 
government and people, including some by men whose political ideas were 
comfortably conventional, such as the Dorset gentleman William Morton Pitt. His 
detailed plans for national defence, published in the 1790s and revised, on 
Addington’s request, in an unpublished form in 1803, were not on the face of things 
very controversial, and have even been mistaken for the work of his distant cousin, 
prime minister William Pitt.146 What made Morton Pitt’s plan particularly 
uncomfortable reading for the government was his insistence on the need to keep the 
nation informed of developments affecting defence policy. His reasoning was that 
official plans were ‘more likely to be acceptable, & eagerly embraced by the people, 
provided it be previously and judiciously explained to them’.147 This had more than a 
flavour of censure about it, since by this interpretation a government that did not 
keep the people abreast of events did not deserve their confidence. This was clearly 
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an attack on government secrecy and an assertion of the rights of the individual as 
being more important than the safety of the community as a whole. 
Morton Pitt proceeded to touch on another delicate issue which, already 
contentious before the French Revolution, had become even more so afterwards: the 
right to bear arms. ‘It should ever be remembered that, by our constitution, by Magna 
Charta, &c, the right of possessing arms is inherent to every British Subject’, he 
wrote.148 The reason this issue was controversial was that it directly related to 
definitions of political representation. As H. T. Dickinson points out, it had an 
established whig pedigree, but was primarily limited to the landed interests, who had 
a direct stake in the survival of the polity.149 It had always been subject to both 
practical and legal interpretations, with the emphasis usually on ‘bearing’ rather than 
‘owning’.150 The idea of the armed nation revealed the dichotomy between the rights 
of the propertied and of the unpropertied. All men were now entitled, and 
encouraged, to bear arms, a practice that flew directly in the face of the old 
conventions. Talk of ‘rights’ was in any case politically unfashionable following the 
French revolution. It was only one step away from the ‘right to bear arms’ to the 
‘right of resistance’, another part of old whig ideology that had mostly lapsed by the 
end of the century.151 One or two correspondents did take that step, and although the 
‘resistance’ in question was not against a corrupt government but against a French 
invasion, some came a little too close for comfort: ‘one of the first principles of a 
free Government’ was to establish ‘a power of resistance in the people to every 
attempt against it either foreign or domestic’.152 Understandably, such language was 
not likely to play a significant role in government justifications of its own policy. 
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More conservative arguments were just as likely as radical ones to conflict 
with official views. Medieval feudalism was one of the most common models for 
national defence harnessed by government correspondents who wished to stress the 
connections between the landlords and their tenants.153 Many politicians were indeed 
sympathetic to such a view, which, after all, seemed to accord so closely with the 
government’s own emphasis on the importance of the social hierarchy. ‘I have long 
been partial to the revival as far as Circumstances would permit of something like the 
feudal Principle in this Country for the support of the Monarchy’, wrote Sir George 
Shee.154 An eighteenth-century adaptation of feudalism was not, however, in step 
with the government’s defence plans. The government expressed its disapproval of 
this contemporary revival of the feudal principle when it turned down the offer of the 
duke of Northumberland to arm a thousand of his tenants.155 It was after all hardly an 
ideal solution for a government seeking top-down control, since it had the potential 
to break the nation’s defence forces down to its smallest components by relying on 
disparate groups raised and armed by individuals. Because of its emphasis on the 
ancient obligations between the lords and the king, feudal principles were no longer 
thought by many in government to provide the right sort of framework for binding 
Britons together.  
However, such luke-warm official responses did not stop plans being formed 
on the basis of a resurrection of feudalism, and one was even implemented in the 
form of the North Pevensey Legion. In its practical form, the Legion was a volunteer 
unit commanded by Lord Sheffield, with the assistance of former soldier and Indian 
nabob Sir John Macpherson. In its theoretical form, it was described by Macpherson 
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as a ‘Return to the feudal System of Defence against the Invasions of Renewed 
Barbarism’, and as ‘the Heureka [sic] for the preservation of order government & 
Property’.156 His plan, which he detailed to everyone who would listen at home and 
abroad, involved stalling the French across Europe with units modelled on the North 
Pevensey prototype, buttressed by the strength derived from local ties and 
aristocratic leadership. In England, however, the proposal failed to find widespread 
support, causing Macpherson to complain that it was ‘better understood at Vienna 
Dresden Berlin & Madrid than at London’.157  
No doubt this was because the Legion did not at all fit into the government’s 
schemes. It eschewed ‘aid from Government except for Arms’ and was limited to 
defending its local territory, both of which clauses had been made illegal by 
Addington’s volunteer legislation.158 Had the Legion been accepted as a prototype, 
its stipulation of property as a qualification for defence would have placed a practical 
limitation on the range of options at the government’s disposal in providing the 
strongest and most comprehensive defence force possible in the event of an invasion. 
Taken to its logical extreme, the Legion’s feudal basis meant that proposals to arm 
the entire nation by rotation, or even by ballot, were out of the question. These were 
expedients the government was unwilling to forego, as proved by the terms of the 
Army of Reserve, the Additional Force Act, the Training Act, and the Local Militia 
Act. Eventually, and somewhat ironically, the Legion fell victim to the march of 
political events. It was finally killed by the withdrawal of government funding under 
the terms of Windham’s Training Act. Too expensive to maintain, it disbanded in 
September 1806.159  
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The government’s victory over this and other attacks on its defence policy 
from independent political commentators was, however, tempered by its growing 
weakness. The ‘balkanisation of the old Pittite alliance’ that followed Pitt’s 
resignation had created a confusing situation in which Pitt and Addington opposed 
each other, while Grenville and Fox joined forces.160 These occurrences seemed 
unnatural to contemporaries, who were deeply alarmed by them. An anonymous 
paper written in early January 1806 pointed out that Napoleon had achieved so much 
on the continent in part because of ‘the Disunion of Parties’ in the states he had 
invaded.161 For the Addington, Pitt, Grenville, Portland, and Perceval governments, 
political instability had more immediate implications. Several government defence 
measures, particularly the Additional Force and Training Acts, were damaged by 
wrangling that had more to do with political circumstances than with the immediate 
danger. Britain’s international reputation, too, seemed likely to suffer from 
successive governments’ loss of credibility at a time when politicians desperately 
sought a new continental alliance. One reason why defence measures became 
stronger and more uncompromising was simply that ministers were stung by repeated 
accusations that they were not doing enough to protect the nation. 
The Times’ insistence that the nation and the politicians should put 
‘confidence’ in the government without asking too many questions, since certain 
information simply had to remain secret in wartime, was no different from the kind 
of argument Pitt might have used in the 1790s. However, it no longer fitted the 
political conditions.162 Opponents agreed that the state had a right to be supported in 
a crisis, but they argued that the low standing of ministers made this harder to 
achieve. ‘Men will doubt the success even of well digested and efficient measures in 
unskilful hands; they will be backward in offering suggestions, if they find their 
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plans marred or confused in the execution’.163 A Foxite pamphlet drove in the point: 
‘Allegiance and protection are reciprocal terms’.164 Without the large parliamentary 
majorities of the 1790s, the ministers found it difficult to maintain the principle that 
the people had a duty to support them willy-nilly. Instead of relying on confidence, 
their reaction was to make national defence even more of a priority than it had 
previously been. All four governments between 1803 and 1807 put it at the top of 
their list of concerns. As soon as war broke out in 1803, Lord Hobart told the king 
that 
The necessity of immediately providing for the defence of Your 
Majesty’s United Kingdom by an augmentation of Your Majesty’s 
army is so universally felt and acknowledg’d that any delay in 
bringing forward a measure for that purpose might be productive of 
the most serious consequences.165 
 
Such concern did not merely reflect the immediacy of the invasion threat, and 
particularly not after 1805 when Napoleon withdrew his Armée d’Angleterre from 
the coast. From the government’s perspective, the most pressing problem of all was 
to prove itself worthy of support. Addington fell after a parliamentary censure of his 
defence policy in 1804, and, had he not died, Pitt would probably also have fallen in 
1806. By that time, indeed, it had become clear that a government’s first duty was to 
establish security. ‘That is the best ministry which will best succeed in putting the 
country in a good state of defence’, Windham wrote.166  
And yet the very weakness that made defence measures a priority also meant 
that they were very difficult to pass. Without a sizeable majority, governments were 
trapped in an endless cycle of debilitating debates that lent credence to accusations of 
incompetence and gave their measures an unpleasantly political sheen. The ‘catch-
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22’ nature of the situation was summarised by Camden, secretary of state for war in 
Pitt’s second ministry:  
What probability is there of being able to do more than scramble 
thro’ the Business of the Country & yet unless some strong 
Measures are taken, on military subjects we are not doing our duty 
but I scarcely think they will be carried in the H. of Commons.167  
 
The fate of the Additional Force Act was a case in point. Unfortunately for Pitt, its 
introduction offered the newly united Fox-Grenville opposition, along with 
Addington’s separate force, a chance to try their strength against his new 
government. ‘It was the first trial of strength of the contending parties,’ one observer 
noted. The result, a majority of only about forty for the government, was not 
unexpected, ‘but has occasioned and too naturally much uncomfortable 
speculation’.168 Addington reported to Yorke that ‘every Exertion, I am told, was 
made’ to procure a majority, but with very little to show for it.169  
Having passed with difficulty, the Act’s bad reputation, and the political 
circumstances under which it was approved, impeded its implementation. Only about 
half the number of men Pitt had expected to materialise in the first three months of 
operation had been raised after a year and a half. Several testy government circulars 
blamed ‘the Supineness and Inactivity of the Parish Officers’, and there was a 
suggestion that this ‘inactivity’ was deliberate.170 There may have been some 
grounds for such an insinuation. Addington was told by one of his correspondents 
that ‘there is not here (any more than every where else, I believe) an Idea of raising a 
single Man’, which suggested boycotting as much as inability to comply.171 The 
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Act’s failure was also ascribed to the scale of opposition it had encountered. 
Castlereagh stated categorically that it had been unsuccessful because of ‘the 
Circumstances of Contest under which it pass’d and the Efforts made for its 
Repeal’.172 Whether the Act failed primarily because it was a bad measure, or 
because of the controversy surrounding its passage, was unclear to 
contemporaries.173 What was obvious was that national defence had become ‘a 
subject on which Pitt is particularly vulnerable’, particularly since he had helped 
overthrow Addington on that very issue.174  
Similar problems attended the passage and enactment of the Training Act two 
years later. In this case, Windham’s bad reputation obstructed his own Act’s 
success.175 Although the political tide had been turning against the volunteers for 
some time, his tactless comments on their usefulness had, as Perceval gleefully 
reported, made him ‘extremely obnoxious’.176 His own colleagues recognised that he 
was something of a liability. Grenville’s brother, the marquess of Buckingham, 
suggested that ‘we should prevail upon Windham to assist Government by going into 
opposition’.177 To the new Pittite opposition, still trying to reconcile themselves to 
the fact that their former colleague Grenville now headed a Foxite ministry, 
Windham’s open hostility to the Additional Force Act — ‘Mr. Pitt’s favourite 
measure’ — made his Training Act fair game.178 They used the occasion to pull 
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together as a body for the first time since their leader’s death. In this they were 
considerably helped by the fact that the Act turned out to be difficult to implement 
and also expensive, costing at least £240,000 a year.179 Embarrassingly, Windham 
was reduced to defending his Act on the same lines that Pitt had previously used to 
defend his Additional Force: that it needed time in which to work, and that it had 
been stunted by an opposition which had destroyed ‘all confidence in what was left 
[of the Act], and all reliance on what was to happen in future’.180 Again, whether the 
Act would have been more successful had the political circumstances which 
surrounded it been otherwise was anybody’s guess. The immediate result, however, 
was to add to the impression of the Talents’ incompetence as defenders of the nation. 
Such a bad reputation also had an impact on Britain’s international relations, 
since most governments sought at one time or another to reopen the continent by 
creating a coalition against Napoleon. Their country’s reputation abroad was already 
not particularly good. Apart from the obvious problems most European powers had 
with negotiating with a non-autocratic, parliamentary state, they resented Britain’s 
colonial dominance and her control over trade, and disliked the fact that she often 
shied away from continental commitments.181 Her standing, therefore, already 
needed work, and rumours of government stupidity did not help. The politicians were 
strongly aware of this factor. When Pitt wrote to the king to explain his open 
opposition to Addington in April 1804, he took care to note that one of his motives 
was to improve ‘the Chance of taking advantage of any favourable Circumstance to 
establish … a cooperation abroad’.182 On the occasion of the impeachment of 
Melville, first lord of the admiralty in Pitt’s second ministry, the foreign secretary 
had to reassure the Russians that his government was sound and not about to fall.183 
Even with a continental coalition in negotiation, Pitt could not be sure that his 
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political weakness would not have a serious impact on his foreign as well as his 
domestic policy. 
The inevitable result was that unstable governments shied away from 
controversy, both in parliament and within their own ranks. Grenville’s refusal to 
indict Pitt’s record, despite being pressured by Fox to do so, meant in practical terms 
that the Talents were never able to break away from the trend that Addington and Pitt 
had previously followed.184 After the debacle of the Training Act, Grenville was 
even less inclined to experiment. This was consonant with advice he was given from 
friends who advised him ‘to avoid all unpopular measures’, but it simply confirmed 
the impression that his ministry had nothing really new to offer.185 The Talents’ 
successors also acknowledged that novelty was not always useful in a delicate 
political climate. Upon coming to office in March 1807, Castlereagh reluctantly 
decided that any measures of éclat were inappropriate for the weak Portland 
government. He advised the other ministers that he could not, ‘without involving the 
government in Parliamentary difficulties propose to his Colleagues any very decisive 
Measure’.186 From the opposition benches, Hiley Addington (Henry Addington’s 
younger brother) shrewdly interpreted the initial reluctance to overturn Windham’s 
military measures as an admission of Portland’s weakness: ‘It was probably … 
thought discreet to proceed step by step, and to avoid any thing that might have the 
appearance of a strong Measure, for which the Public Mind is hardly ripe’.187 Until 
the government could acquire stability there was little alternative but to play safe. 
‘Buonaparte may come or not as he pleases,’ one spectator wrote sarcastically 
of the priority given in political circles to the ins and outs of ministers at a time of 
great national danger. ‘It will make little sensation here at present, Every one being 
occupied with the more important concern of what is to happen in the House of 
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Commons’.188 The ministers themselves were, of course, desperate to break the 
deadlock. On one occasion Addington was so harassed by claims and counter-claims 
that he had not provided well enough for the defence of the country that he snapped. 
Whatever he proposed, he could not win:  
What has been the uniform subject of complaint, from the benches on 
the other side, but that, since the commencement of the hostility, we 
have never sufficiently provided for the internal security, and that we 
have wholly neglected the means of increasing the disposable force; 
yet most unfortunate it is, that whatever plans are suggested for those 
purposes, they have to encounter opposition from the same quarter.189 
 
His complaint was heartfelt. If the opposition really meant what they said when they 
called for a solid national defence policy, then they ought to allow the government to 
do its job. Without adequate political strength, however, Addington could not get 
himself a fair hearing. Part of the problem which beset his and other unstable 
governments lay in the fact that attention had shifted from temporary to permanent 
measures. Once it had been acknowledged that the war with France might last for 
years, the tendency was to forget that the invasion threat required short as well as 
long-term measures. When the Times complained that the Additional Force Act 
would take ‘ten years at least to carry … into complete effect’, it emphasised the 
difficulty of finding a measure capable of meeting both future and current 
requirements.190 Sidmouth identified the same issue when he noted that the Training 
Act ‘has hitherto done nothing: it is not on that Account to be laid aside: but 
Measures of certain, Immediate Efficacy should be adopted without Delay’.191 The 
trouble lay in finding expedients which would function in the long term while 
reaping immediate results.  
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Conclusion 
Continuing checks to the Liverpool government’s political authority after 
1815 might suggest that the executive emerged from twenty-two years of war still 
comparatively weak within a decentralised political system, but this conclusion does 
not adequately take stock of the impact of the war on the state. True, successive 
governments had striven to locate their measures within a broader context of 
constitutional and historical legitimacy, aware that in fighting a revolutionary power, 
Britain should take care not to become one herself, but this did not preclude 
alterations from taking place within the existing constitutional boundaries. By 1798 it 
was clear that the danger from France might outlive the war, and that temporary and 
precedent-bound measures were no longer sufficient. Frequent diplomatic and 
military isolation, and the establishment of Napoleon’s regime, meant that the 
prospect of Britain returning to her pre-1793 state was unlikely. Politicians would 
have preferred to work within the system, but since that was not sufficient, then the 
urgency of the situation excused a number of political sins. The result was a thorough 
and practical exploration of what was and was not possible in terms of national 
defence. Windham noted this when he defended his conduct in attacking the 
Additional Force Act in 1806:  
None of the measures that had been successively tried … had been 
rejected in consequence of any idle desire of change, and still less of 
any mean and envious spirit of jealousy on the part of persons newly 
succeeding to the government … In fact, the measures were most of 
them changed without any change of ministry, and by the very same 
persons who had brought them in. They were changed, either because 
they were found impracticable, or objectionable.192 
 
Unfortunately for the politicians, the highest point of the invasion scares coincided 
with a sharp increase in political instability. The fact that defence measures had to 
respond to continental circumstances effectively prevented national defence from 
being harnessed to the party wagon, but the government was always uncomfortably 
aware that its actions were under public scrutiny, both in and out of parliament.  
                                                 
192 Speech by Windham, 22 July 1807, PD VIII, 890-1. 
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This weakness did not, however, prevent a number of new developments. The 
unfavourable continental circumstances had ushered in a new way of looking at the 
armed forces in the context of national defence. With more and more people 
participating in military bodies of one kind or another, and with the increased need to 
defeat France either on British soil or on the continent, a perceptible change operated 
in the political mind with regard to the way Britain was portrayed as a national 
entity. Fears of large standing armies and the need to counterbalance the power of the 
centre with the power of the localities were now out of date. General military service 
was now regarded by the politicians as desirable, even essential. The extent to which 
these developments rocked the foundations of British identity will be the subject of 
the next chapter. 
 
 105 
Chapter Three 
Citizen-Soldiers and ‘Military Spirit’ 
 
Growing reliance on a more regular body of troops firmly placed under 
central control did not merely impact on defence policy. It also had an obvious effect 
on the way that politicians portrayed the nation. It was widely believed that France 
had become a military country and could only be checked or defeated using like 
methods. The upshot of this was that Britain’s traditionally anti-militaristic stance 
came into question. The growth in the number of auxiliary defence bodies and the 
increased reliance on military power was clearly at odds with Britain’s once 
predominantly commercial and naval sense of itself.  
As part of this process, several political terms that had been current in the 
eighteenth century were re-conceived to fit the new circumstances. Two of the most 
prominent — ‘citizen-soldier’ and ‘military spirit’ — reflected the increased 
importance of the Army for defence, and demonstrated the shift that was taking place 
in the portrayal of Britain’s national and political character. Once associated with the 
creation of the militia and expressing radical fear of standing armies and despotism, 
they were employed less often by radicals than by policy-makers.1 ‘Military spirit’ 
was something they found increasingly desirable to foster in the nation, convinced 
that it would lead to a greater number of recruits for the regular army. Its inculcation 
therefore went hand-in-hand with the rehabilitation of the Army itself, even before 
the first victories came in from the Peninsula. As for the ‘citizen-soldier’, once at the 
vanguard of freedom from military despotism, he now became ensnarled in the 
semantic battles of post-French Revolutionary political language. Discussion about 
what exactly made a citizen and a soldier, and how the two could be put together, 
                                                 
1 Miller, Defining the Common Good, p. 186; Schwoerer, ‘No Standing Armies!’, pp. 152, 194; 
Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, pp. 63-6; Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe, p. 59. 
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were profoundly revealing about the way the defence debate helped shape the 
politician’s view of Britain’s identity. 
A shift in balance: Army versus Navy 
Between 1793 and 1803 the balance in the armed forces moved from a 
reliance on naval to military power. In 1793, Britain was emerging from a decade 
during which the development of the Navy had taken priority over that of the land 
forces. The regular army had numbered only 47,395, 28,000 of whom were stationed 
in Britain and Ireland, whereas the Navy had counted 145 ships of the line alone in 
1790, three years before the war began.2 In January 1803, by contrast, the Navy had 
stood at a total of only 196 vessels, although by July this had grown to a force of 
361, including 72 ships of the line and 100 frigates.3 The Army, on the other hand, 
had not been much reduced from the 150,000 regulars reported on 1 January 1802. In 
March 1803 it stood at 128,000, and was later backed up by the several auxiliary 
bodies called out or created over the course of the war.4 In addition, the militia, when 
fully embodied and added to the Supplementary Militia created in 1796, provided 
70,000 for national defence.5 Addington’s government also renewed the call made 
during the 1790s for volunteers. These, added to the well-to-do Yeomanry, which 
acted as a police force, numbered 400,000 men at their peak. The Levy en Masse, 
Army of Reserve, Additional Force, Training Act, and Local Militia increased the 
nation’s manpower still further. By the end of the war in 1815, about 3-4% of the 
population had served in Britain’s land-based armed forces.6 
                                                 
2 Statement of effective troops in Britain, 1793-1804, 1 February 1804, Castlereagh MSS, PRONI, 
D/3030/1886; Effective Strength of the British Army exclusive of Artillery on 1 January of the first 
four years of the present and last war, Sidmouth MSS, Devon RO, 152M/C1806/OM/7; Baugh, ‘The 
Eighteenth Century Navy as a National Institution’, 123. 
3 An Account of His Majesty’s Ships in Commission 1793-1804, 15 March 1804, Sidmouth MSS, 
Devon RO, 152M/C1804/ON; Account of the Ships and Vessels in Commission, 22 July 1803, 
Sidmouth MSS, Devon RO, 152M/C1803/ON/8; Report on the State of the Navy, 1793-1804, 
Castlereagh MSS, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), D/3030/1903. 
4 Memorandum on the Regular Force, March 1803, Castlereagh MSS, PRONI, D/3030/1769; return of 
the land forces 1801-1808, Sidmouth MSS, Devon RO, 152M/C1808/OM. 
5 Fedorak, Addington, p. 162. 
6 Gates, ‘The Transformation of the Army, 1783-1815’, 133. 
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This boost to the importance of the armed services reflected the 
circumstances of a predominantly defensive war. The Army’s poor offensive record 
over several decades had certainly contributed much to the decline of its reputation, 
despite a brief flourish during the Seven Years’ War between 1756 and 1763. 
Moreover, Britain’s ‘revival’ after her defeat in America in 1783 was based on her 
commercial and maritime, not military, prowess.7 The opening campaigns of the war 
with France did little to overturn this emphasis: military defeats in France, Flanders 
and Holland, and naval victories at Ushant, St. Vincent, Camperdown, and the Nile 
between 1794 and 1798, underlined the point. Cornwallis mourned ‘over the British 
Infantry, once the pride of my heart and the horror of our enemies, and now … 
reduced to a state which I am ashamed to mention’.8 Britain’s main contribution to 
the war consisted of naval operations and financial subsidies to the continental 
powers which, apart from brief interludes in 1799 and 1805, provided almost all the 
military clout in Europe till 1807.9 Eventually, however, the realities of a war fought 
in a state of frequent continental isolation against a power which repeatedly 
threatened invasion began to take its toll. The Navy was all very well as an offensive 
force, and the occasional resounding victory helped maintain its reputation, but as a 
defensive force it was deeply flawed. Its main role in defence was to keep the French 
and their allies blockaded in their ports all along the Atlantic and Mediterranean 
coasts, but this strategy was not a complete success. The French managed to escape 
at least seven times from Brest alone between 1794 and 1802.10 The Times remarked 
ironically in 1798 upon ‘so many repeated instances of the good luck of the French in 
                                                 
7 See Kathleen Wilson for the impact of the Seven Years’ War: Wilson, The Sense of the People, pp. 
25-6. David Gates argues that ‘the British army sank into dereliction’ between 1783 and 1793: Gates, 
‘The Transformation of the Army’, 133. Jeremy Black cautions against overestimating the failure of 
the British army in the 1770s, but cannot deny the effect of the lacklustre campaigns of the 1790s on 
its reputation: Black, Britain as a Military Power, pp. 43, 194. For the commercial revival, see Bayly, 
Imperial Meridian, pp. 2-3, 252-3; Colley, Britons, p. 144; Wilson, The Sense of the People, p. 184. 
8 Cornwallis to Dundas, 26 June 1800, Melville MSS, National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh, 
GD51/1/331/28. 
9 Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, pp. 3-4. However, Sherwig also points out (p. 354) that subsidy 
payments formed only 8% of the total war expenditure between 1793 and 1815. 
10 Memorandum on Instances of the Escapes of the French from Brest during the Blockade, undated, 
Melville MSS, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, MEL/3. 
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escaping the vigilance of our squadrons’.11 Keeping blockade depended, too, on the 
vagaries of the weather. Portland reported that a squadron possibly intended for 
Ireland had taken advantage of ‘a thick Fog’ to break blockade at Brest in 1799, and 
at the turn of the New Year in 1804 a storm dispersed the Channel fleet and left 
Britain vulnerable for a space of three or four anxious days.12 
Given the vulnerability of the naval blockade system, it is understandable that 
the Army should have benefited strongly from the heightened fear of invasion. Its 
vital role in defending the home base reduced the unsavoury political connotations 
associated with a large standing force.13 This issue had not vanished from political 
discourse, contrary to what Lois Schwoerer and Paul Langford have suggested.14 By 
now, however, it was being used differently. Radicals such as Sir Francis Burdett 
still harked back to the dangers of an alliance between the standing army and the 
Crown, but living under the shadow of invasion caused what had once been an 
ideological debate to be fought in more practical terms. In 1802 Castlereagh argued 
that  
altho’ we have lately happily got rid of many idle prejudices on the 
subject of our Army … neither the feelings, nor the finances of the 
Country are prepared to support such a force in Peace, as will place us 
in security at the outset of a War, without a powerful body of Militia 
in both Islands.15  
 
There was another aspect to the concerns expressed over the country’s lack of 
military muscle. Invasion scares in the past had drawn attention to the effect of 
commercial ‘luxury’ and ‘effeminacy’ on the character of the nation and the new 
emphasis on military service reflected this long-standing concern. Various remedies 
                                                 
11 Times, 24 September 1798, 2(a). 
12 Portland to Cornwallis, 1 May 1799, Castlereagh MSS, PRONI, D/3030/756/a; Thomas Steele to 
Pitt, 3 January 1804, Pitt MSS, Cambridge University Library, Add Ms 6958 Box 16 f. 2995. The 
same thing happened at the beginning of February: Times, 2 February 1804, p. 2 col. b, 4 February 
1804, p. 2 col. b. 
13 For standing armies, see Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe, pp. 28, 30, 176; and Schwoerer, 
‘No Standing Armies!’, pp. 2-5, 151, 160-1, 180, 188-90. 
14 Lois Schwoerer argues that the standing army debates ‘ceased to be the burning issues that they had 
been’ after the Glorious Revolution, and Paul Langford declared the cause ‘dead’ by 1780. Schwoerer, 
‘No Standing Armies!’ pp. 189-90; Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 50, agrees. 
15 Castlereagh to Wickham, 18 November 1802, Wickham MSS, Hampshire RO, 38m49/6/17. 
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had been proposed to combat this pernicious influence in the 1750s and 1770s, even 
by Adam Smith, who feared that Britain’s increased commercial power would both 
attract foreign envy and atrophy the nation’s ability to defend itself against attack.16 
What was new in the 1790s and 1800s was not the rhetoric, but the practical 
application and the extent of the debate.  
France had redefined the terms on which Britain would fight her war. ‘Our 
best expectations in this state of hostility are, that we may be able successfully to 
repel an invasion of Great Britain or Ireland, if it should be attempted,’ wrote George 
Rose in his diary.17 It was obvious by 1806 that Britain and her allies were very 
unlikely to defeat France militarily. What the country needed to do instead was to 
learn how to defend herself in the event of her navy being neutralised and her 
defences broken. An 1804 pamphlet which Addington thought very influential 
argued, ‘at a time, when it is so much insisted upon, that the independent states of 
Europe are obliged to become more military in consequence of the more formidable 
state of France … England must conform’.18 So long as France remained militarily 
potent, politicians would have to relax old attitudes towards the Army in order to 
allow Britain a chance to match her. 
A commercial nation at war 
The long periods of military stagnation during which the war was (from the 
British point of view) being fought almost entirely defensively left room for 
speculation about why Britain was unable to turn the tide. Two answers suggested 
themselves. Firstly, with the threat of invasion from 1794 onwards the war had 
become one of national survival. Britain’s strategic options were therefore 
                                                 
16 Smith, Wealth of Nations, pp. 341b-342a; Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics, pp. 108., 112-3. For other 
responses to ‘effeminacy’ see Romani, National Character and Public Spirit, pp.161-2, 164; Wilson, 
The Sense of the People, pp. 165, 185-6, 195; Raven, Judging New Wealth, pp. 174-5, 254. 
Biancamaria Fontana points out however that there were some, including the editors of the Edinburgh 
Review, who felt the connection between commerce, luxury and effeminacy to be erroneous: Fontana, 
Rethinking the politics of commercial society, pp. 13-4. 
17 Rose Diary II, 139. 
18 Yorke, Proposals tending to augment the Force of this Country, and encourage the Martial Spirit of 
the People, p. 2. Addington wrote to his brother that he had read Yorke’s pamphlet ‘with Admiration, 
& Satisfaction’: Addington to Hiley Addington, 17 June 1804, Devon RO, 152M/C1804/OZ/65. 
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constrained by the need to secure the home base. As Castlereagh noted, if anything 
happened to the offensive force abroad ‘we should be destitute of any considerable 
Proportion of effective Regular Infantry for Purposes of Home Defence’.19 Secondly, 
the sinews of war — finance and commercial enterprise — were profoundly affected 
by the length of the conflict in an apparently unprecedented manner. 
In a way the nation was paying the price for the past century’s success in 
trading and colonial expansion. That expansion had not only stretched slender 
military and naval resources to breaking point, but had also damaged her 
international reputation, fostering the mistrust of potential continental allies who 
suspected that Britain simply wanted to exploit the war with France for commercial 
and colonial advantages. The events of the 1790s exacerbated these suspicions, 
particularly the limited commitment of British troops on the continent while tens of 
thousands of men were sent to the West Indies and the Mediterranean. Sir John 
Macpherson, who had strong continental connections, regretted the ‘jealousy in 
every Court in Europe, even in those of our allies, against our grasp of dominion in 
the East & West & on the Ocean’.20 Their distrust was amply reciprocated by many 
Britons, who feared that they were being used by the allies as a bank from which to 
draw subsidy money for their own (not necessarily war-related) purposes. However, 
given that the allies were necessary to defeat France, it was alarming that so few of 
them trusted Britain, and that so many of them even regarded her as a hostile power, 
second in acquisitiveness only to France.21 
Worse still, the circumstances of war were unfavourable to British commerce 
and enterprise. A succession of trade disputes — from the Armed Neutrality of 1800 
which shut off supplies of Baltic timber, to the War of 1812 with the United States, 
not to mention the vulnerability of convoys subject to frequent attacks from 
privateers — greatly increased fears that Britain’s economic might was precarious. 
                                                 
19 Memorandum as to Defence, 15 July 1804, Camden MSS, Kent RO, U840/O211/2; Castlereagh 
MSS, PRONI, D/3030/2481. 
20 Macpherson to Pitt, 4 October 1794, Pitt MSS, Cambridge University Library, Add Ms 6958, Box 
8, f. 1503. 
21 Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, p. 13. 
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Contemporaries saw worrying signs that a long war would be particularly damaging 
to a commercial country like Britain.22 The financial crises of 1797 and 1809-11 
raised the spectre of national bankruptcy.23 The Continental System of 1806-7, 
moreover, ushered in by the Milan and Berlin decrees, effectively blocked British 
exports to almost all of Europe and seriously damaged several industries, particularly 
textiles.24 Hiley Addington noted the country’s commercial vulnerability in a letter to 
his brother, Sidmouth: ‘At present perhaps, his [Napoleon’s] mean game will be, to 
be content with clipping our Wings; and so close, that it will be difficult long to 
survive the Operation’.25 Just as serious was the fact that protecting trade in wartime 
was a distraction for the already-overstretched Navy.26 Under attack for not 
providing enough convoys, Pitt emphasised that there would have to be a change in 
priorities:  
Though it could be proved that the trade was not fully protected, yet 
this would not be a matter of crimination. Great as the commerce of 
this country was, yet it was not so great an object as war was now. … 
He would [not] consent [that] this bulwark of our strength should be 
frittered down into convoys to carry ships to Ancora or the fairs of 
Salerno.27  
 
In other words, defence had to be placed above commercial development as a 
political priority. 
Napoleon’s increasing hold over Europe, and the consequent decline in 
Britain’s trading position, led some to argue the need to seek new markets abroad. 
However, a side-effect of the prioritisation of defence over commerce was the need 
to avoid further expansion and over-extension. ‘I cannot but think that we are in a 
difficult dilemma as to the prosecution of Foreign Conquests,’ Hiley Addington 
                                                 
22 J.L. Anderson, ‘A measure of the effect of British public finance’, 611, 616-8. For more see p. 177 
below. 
23 Gray, Spencer Perceval, pp. 341-3, 386-7. 
24 For example, mercantile attacks on the Orders in Council: Gash, Lord Liverpool, p. 90; Harvey, 
Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century, p. 292; Bowen, War and British Society, pp. 72-8. 
25 Hiley Addington to Sidmouth, 1 December 1806, Sidmouth MSS, Devon RO, 152M/C1806/OZ. 
26 The blockades of the French harbours took up an increasingly large proportion of the Navy’s 
efforts: Morriss, The Channel Fleet and the Blockade of Brest, pp. 11-2, 241-2. 
27 Speech by Pitt, reported in the Times, 19 February 1794, 1(c)-3(a). 
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wrote to his brother. ‘The exclusion from Europe seems to render the acquisition of 
other Markets necessary, while the means which we are obliged to employ to open 
them are exhausting those of home-defence, and exhibiting us weak and vulnerable 
in all points’.28 The American war in the 1770s, and the war of 1812, suggested that 
Britain was unequipped to fight an extensive, far-flung colonial battle. The conflicts 
in India during the 1790s and 1800s were relatively successful because of the use of 
the East India Company forces and local auxiliaries, but elsewhere Britain had to rely 
more on regular garrisons, which meant that colonies became liabilities rather than 
assets. The failure of highly-publicised attempts at expansion (such as the Buenos 
Aires campaign in 1806 to open up South America for British goods) suggested that 
the risk of seeking alternative markets was too great at a time when attention needed 
to be focused on the home front. Sheridan commented in 1795 that ‘he entertained 
great doubts of the policy of enlarging our West India possessions, which could only 
serve to drain what we could least spare — men’.29 It seems safe to conclude, 
therefore, that imperialism was not the driving force behind the considerable 
territorial expansion that occurred during the war. The main purpose, as the Times 
noted, was to seek ‘indemnity for the expences of the war, and of our equivalent for 
her [France’s] own acquisitions in Europe’.30 After all, the war could not ultimately 
be won in the colonies. 
With this in mind, some social theorists argued that there was nothing for it 
but for Britain to adapt to a hostile world, and that the only way to do this was to 
move away from the colonial, commercial, and latterly industrial path taken during 
the eighteenth century. William Spence’s Britain Independent of Commerce (1807) 
advocated a return to the agrarian economy of the pre-industrial days. Spence and 
other ‘physiocrats’ (as they were known) were not simply arguing for a retreat into 
an insular past. Such a position was particularly relevant to a generation which had 
                                                 
28 Hiley Addington to Sidmouth, 1 December 1806, Sidmouth MSS, Devon RO, 152M/C1806/OZ. 
29 Speech by Sheridan, 29 October 1795, PH XXXII, 160-1. 
30 Times, 9 February 1796, 3(b). A.D. Harvey concludes that ‘as the war prolonged itself talk of 
annexation and colonisation became increasingly audible’, but seems not to trace the reason for this to 
the need to counterbalance French influence. Harvey, Collision of Empires, p. 22. 
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lived through the two near-famines of 1795 and 1800. On both occasions grain had 
been imported from overseas, which suggested a worrying lack of self-sufficiency 
that Napoleon’s Continental Blockade could only make worse.31 The arguments of 
the physiocrats represented in part an ideological response to the French 
revolutionary challenge. They were also in line with political trends which advocated 
a return to chivalric notions of behaviour and a medieval hierarchical structure.32 
Ultimately, however, though the physiocrats included men like Thomas Chalmers, 
most of those in power wanted to move away from the decentralised, agricultural 
past and so were more likely to listen to arguments from the opposite scale, advanced 
by men such as David Ricardo, who looked instead to overseas contacts and 
industrial growth.33  
To some, however, there was an even more serious problem than the decline 
of commerce, and that was its effect on the national character. Trade, and the 
boldness and enterprising spirit that came with it, had helped make Britain great, but 
it could not defeat France. For that, military strength, rather than commercial 
enterprise, was required, and the two were seen as opposites. In The Wealth of 
Nations, an influential work read and approved by most of the politicians of the 
period, Adam Smith indicated the disparity between the commercial and martial 
mind:  
Unless very particular pains have been taken to render him [the 
labouring Briton] otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his 
country in war. The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts 
the courage of his mind, and makes him regard with abhorrence the 
irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life of a soldier.34  
 
                                                 
31 Portland to R.B. Haden, 14 May 1800, Home Office MSS, National Archives, London, HO43/11 ff. 
485-7. A similar problem arose after the war’s end in 1815, when Britain felt that it could not rely on 
postwar Europe for help in food shortages: Gash, Lord Liverpool, pp. 116-7. 
32 See Chapter Two’s discussion of the revival of the feudal principle in British political debate, p. 94 
above. 
33 Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, pp. 8-9, 48-9; Fontana, Rethinking the Politics of 
Commercial Society, pp. 49-52, 128-9. Spence’s pamphlet in any case provoked a lively debate on the 
subject in which conflicting ideas of Britain’s commercial or industrial status were aired. 
34 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 382a-b. 
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France herself was a perfect exemplar. Her military success had been bought at the 
price of commercial stagnation, since all her male citizens from 18 to 26 had been 
‘forced to become a soldier’ and therefore ‘taken out of the habits of industry, and of 
social and civilised life’.35 Presumably, a militarised Britain would experience the 
same phenomenon. There was a growing feeling, however, that this might not 
necessarily be a bad thing. Commerce throve on free thought; military strength 
throve on discipline. Commerce and liberty went hand in hand; military strength was 
associated with despotism. However, commerce was also associated with bankruptcy 
and financial uncertainty, whereas military strength increasingly became associated 
with public sacrifice, duty, and national involvement.36 French sneers about 
‘effeminacy’, too, brought back old fears that Britain, in abandoning herself 
wholesale to commercial activity, had forgotten how to fight. ‘We are become a 
Nation of Merchants and Shopkeepers, and have lost all Military Spirit,’ lamented 
the duke of Buccleugh.37 Celebrations of the British volunteer, British spunk, and 
British spirit were all responses to an underlying paranoid fear that, in the event of 
invasion, the nation would not be up to the challenge. 
‘Military Spirit’, conscription and the manpower problem 
This combination of circumstances — the war, the decline of commercial 
supremacy, and the doubts provoked by the connection between commerce and 
effeminacy —  resulted in a drive to raise the ‘military spirit’ of the nation. This was 
not an entirely novel reaction: throughout the eighteenth century, whenever invasion 
was threatened or military defeat loomed, the need to increase ‘military spirit’ had 
been invoked by radical theorists who feared the feminisation of the nation through 
                                                 
35 Times, 20 July 1803, 3b. 
36 For example in a comparison of the British and French characters by Alexander Hope, in his 
‘Military Memoir for the Defence of the Eastern District’, 1797: Hope of Luffness MSS, Scottish 
National Archives, Edinburgh, GD364/1/1083/1 ff. 42-3. 
37 Duke of Buccleugh to Dundas, 31 March 1797, Melville MSS, Scottish National Archives, 
GD51/883. 
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commerce and luxury.38 The difference in the 1790s and 1800s was that the same 
fear was now also found at the top of the political hierarchy, including government 
members. As expressed in parliament and the press, the concept of ‘military spirit’ 
echoed the ideas of Britishness held by its exponents: it was inclusive, it was 
deferential, and it vaguely accorded with ideas about the national past, though this 
vagueness ensured that it continued to retain some of its old radical connotations. In 
general, however, turn-of-the-nineteenth-century ‘military spirit’ was conservative 
and above all practical. It proposed a solution to the manpower problem by raising 
the profile of the regular army. 
Even more importantly, ‘military spirit’ was a defiant expression of the 
nation’s ability to adapt to new continental circumstances in a way that would 
complement rather than destroy her commercial character. ‘In time coming we must 
be a Compound Mixture of Merchants, Manufacturers, Farmers, and Warriors, and I 
have no doubt these various occupations may be so arranged as rather to improve 
than injure each other’, wrote Dundas.39 Most advocates saw it simply as a 
channelling of Britain’s commercial energies in a different direction: ‘We were not 
mere merchants who could traffic, but could not fight; not mere soldiers who could 
fight, without excelling in other arts’.40 Significantly, also, it addressed the need to 
transmit some new image to take account of the fact that there was now a union of 
Great Britain and Ireland. John Robertson and J.E. Cookson have argued that 
military spirit reflected Scotland’s ‘distinctive martial heritage’, but this was not how 
the matter was seen by politicians anxious to stress national unity in the face of an 
external threat.41 Thus, the Anti-Jacobin Review deliberately drew attention to the 
combined Scottish, Irish and English spirit which had secured victory at Alexandria 
                                                 
38 Wilson, The Sense of the People, pp. 165, 188; Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment and the 
Militia Issue, p. 135. 
39 Dundas to Alexander Dirom, 7 August 1797, Melville MSS, Scottish National Archives, 
GD51/888/2. 
40 Speech by Lord Limerick, 22 November 1803, PD I, 1527. 
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in 1801, ‘when Sir Ralph Abercromby was seconded by Lord Hutchinson, and aided 
by Sir Sidney Smith!’42 If the ‘military spirit’ campaign left out any part of the 
United Kingdom it was Ireland, which was always viewed ambivalently whenever 
issues of arming the people or encouraging military ardour were concerned, but even 
so her large contribution to recruitment into the regulars put paid to any doubts about 
the military prowess of Irishmen. Military spirit was not exclusively Scottish, though 
it continued to be a favourite with Scotsmen. It was common to all Britons, whether 
descended from Highlanders or the victors of the Spanish Armada. 
Ultimately, however, the great advantage of the ‘military spirit’ idea was its 
role in sustaining the high levels of manpower required to fight a defensive and an 
offensive war simultaneously. The need for a strong regular army which could fulfil 
both of these roles was widely acknowledged. Even concentrating purely on defence 
would require large numbers. The issue was simple: ‘It has now indeed become self-
evident, even to the great Body of the People, that the period has at length arrived, 
when Great Britain must either become a Nation of Soldiers, or cease to be a Nation 
at all.’43 To this end, almost everyone could agree on the need to promote the 
nation’s military spirit. The real problem was, how to make it practical.  
The most obvious solution would have been to imitate France and impose 
conscription, but, as noted in Chapter Two, this was not done. The reasons for such 
reticence had nothing to do with novelty or the lack of the requisite bureaucratic 
framework.44 The politicians who felt confident enough to pass the Levy en Masse 
Act, and who had access to a variety of information provided by the census and other 
sources, were unlikely to be fazed by a step which would simply have meant 
continuing what they had already been doing, albeit at a higher level. It would have 
required little more than an adaptation of the naval impress, which had been 
                                                 
42 Anti-Jacobin Review, XVI, 1 (September 1803), 101. 
43 Major William Stewart to Castlereagh, 8 April 1808, Castlereagh MSS, PRONI, D/3030/2622. 
44 Chandler, The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army, pp. 134-5; Black, Britain as a 
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undertaken successfully for years under admiralty control.45 As a political 
commentator noted at the time, ‘the government which forcibly seizes the sailor’ was 
hardly in a position to ‘mount into the sublime regions of the rights of mankind, and 
thence looking down … to exclaim, O! the horrid injustice of taking the soldier!’46 
To those who argued against conscription on constitutional grounds, the Times 
pointed out that all such scruples could and should be overcome ‘in such an alarming 
and dangerous crisis’.47 Many politicians urged the need to match France in the 
manpower stakes. Grenville, who had experienced the difficulties of finding men in 
the 1790s, reluctantly conceded that there was no alternative to some form of 
mandation: ‘I heartily wish it were possible to avoid any compulsory recruiting for 
the army, but I know not how it could be done, & an army some how or other to be 
sure we must have’.48 Windham, of course, was even more outspoken, declaring in 
1803 that ‘he would not court popularity, nor discredit his own judgment by decrying 
[compulsion] as unconstitutional’.49  
These were powerful recommendations; moreover, direct conscription into 
the regulars would have helped overcome a number of the issues associated with the 
competition for recruits between the Army and the auxiliaries. The men recruited to 
substitute for principals balloted into the militia were frequently those who would 
otherwise have entered the Army: ‘Hardly one [man] serves [as a militia substitute] 
who is not taken from that class from which the regular army is recruited’.50 It is also 
clear from the evidence that the cabinet seriously discussed the possibility of 
                                                 
45 A special Impress Service had been created to coordinate the short-term initiatives that had been 
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conscription. The reason why it was not implemented seems to have been simply that 
ministers were concerned about the quality as well as the quantity of troops. Several 
advisors drew Addington’s attention to this point when they discussed conscripting 
men for service anywhere in the world.51 Yorke acknowledged the utility of 
conscription, but thought it would be impractical:  
A mixture of Men like these, with trained soldiers, unless in a limited 
proportion, and time was given to form & discipline them, (a 
supposition which is inconsistent with that stated of a sudden 
emergency), might only tend to introduce confusion & disorder, & to 
impart weakness instead of reinforcement.52  
 
Two years later, the duke of York explained that what made crimping ‘the most 
banefull of practices’ was the introduction into the Army of ‘a number of persons 
perfectly unacquainted with the Military profession and in many instances ineligible 
in point of Character’.53 It was not the prospect of impinging on liberty that troubled 
York and Yorke, but the prospect of mixing tried and untried men in battle. It seemed 
much wiser to draft trained men from the Reserve, Additional Force, and Local 
Militia than to pluck them directly from the farms and cities. These bodies were, 
however, quite small, especially the first two, and it was therefore requisite somehow 
to make the British more accustomed to the idea of military service and more likely 
to join up. If the whole population of Great Britain were already trained to arms, 
then, as Windham recognised, the lower orders would represent ‘an inexhaustible 
fund to recruit from’.54 Along with other politicians, he was moving away from the 
old idea that a strong standing army signified despotism, and towards the view that 
militarism was a sign of national strength.  
The eagerness of the politicians to harness ‘military spirit’ illustrated how the 
war with France had shaped their perceptions of what made the nation great. Service 
in defence of the nation was to be considered one of the first duties of the citizen. 
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Dundas was one of many who considered a form of national service, in which all 
young men would experience military service between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-one, as the best way to instruct Britain’s youth in loyalty to their nation: ‘If 
this plan is adopted we then become in reality an armed nation, & every individual 
when he enters into life by his arrival at Manhood, does it with the sentiment 
implanted in his breast that the defence of his country, as it was almost his earliest 
education, so it is his first duty’.55 During this period several military academies were 
founded for the education of future officers, and the more ‘martial’ characteristics of 
the nation — its love of pugilism and ‘manly sports and exercises’, its belligerent 
xenophobia, its patriotism — were praised in its youth.56 Windham, for example, 
praised ‘those qualities of body and mind of which we were inclined at all times to 
talk so boastingly, and on which we were now, it seems, to place our chief 
dependence’, which were fed by bull-baiting and ‘those athletic sports and hardy 
contests, which heretofore made the delight of the common people, and which … 
trained them … to every generous and manly sentiment’.57 Dundas’s plan was 
particularly useful because it created ‘a Nursery for the recruiting every other branch 
of the Military Service’, which encouraged recruitment into the armed services by 
familiarising youth with military duties.58 The attempt to inculcate military spirit, 
therefore, was not only based on the need for more conscription, but was designed to 
make army life so central to the normative values of Britons that they would come to 
see military service as a respectable way of life. 
Patriotism, the ‘Citizen-Soldier’, and the duties of citizenship 
The need to reconcile military spirit with traditional British ideas of liberty, 
and the attempts to portray republican France as Britain’s inveterate enemy, 
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politically, commercially, and morally, also led to a refinement of concepts such as 
patriotism and, more particularly, citizenship. Political language dramatically 
portrayed the struggle between the two nations as a duel to the death, particularly 
during periods of continental isolation.59 Lord Temple declared in an especially 
apocalyptic speech that ‘the suns of England and France can never shine together in 
the same hemisphere … The cry of the armies, of the Directory, of the councils, and 
of the people [of France], is still “Delenda est Carthago”’.60 These opinions did not 
subside with the fall of republican principles, since French politics were now seen as 
‘despotic’ rather than republican. Depicting the war as a struggle for survival made it 
possible for the politicians to foster an inclusive version of patriotism and citizenship 
in which most Britons could play a part.61  
Both of these were profoundly affected by the influence of the French 
Revolution and its impact on political language. ‘Patriotism’ in particular had, by 
1803, moved away from its more radical, oppositionist roots and been adopted by 
supporters of the establishment in a way that echoed a growing inclusiveness within 
the British political tradition. The oppositional meaning of patriotism was still in use 
in 1805 when Lord Carnarvon used the term to describe the parliamentary process of 
protecting the rights of the people from the government’s encroachments, and 
Canning also used it to justify his opposition to Addington between 1801 and 1804.62 
By this time, however, as John Dinwiddy argues, the government’s tapping into the 
mid-eighteenth-century oppositional language of liberty had allowed patriotism to 
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become associated with loyalist forces.63 Pitt, too, as Michael Duffy points out, could 
credibly lay claim to a patriotic tradition.64 He could even be scathing about 
opposition attempts to do the same, which he dismissed as ‘what is called patriotism 
… nothing more than an aim at temporary popularity’.65  
As these different responses suggest, the language of patriotism was highly 
flexible. J.E. Cookson identifies several different kinds during the wars with France, 
including radical patriotism which was opposed to the war, ‘liberal’ patriotism which 
was ready to accept defensive war, and ‘Evangelical’ patriotism which sought to 
interpret the fortunes and misfortunes of war in terms of divine judgment. For 
Cookson himself, the most prominent version of wartime patriotism was based on 
‘national defence’, was largely unpolitical and was largely local in basis.66 The 
problem with this approach is that it ignores the amount of interest expressed by 
politicians in patriotism, and their recognition that a good deal of capital could be 
drawn from it. Patriotism was held to be an essential ingredient for a successful 
armed nation, since it proclaimed the ideal of a united nation fighting against a 
common enemy. It gave everyone something to fight for, and the strength to fight in 
person, should the need arise. 
If patriotism was to be the motivation, then the duties of citizenship provided 
a guide for action. This concept was, however, complicated even more than 
patriotism by the fact that the French Revolution had reinforced its connection with 
radicalism and democracy. ‘Citizen’ in the 1790s meant something completely 
different from what it had meant in the 1750s or 1770s, when defence had last been a 
priority. The knock-on effect of this was a certain wariness of the term in some 
circles after 1789. The Anti-Jacobin Review pronounced a book to be ‘jacobinical’ 
partly because it made use of the term ‘fellow-citizens’.67 ‘Subject’ was reckoned by 
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some to be a more pertinent term to describe the political status of Britons, who lived 
in a deferential and monarchical society where the vote was depicted as a privilege 
rather than a right.68 Several historians have fallen into the same trap of identifying 
citizenship with the franchise, among them Linda Colley and Robert Dozier. The 
latter goes so far as to argue that the majority of the people were outside the 
constitution, and that Pitt’s first government had to create an ‘informal’ one in order 
to involve them at all in defence.69 In much the same vein, Kathleen Wilson argues 
that ‘the people’ mostly existed outside political structures, and were therefore as 
much distinct from ‘the citizens’, who were largely propertied, as they were from 
‘the mob’.70  
Such narrow definitions of political participation were not, however, ones 
which eighteenth-century politicians would necessarily have recognised. If 
participation was limited to the parliamentary vote, as Colley, Dozier and Wilson 
suggest, then only around 320,000 Britons could qualify as full citizens, but not 
having the franchise did not mean exclusion from the political process. Most local 
governments were fairly open and allowed Anglicans at least a say in public affairs.71 
The concept of ‘virtual representation’, moreover, ensured to the satisfaction of many 
opponents of reform that all the Crown’s subjects were represented in parliament, 
even if they did not have the privilege of a direct vote. Members of parliament 
represented interests, such as manufacturing or commerce, rather than simply the 
boroughs for which they were elected. There was thus a distinction between direct 
and indirect representation rather than a keenly defined line between the enfranchised 
and the disenfranchised.72 This differed markedly from more radical ideals of civic 
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rationalism in which the individual’s role in the polity took precedence over that of 
the community, but it still allowed most men to participate at various different 
levels.73 There were also other ways in which the people acquired a more direct voice 
in politics. Petitioning, for example, remained a path between both directly and 
indirectly represented citizens and parliament.74 Even rioting was a valid, if violent 
and undesirable, form of expression for the disenfranchised. As John Bohstedt points 
out, ‘Clearly [the rioters] did think of themselves as citizens with rights and 
claims’.75 Less controversially, membership in clubs, including volunteer corps, was 
a means of participating at a local level.76 The reciprocal nature of taxation and 
citizenship helped to define the latter’s boundaries. It had famously played a role in 
the loss of the American colonies, and had led many to argue that those who paid 
taxes ought to have a direct investment in the state. ‘He who is taxed without being 
represented is a slave’, the Public Advertiser had declared in 1766.77 By the 1790s, as 
Dror Wahrman argues, taxation had become a means for the middle classes to lay 
claim to a stronger position in society.78 Pitt’s innovatory financial measures, 
including the Triple Assessment and the Income Tax, spread the burdens of payment 
further and prompted new social groups to find their political voice. 
In its broadest sense, therefore, citizenship was far from exclusive. Nor was 
its terminology abandoned by politicians eager to distance themselves from 
revolution and radicalism. On the contrary, it experienced a defiant renewal as 
politicians sought to reinterpret it under the new international circumstances. Real 
citizenship was not a matter of wanting more than it was practicable to give, but of 
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accepting one’s place in the political system and the willingness to take arms to 
defend it. The result was a concept of citizenship that echoed traditional values at the 
same time as it allowed continental circumstances to shape old ideas of Britishness. 
It was this new version of citizenship that now applied to the term ‘citizen-soldier’, 
in a way that reflected the change in conditions wrought by a long, defensive war 
against a revolutionary and despotic power.  
Originally, ‘citizen-soldiers’ had been found almost exclusively in the ranks 
of the militia formed in 1757. The term invoked the image of the well-to-do man 
who stood forward to defend his country against foreign invasion and the domestic 
tyranny of Crown influence exemplified by a large standing army.79 Since, however, 
late eighteenth-century citizenship was not as exclusive as that, the politicians 
recognised that the people called upon to defend the nation would not necessarily be 
those who possessed the franchise or owned property. As the ideological raison 
d’etre of the war faded, and as the threat of invasion became more immediate than 
that of insurrection, it became more common to call on a broader base of support 
than in the early 1790s when the volunteers had been devised as a police force and 
had therefore been recruited solely among the middle and upper classes.80 This 
inclusiveness was a matter of pride for many men who might not have been expected 
to view wide participation with approval. ‘I am no ways afraid of the general bugbear 
of arming too many people,’ Dundas argued. ‘I am much more afraid of their 
inertness & want of military feeling the moment the pressure of danger is past’.81 
Greater involvement was not simply ‘a calculated risk’ on the part of the government 
that the lower orders would not demand too much in the way of political returns for 
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their efforts.82 It showed the people that the government made an effort to defend 
them, and it showed the government that the people were happy with the status quo. 
Duty was an integral part of both active and inactive citizenship. In times of 
national peril, indeed, the citizen’s duties became more important than his rights, and 
politicians recognised that Britain’s social hierarchy was extremely useful for 
instructing people in what these were. This was not simply a case of the upper 
classes allowing the more loyal of the lower orders to fight for them. Strategic 
references to the networks that linked the king, the upper levels of society, and the 
people at large, reinforced the important message that they were all connected and 
that everyone had a stake in the survival of the whole system. Pitt, for one, was 
confident that all Britons knew exactly what was expected of them: ‘We always 
admitted the zeal of the country, and applauded its noble and patriotic devotion’.83 
The fact that the lower orders could be trusted with arms said a lot for the resilience 
of the nation in the face of the French revolutionary threat. The people had not been 
seduced by the spectre of democracy.  
This was a very optimistic view of the British nation, and it is no accident, 
perhaps, that Pitt — the perennial optimist — was its foremost exponent.84 No doubt 
many radicals and reformers did latch onto participation in defence as a means to 
extract concessions from the government. In 1795 Major John Cartwright, the 
political reformer, wrote that ‘arming the people and reforming Parliament are 
inseparable’.85 By and large, however, the men who formulated defence policy did 
not consider this to be a major problem, which is surprising, perhaps, given the 
prevailing political opinion against reform, but it reveals a great deal about the way 
politicians viewed the extent of citizenship and national involvement. The modern 
implications of citizenship did not yet exist: there were still no passports and no 
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official definition of what it meant, in state terms, to be British.86 ‘Citizenship’ in 
Britain was only partly a method of self-identification. Above all, it was a defiant 
statement that, unlike the French Jacobins, the British knew the boundaries of their 
rights and were happy with them. It was therefore a surprisingly inclusive term, and 
when Pitt used the term ‘fellow-citizens’ to describe the volunteers he did not simply 
mean the propertied, but all those ‘who have rushed forward to the post of danger, 
when the safety of their country was menaced’.87  
Significantly, the bastion of propertied citizen-soldiery, the militia, had 
almost completely altered by the time Napoleon mustered his Grande Armée in 1803. 
As Chapter Two has argued, it was no longer a counterpoint to the regular army, or 
an expression of the power of the localities over the centre. By 1803 it was mostly 
subject to central control and viewed as a pool for recruitment into the regulars.88 
Lord Selkirk felt that ‘the original idea of the militia … is now completely lost. The 
present militia has no resemblance whatsoever to the species of force which it was 
intended for’. Lord Sheffield agreed: ‘Nothing like a Militia principle is left except 
the appointment of officers by the Lord Lieutenant and the limitation of Service 
within England’.89 Because the practice of substitutes allowed the rich to buy 
themselves out of direct service, the militia ranks, once intended to be manned 
almost entirely by the propertied, were now composed almost entirely of the lower 
orders. As a result, the social base of the Army and the militia had become fairly 
similar. This facilitated the process of drafting, which was finally legalised by the 
Local Militia Act in 1808. By this time, indeed, the militia was described as ‘what it 
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ought constitutionally to be, the Basis of our National Force’.90 The days of the 
exclusively propertied citizen-soldier were over. 
By 1803, therefore, the term ‘citizen-soldier’ no longer referred exclusively 
to the militia, or to an armed property. Like patriotism, it lost its radical connotation 
as politicians sought a solution to the recruitment problem and lighted on popular 
military participation. ‘Mankind are creatures of habit,’ argued Pitt.  
Attention to military affairs begets a military spirit, and perhaps … it 
is fortunate for this nation that the spirit for a military life rises in 
proportion to the extent of those dangers by which a military life is 
rendered necessary in society.91  
 
It became, in short, a symbol of the change the nation underwent in the face of the 
Napoleonic threat: Britain the commercial country, dependent on its Navy and 
deeply suspicious of standing armies, had, by 1812, 254,500 regular infantry and 
cavalry and had a much higher opinion of the value of those forces in general.92 As 
the next section will show, however, these changes in terminology were not 
unproblematic. In the period following the French Revolution, deep-seated changes 
in political and national identity were not easy for politicians to swallow without a 
few qualms. 
Problems of adaptation 
The main problem with these changes in terminology was that they largely 
reacted to similar changes in the French revolutionary vocabulary. Terms like 
‘citizen-soldier’ and ‘military spirit’ had been in common political usage for some 
time, and there was no accepted definition for any of them. For some, ‘citizen-
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soldier’ still meant either an armed property or the militia on the lines of its 1757 
establishment, constitutional dislike of standing armies, and a blending of the 
military and the civilian. Likewise, ‘military spirit’ could still mean a distrust of 
commercial luxury, and there doubtless were many reformers who hoped national 
involvement in defence would lead to great political change. Although the need to 
defend the nation against invasion did not provoke political divisions, and the 
arguments for an ‘armed nation’ were advanced by a variety of different people 
including Pitt, Fox, Windham, Addington, Castlereagh, and Dundas, it is a mistake to 
argue that the issue had no political impact.93 Some were happy to embrace the 
changes in British political life heralded by the new international circumstances, but 
others were less sure. How far should Britain be allowed to alter in response to the 
conflict, and should the new situation be allowed to dictate her new identity? The 
main issue in dispute revolved around the role of the much-enlarged armed force that 
was required to combat a French assault. Did a large standing army now represent 
‘the only defence of any modern & civilised state’, or was ‘the Austrian or Prussian 
system which has failed on the Continent’ best avoided altogether?94 
As argued above, there were some who held the opinion that Britain, a 
commercial and naval nation, could not become predominantly dependent on its 
military might. They felt that Britain should use her existing strengths to combat 
France, rather than adapt herself in a manner that was probably incompatible with 
her true character. ‘It is by commercial pursuits and resources that we must attempt 
to compensate for the aggrandizement of our ancient rival,’ urged Fox.95 Taking men 
away from trade, commerce and agriculture was also considered unacceptable at a 
time when the nation was suffering commercially because of the war and Napoleon’s 
blockades. Government energy would be better spent if it kept a small but efficient 
regular force to defend British holdings around the globe, and if it returned to the 
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original basis of the 1757 militia at home.96 The Navy would do the rest. In short, 
Britain should not allow the war to change her character: such a mutation would be 
‘delusive’ and would no doubt lead to ‘a sudden & dreadful Calamity’.97 
On the other side of the debate was a growing body of opinion which held 
that Britain should be wholeheartedly re-invented as an armed and military nation. 
Many government ministers embraced this position, with varying degrees of caution. 
Among them was Yorke: 
Such is the state and condition of the human race, that it [military 
science] must be cultivated, to enable us to defend ourselves 
effectually against the ambition, the malice, and the envy of other 
nations. Little would it avail a nation to be eminent and flourishing in 
all the arts of peace; to excel in agriculture, manufactures, and 
commerce, and in the sciences connected with, and producing these 
advantages; to abound in wealth; to possess all the comforts and 
conveniences of civilised life, if it did not at the same time possess 
the skill and the knowledge, as well as the power and the spirit 
necessary to protect itself.98  
 
Circumstances had changed and Britain had to move with the times to survive. If this 
meant a complete redefinition of the national character, then so be it. Advocates of 
this position scoffed at the arguments that taking men from the fields at harvest-time 
would lead to famine. Melville, for one, felt that opposing invasion was more 
important than maintaining the annual farming cycles: ‘What will the Harvest signify 
if we allow an Enemy either to reap or destroy it[?] If we neglect our defence for the 
purpose of saving our Corn, … those who stay at home to reap may not be permitted 
to enjoy’.99 Many future generations might also have to live with the French menace, 
and it made no sense to pretend that everything would ever return to the way it had 
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been before the war. Britain had been permanently changed by the struggle, and it 
was time she recognised the fact. 
Of course any suggestions of change, at a time when change had such 
negative connotations in political circles, invited parallels between the French 
situation and the British. After all, the fact that Britain had hitherto avoided a bloody 
revolution on the French model was put down to the difference in character between 
the two nations. Comparisons between them usually found in favour of the former on 
a variety of counts. This was not unnatural, considering that they were written by 
Britons, but the points which they selected for purposes of contrast were significant. 
Alexander Hope described the French as ‘in prosperity full of fire and activity; in 
adversity desponding and cowardly’, as well as ‘impetuous’ and more reliant ‘upon 
stratagem than valor’. The British, on the other hand, were ‘sanguine, animated and 
persevering’, and ‘of a nature too bold and generous to seek conquest by 
stratagem’.100 Such a sense of ‘otherness’ has provided the backbone for Linda 
Colley’s argument that Britain’s eighteenth-century identity was forming with the 
French menace in mind, an argument echoed by a number of other historians.101 And 
yet there was one aspect of this fascination with the ‘other’ which does not fit 
Colley’s argument — the tendency, in a war which many considered to be a death-
struggle, to select characteristics which contributed to France’s success and adapt 
them to the British mentality. Charles Dibdin wrote to Addington about attempts to 
rouse the patriotic spirit of the nation:  
The French have always infused a spirit, an evanescent one perhaps, 
but still a spirit, into their countrymen by the advantage of their 
national vivacity. At their theatres the spectators join in chorus. I want 
to produce this effect … [and] to improve ‘ça ira’ into ‘God save the 
King’.102  
 
In essence, the approach was to learn from the enemy in order to defeat him. 
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The question was, how apt a pupil Britain should become in the art of 
warfare. Not everyone was comfortable with the attempts to keep up with the 
military developments of France, since these had transformed her ‘into a military 
despotism, which acknowledged no law but the sword’.103 Would Britain follow the 
same route if she adhered too closely to her enemy’s example? ‘Shall the mighty 
beacon, which has been blazing in France for thirteen years, blaze only to attract us 
to its gulph?’ wrote an anonymous pamphleteer in 1806.104 ‘I grieve to think, that 
while the military despotism of France exists, every nation must rely, for the 
protection of its liberties, not on its civil constitution, but upon its military force,’ 
regretted an MP in 1803.105 This fear instilled a degree of caution into successive 
governments’ approach towards questions that affected the constitution and national 
character. What was approved in theory did not necessarily translate into practice. 
Conscription was dismissed as impractical; martial law was considered but only as 
an emergency measure; even the Levy en Masse Act was suspended because of mass 
volunteering, though vigorously defended as constitutional in parliament.106 Yet this 
was also the period in which the government became more desperate to find 
comprehensive solutions to the defence problem. Risks were worth taking because 
the situation was more dangerous, and were also necessary because over-caution 
could be bad for the government’s image. As a result measures became bolder, the 
comparisons with France more and more overt, even as successive governments 
grew weaker and weaker. 
The politicians knew what they were doing when they made these parallels. It 
was a gamble, of course, precisely because Britain had always been paraded as being 
everything that France was not. France was an aggressive, expansionist, despotic 
nation. Britain, on the other hand, was traditionally libertarian, defensive, and 
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concerned about maintaining the balance of power.107 However it was not forgotten 
that France herself had successfully repelled an invading force in the 1790s: nor was 
it lost on observers that the French, as an ‘armed nation’, had been successful in all 
their undertakings.  
Were a French army to land in this country, declaring that they would 
make no peace with us, till we renounced our constitution and 
accepted of a form of government according to their fancy, who 
would deny that every man capable of serving against them ought to 
be compelled to service, and that every sacrifice must be made by 
individuals to repel the common danger? Such acts in such cases, 
instead of tyranny, become a virtue.108  
 
So argued Fox in 1794. The government hoped to achieve much the same effect in 
the 1800s by a levy en masse on the French model or, failing that, by instilling the 
conviction that the nation was worth dying for in the minds of ordinary Britons. The 
difficulty lay in convincing political opponents and observers that the polity could 
take a little militarism in order to oppose a much greater militarism. 
Military versus civilian 
A more serious issue, however, had arisen as a result of the redefinitions of 
military spirit and citizenship. The desire to instil a profound respect for the military 
in the minds of the British people had led to the attempts by Windham and others to 
restore the reputation of the regular army. At the same time as Britons were being 
encouraged to defend their country, a parallel opinion was forming that deemed it 
dangerous to oppose a potential French invasion with anything but a highly 
disciplined, trained soldiery. The result was an effort to develop a concept of a 
professional soldier in which the amateur ‘citizen-soldier’, or a citizen who was also 
a soldier, had no place. This marked the most obvious move away from the citizen-
soldier’s radical heyday, when he had stood as a counterbalance to standing armies 
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and Crown influence — a position which, by 1803, had been relegated in parliament 
to isolated radicals. 
The barracks debate cut to the heart of this shift in attitude. Barracks were 
not, of course, a novelty in the period of the French Revolution. There were over 
forty barracks in the British Isles in 1792, but these were largely in Scotland and 
Ireland, or concentrated around the naval centres at Portsmouth, Plymouth and 
Sheerness, and most of these (with some exceptions during the Jacobite rebellions of 
1715 and 1745) had been constructed prior to 1689.109 The growing fear of large 
standing armies, particularly after the civil war and the Glorious Revolution, led to 
the military force being dispersed as much as possible. The Mutiny Act of 1689 
accordingly provided for the billeting of soldiers all around the country in public 
houses.110 One of the main advantages of this arrangement was that the soldiers 
would continue to live among civilians and would, therefore, be much less likely to 
become oppressive tools in the government’s hands. This position survived into the 
1790s, but following the French Revolution the mood turned against the older view 
that saw no distinct separation between soldiers and people. ‘Jacobinical principles’ 
seemed to be rife, and the government’s greatest fear, fed by Colonel Oliver 
DeLancey's 1792 report  on the poor disposition of soldiers billeted in manufacturing 
areas, was that they would infect the Army.111 Allowing the soldiers to come into 
daily contact with civilians, many of whom might be influenced by such nefarious 
doctrines, was potentially dangerous. Besides, as Dundas noted, the crisis offered an 
unparalleled opportunity to revise outdated constitutional prejudices which could 
only hinder wartime mobilisation: ‘the Iron should be struck when it is hot’.112 A 
new Barracks Department was created, with DeLancey as Barrack Master General, 
and a string of new barracks was sprinkled across the north, east and south, with 
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further concentrations in the troublesome manufacturing districts.113 The naval 
mutinies of 1797 seemed to confirm the Government's suspicion that there was 
reason to fear the spread of Jacobinism in the armed forces, and the building 
proceeded apace. By 1797 there were over 80 barracks in Britain, and by 1805 there 
were over 160, with the capacity to house up to 130,000 troops.114  
This triumph over constitutional fears of barracking was not effortless, 
however, and there were a number of acrimonious debates on the issue in parliament. 
The Foxites took the old ground that barracks represented the first step on the road to 
tyrannical military rule.  They introduced ‘an invidious distinction between a citizen 
and a soldier in this country, a thing at all events to be avoided, because it was on the 
union of the two characters that every thing excellent in our military depended’.115  
However, the Foxites were out of step with general public opinion, which (not 
entirely unexpectedly) was extremely supportive of any attempts to relieve the local 
population of the need to maintain the soldiery. Despite a Foxite call for nationwide 
petitions against the building of barracks, none was received. On the contrary, 
several towns promptly petitioned for barracks to be built in their area.116 More 
significantly still, political trends had now moved away from the emphasis on 
barracks as a threat to liberty. The government’s response to Foxite arguments did 
take into account the practical relief barracks would give to the billeting public, but it 
also stressed the change in domestic and international circumstances that made them 
vital. Windham was, as usual, the most outspoken on the dangers of allowing citizens 
and soldiers to mix: ‘if they thought that there were men who night and day were 
preaching up bad doctrines in this country, was it unconstitutional in the government 
to withdraw the soldiery from being infected by them?’117 He was supported by his 
colleagues in more restrained, but nonetheless significant, terms. Pitt echoed 
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Windham’s doubts about contact with the undisciplined public leading to 
insubordination among the military: it was appropriate to segregate citizens and 
soldiers ‘at a time when the most ill-disposed parts of the community might, with 
success, instil into their minds sentiments of the most pernicious tendency’. Even 
more interestingly, Pitt emphasised that constitutional priorities had changed. Foxite 
arguments against barracks did not address ‘what we ought to do’, but rested 
‘merely’ on the fact ‘that the opinion of Mr. Justice Blackstone was against standing 
armies’.118 The short-term threat from the French was much more important than 
maintaining an obsolete political tradition. 
As Pitt and Windham acknowledged, barracks did not in any case take 
soldiers completely out of society.119 Officers continued to play a role in local affairs, 
soldiers usually attended the local parish churches on Sundays, and there were 
numerous cases of intermarriage between the barracked men and local women, not to 
mention the fact that some billeting continued.120 Despite this, general discipline was 
almost certainly improved by the increased use of barracks, which fostered 
communities in which the rituals of military life dictated everyday activities.121 As 
several historians have noted, indeed, the important point was that the rooted 
political opposition to barracks, and all that they stood for, had been broken. By the 
1820s, hardly any of Britain’s remaining domestic force was billeted on the public.122 
The fear that Jacobinism would find its way into the armed services had changed 
both the constitutional and practical attitude to the quartering of the British army. 
The natural corollary to this was that the encouragement of military training 
throughout the population might put weapons, and the ability to use them effectively, 
into the hands of republicans and revolutionaries. Such a position was most often 
expressed by politicians who were not in government, and who worried about the 
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extent to which the ‘armed nation’ relied on the goodwill of the people. They were 
unlikely to have agreed with the assessment of sanguine men like Pitt, who felt that  
from an army to consist of the round bulk of the people, no man who 
knows the British character could have the least fear — if it even 
were to include the disaffected; for, they would bear so small a 
proportion to the whole, as to be incapable of doing mischief.123 
 
The popularity of the volunteer movement, which encouraged ordinary men to bear 
arms without being subject to regular army discipline, was deeply troubling to many 
such observers and did nothing to assuage their doubts about the wisdom of military 
training. The prospect of implementing the Levy en Masse Act, under which all men 
regardless of status were to receive such instruction, was even worse. ‘I hope that the 
Number of Volunteer Offers of Military Service will be so great that there will be no 
necessity to have Recourse to the arming the People en masse, which may do very 
well in some Parts of England but I am sure would be most dangerous in others,’ 
wrote Lord Arden to Lord Redesdale.124 Sir John Macpherson agreed: once the 
invasion was over ‘it might be asked whether the poorer class so armed would return 
again cheerfully to their former Labours & Clothing? Whether the Taxes could be 
easily & regularly raised from a People in Arms?’125 These doubts were fed by the 
behaviour of the volunteers during the famine of 1800, when many units refused to 
follow orders to attack their rioting fellow citizens. In Devon and Cornwall several 
units joined the riots themselves.126 It was an uneasy reminder of the danger of 
entrusting arms to a nation just emerging from the suspension of Habeas Corpus and 
a string of other oppressive measures designed to maintain control from above. 
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Under these circumstances, the traditional associations between the ‘citizen’ and the 
‘soldier’ unravelled even further. 
At the same time as the connection was being loosened between soldiers and 
citizens, the professionalisation of the regular soldier was experiencing a significant 
boost. The practical reasons behind the unwillingness to implement conscription 
made the government eager to increase voluntary recruitment into the Army by 
improving the image of the regular force. The series of Army reforms undertaken by 
Windham in 1806, and by the duke of York as commander in chief from 1794 to 
1809, were an integral part of this process. Until 1806 soldiering was effectively for 
life, or until a soldier could be pensioned out of the Army at the end of his useful 
career, but the Army’s low reputation meant that they were often viewed as lesser 
creatures, ‘vagabonds, and even criminals from the jails’, ‘collected from the dregs 
of the people’, who were in any case unfit to be citizens.127 One of the priorities of 
the campaign to raise the stock of the Army was to change this attitude. Although no 
longer recruited exclusively for life, soldiers were encouraged to continue with the 
lure of greater bounties and stronger pension schemes at the end of an extended 
career. With Windham’s backing, the solution to the manpower problem became ‘a 
general improvement of the conditions of the service in such a way as should not be 
attended with too great an expence, nor be inconsistent with the discipline and well-
being of the army’.128 As he explained, ‘the general principle is to raise the value and 
estimation of the service, and to attract the soldiers to it, as well by the credit in 
which he sees it held, as by the advantages which he may expect to find there’.129 
The profile of the armed services may have been damaged rather than improved by 
continuing military defeat and continental isolation, but from 1792 onwards the 
professionalisation of the service was increased by the regularisation of the 
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drillbooks, compiled by tried and tested Army officers and bearing the official cachet 
of the commander in chief.130 
A consequence of this increase in military expertise, however, was that armed 
service was placed out of the reach of ordinary citizens. The volunteers, and even the 
militia, were increasingly viewed with contempt because of attempts by the 
politicians to pass them off as ‘real soldiers’ when they could never be anything 
more than ‘a sort of military carnival’.131 In some ways this was ironic, since some 
of the Army reforms seemed to be designed to strengthen the bond between soldiers 
and citizens. Windham had even envisioned giving old soldiers the franchise as a 
reward for life service, which suggested a direct link between soldiering and political 
participation of the kind traced by Colley and others.132 Yet Windham had been one 
of the foremost exponents of separating soldiers and civilians during the 1790s. What 
he was trying to do in the 1800s was not to foster the original idea of a citizen-soldier 
but to accustom the population to the idea of soldiering as a career, and to give them 
added incentives to pursue it. His proposals were, in fact, in tune with a growing 
assumption from 1803 onwards that citizens could not be soldiers by definition. 
The nation’s experience of volunteering was part of the reason why its critics, 
including Windham, found such a separation attractive. One of the great debates over 
the usefulness of volunteers touched on the ability to discipline them, since they were 
not subject to martial law except in cases of invasion or rebellion. There were 
frightening tales of volunteers resigning in mass, refusing to implement unpopular 
orders, using their meetings to discuss political events, and electing their own 
officers.133 ‘The dangers arising from bodies, at once deliberative and military, are so 
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obvious, that they must occur to the most ordinary understanding,’ The Anti-Jacobin 
Review stated.134 Grenville was beside himself:  
The project, contained in the papers circulated to the Lords 
Lieutenants, that of inviting day labourers & working manufacturers 
… to arm themselves … under leaders chosen by themselves from 
among themselves, was received in this County … with … marked 
disapprobation — nor can I conceive how there can be two opinions 
on the subject, out of that wise assembly called His Majesty’s Cabinet 
Council.135 
 
Windham in particular opposed the kind of volunteering that mixed soldiering with 
politics. He fulminated against ‘bodies of armed men, subject to no regular authority, 
governed by committees and sub-committees, and having more the character of 
debating societies than schools of military discipline’.136 The experience of the 
1790s, in which lower class political debate had been actively discouraged by 
government policy, was not forgotten, and the volunteers were frequently drawn 
from the lower class and manufacturing towns. To have armed bodies deliberating 
was the politician’s worst nightmare. What was needed to defeat the French was not 
large bodies of civilians who were free from central control, but a regular army that 
was not politically active and responded to strict rules of discipline. 
Real soldiers were therefore better than volunteers and perhaps even militia 
because their exclusion from the rights of citizens made them more reliable and 
easier to control. Although they had to abandon their own citizenship in order to be 
subject to martial law, they defended the country on behalf of those who could 
themselves never truly be soldiers. Naturally enough, the military men were most 
adamant on this point. A pamphlet written by one argued that ‘the creation in time of 
danger of an amphibious force partially partaking of the military character, but 
incessantly maintaining the nature, and appuying [sic] itself on the rights of the 
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citizen, is … a body affording no real protection to the state’.137 Because martial law 
and discipline played such a strong role in creating the soldierly mind, citizens could 
never really be soldiers. This dichotomy had already appeared at the time of the 
naval mutinies in 1797, when the Morning Post had reported of the petitions sent in 
by the seamen, ‘Upon reading them we are led to suppose they are the production of 
Citizens deliberating their rights as Members of Society, rather than as the 
production of men armed for war, and necessarily put under martial law’.138 
Volunteers could never be effective military men  
because they ever must continue half labourers, half farmers, half 
mechanics, half tradesmen, half gentlemen, &c — and they can 
never be so adroit, and so productive as they would otherwise be, in 
these latter capacities, because, they are besides obliged to be half 
soldiers.139  
 
The debate over what made the regular better than the auxiliary gradually led 
to the emergence of the ‘perfect soldier’. He was no vagabond peeled off the streets: 
if he ever had been, he had since cleaned up his act.  
Firmness, steadiness, perseverance, endurance: these are the 
characteristics of the British soldier; zeal, alacrity, and enterprise; 
these are the characteristics of the British officer; common to both are 
loyalty and fidelity without a stain, combined with the most fearless 
and determined courage; the ancient and hereditary bravery of the 
British and Irish nations; ‘the unconquerable mind, the spirit never to 
submit or yield’.140  
 
The perfect soldier acquired his prowess by a number of means which were out of 
reach for the volunteer and militiaman: service abroad, exposure to danger, and the 
habit of obedience. Windham described him as follows: 
There is, moreover, a sort of soldier character, arising from a 
thousand causes, and acquired insensibly in the course of regular 
service, which will easily be distinguished by discerning eyes, and 
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will furnish in general a marked discrimination between the militia 
soldier, and the soldier of the line.141 
 
This character, in essence, was what prevented the militia and the volunteers from 
being of any practical use at all. As a citizen police force they might serve well 
enough, but as an armed force they lacked the ‘character’ the Army had acquired in 
abundance through discipline and service. Volunteers were commanded by ‘no 
community of habit or sentiments, but that of the general danger’. They were simply 
taught ‘a sort of mimicry of military evolutions’: they lacked ‘the military character’. 
The same was true of the militia: Cornwallis thought that ‘the same sense of 
subordination, and an equal zeal and energy, cannot be expected from the officers in 
general of troops of this description, as may be naturally looked for amongst those 
who have chosen the army as their profession’.142 
The emphasis on discipline and obedience, indeed, suggested that to 
transform a citizen into a solider at all was to question the British constitution’s basis 
of liberty and freedom. ‘A sacrifice of a greater portion of the personal liberty of 
individuals is necessary in the profession of a soldier, than in any other of the 
employments of civil life; for without that sacrifice the army could not for a moment 
be kept together,’ said the Anti-Jacobin Review.143 The soldier was compelled to 
obey, whereas the citizen cherished his independence of thought. The implications of 
this were significant. If citizens could not be soldiers, then it was pointless to 
encourage volunteering and to continue expanding the militia. Military spirit raised 
the profile of the Army and accustomed people to the idea of joining it, but it failed 
in its purpose if it encouraged citizens to believe that they could dispense with the 
Army altogether. The best solution under these circumstances was to maintain the 
militia and volunteers on the basis of property — effectively their original foundation 
— and to encourage the growth of a professional soldiery by recruitment, ‘the most 
                                                 
141 Speech by Windham, 20 June 1803, PH XXXVI, 1612-3. 
142 Cornwallis to Portland, 1 November 1800, Cornwallis Correspondence III, 299-300; Stewart, 
Outlines of a Plan for the Reform of the Land Forces, p. 13; Reflexions on the Invasion of Great 
Britain, p. 14. 
143 Anti-Jacobin Review, VI, 3 (July 1800), 265-6. 
 142 
valuable portion of our military force’.144 This was the path pursued by Windham 
and, eventually, by Castlereagh. 
Perhaps the closest one could come to a real citizen-soldier was the light 
infantryman, who mixed the citizen’s independence and quickness of thought with 
the soldier’s disciplined action.145 The light infantry were expected to think, unlike 
most other soldiers who were just expected to follow orders. It was no accident, 
perhaps, that most of the professional soldiers who considered the subject of the 
volunteers preferred to train them up as light infantry rather than to act alongside 
soldiers of the line, since such training was supposed to be more fitting for their 
character as a force.146 ‘I hope then to see the men taught all the duties of light troops 
… as well as to act with steadiness and correctness in extended lines and deep 
columns,’ wrote a supporter of the volunteers in 1806.147 The qualities of the light 
infantryman were considered perfect for the citizen who wanted to become a soldier, 
as it placed the emphasis on individuality rather than on working as part of a highly-
disciplined body. This was presumably also why the development of a regular light 
infantry force was politically controversial, particularly since it required a much 
stronger move in the direction of the French Revolutionary style of skirmish fighting 
than the British Army, brought up on Prussian drill, was ready to undertake.148 
This move towards reliance on a stronger regular force, and the downplaying 
of the auxiliaries, did have one particularly unpleasant consequence. The growth of a 
large professional army obviously entailed problems for demobilisation once the war 
was over. Sooner or later the military man would have to be rehabilitated into 
society, and a strict separation between soldiers and citizens would be an economic 
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disadvantage in this case. The soldier was ‘as little fitted, or rather as much unfitted, 
by his habits, for any other profession, as he who has been bred a weaver is for the 
trade of a shoemaker or a carpenter’.149 The need to deal with a sudden influx of 
professional fighters after 1815, who were largely unskilled to deal with everyday 
tasks, was one of the more serious problems faced by the postwar government. 
Perhaps these issues could be ascribed to lack of forethought on the part of the 
policy-makers, but they could not be expected to foresee the eventual defeat of 
Napoleon on the continent, not while potential European allies held aloof. The peace 
of Amiens had already shown that a large professional force would probably be 
needed even in peacetime. In 1806 a memorandum recommended that the 
organisation of the regulars ‘ought to be formed with a view to Peace as well as 
War’.150 In theory, Britain might always need a large fighting body, as a result of 
which the economic question might never arise. The prospect of future 
unemployment for the vast army that was being created was a secondary problem for 
politicians who saw it as their main task to find a solution to the immediate 
manpower problem. From their vantage-point, the future seemed to call for military, 
rather than industrial or commercial, prowess. Their policies for Britain’s defence, 
and their language on the subject, reflected this conviction. 
Conclusion 
Crucially, none of the objections to the political defence programmes 
challenged the idea that Britain had to become more militaristic in the face of the 
French threat. There might be differences over how military spirit was to be 
encouraged in practice, but the need to cultivate it was not in doubt. ‘The question is 
not now whether we shall become a military nation,’ an anonymous pamphleteer 
wrote in 1806: ‘that is already decided: but what sort of military nation?’151 Very few 
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politicians denied that the character of the nation had changed, or ought to change, 
while Napoleon still threatened invasion. As subjects, all Britons had a duty to 
defend their monarch and their country from attack. As citizens, they also had a duty 
to protect the political system which permitted them a limited degree of involvement 
at several different levels. There was, however, no consensus about the kind of 
defence to be provided. Continental circumstances, and the creation of different 
kinds of military service, raised the profile of the regular forces to the point at which 
they could be advanced as the only viable means of self-defence. By 1809, when the 
defence threat receded due to the achievement of several victories in the Peninsula, 
the Army had improved both its importance and its reputation. The result was a 
recasting of ideas about the armed services, British identity, and the practical 
application of citizenship. ‘The true character of the English People is not only 
egregiously mistaken by the Enemy, but is even misapprehended by some amongst 
ourselves,’ reported the Times at the height of the invasion scares of 1803.  
We seem to be regarded as a Nation corrupted by wealth, and 
immersed in luxury; depraved by sensuality; and by indulgence and 
vanity rendered totally effeminate. There can, however, be no greater 
mistake. It was always the character of the Englishman, to love his 
domestic comforts; but no man knows better when and how to resign 
them. It is true, we are a wealthy, but still we are a moral nation, and 
are neither sunk in sloth nor sensuality. The courage of Britons has 
never been found deficient, either by sea or land.152 
 
The results of the debate over military spirit, however, were not always clear-
cut, particularly since the sensibilities of the government’s supporters could not be 
trampled wholesale and rough-shod. Political circumstances as well as identities 
were also changing. After 1801 individual ministries were frequently too weak to 
push their particular interpretation of how Britain should respond to the invasion 
threat, and continued military stagnation did not help. The result was that unstable 
governments found it alarmingly difficult to impose central control at a time when 
the international situation was deeply worrying. Objections to policy could not 
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simply be overridden, and yet compromises were often too costly. Part of the 
solution lay in trying to convince the political nation that the government, rather than 
anyone else, had the country’s true interests at heart. National defence was a very 
public concern; ministers recognised this by calling for volunteers, and by reiterating 
the constitutional doctrine that defence was a duty owed by all members of the state. 
The fact that politicians clung to the volunteers for so long after the 
professionalisation of the regulars became more desirable showed how keen they 
were to emphasise this policy of inclusion. In the end, one of the strongest weapons 
in their armoury was public opinion. By manipulating this a government could make 
coercion seem like a compromise and justify strong measures or controversial 
policies by appealing to the wider audience of the nation. The means by which this 
was achieved will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Morale and the ‘national spirit’ 
 
Britain’s frequent diplomatic isolation between 1797 and 1810 necessitated a 
predominantly defensive war, a fact which brought the question of national ‘spirit’, 
or morale, to the front of political debate. Without strategic opportunities on the 
continent, and persistently threatened with the prospect of a French invasion, the 
politicians were strongly aware of the ‘call for Extraordinary expedients to animate 
Public Confidence’ in order to counteract growing dissatisfaction with the aims, 
length, and conduct of the war.1 J.R. Western has argued that the government — ‘an 
active minority surrounded by an indifferent multitude’ — was threatened with mass 
desertion from groups that traditionally supported it, particularly the county 
aristocracy and gentry.2 It was thus faced with a number of questions which deeply 
affected the formation of defence policy. How could general confidence be 
maintained when the war was going badly? How could the government gain 
sufficient strength to deal with the strong measures it felt were necessary, and how 
could it persuade a reluctant country to submit to them? 
For the politicians the situation was far from ideal. Jeremy Black has argued 
that, had they confined their war aims to naval and colonial warfare and to preserving 
the integrity of the British Isles, successes would have been much more marked and 
low morale would not have been so much of an issue.3 What Black does not seem to 
realise is that this was precisely the situation the government was keen to avoid. 
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‘Nothing can tend so much to discourage a nation, to lower their spirit, to damp their 
expectations, and to defeat their hopes, as a mere war of defence,’ maintained the 
Anti-Jacobin Review in 1803.4 Yet Britain was on the defensive whether she wanted 
to be or not. Without any strategic openings on the continent the only way to turn 
that situation around was for the French to invade, and some were of opinion that this 
was the best thing that could occur: not only would the deadlock finally have been 
broken, but the nation would also have been given an opportunity to prove its valour. 
‘I don’t like to gasconade on the subject, but I am confident … an attempt to invade 
us two months hence is an event devoutly to be wished,’ Dundas wrote to Grenville 
in 1798. ‘Without such an attempt the relative strength of the two countries, and the 
independence and invulnerability of Britain never will be sufficiently ascertained 
either to our own satisfaction, or to that of the enemy, and the rest of the world.’5 Pitt 
echoed the sentiment in a toast attributed to him as Colonel of the Cinque Ports 
Volunteers in 1803: ‘A speedy meeting with the enemy on our own shores!’6 No-one 
spoke of the possibility of defeat, of course. 
A large part of the politics of national defence, therefore, focused on the 
domestic mood. The result was an emphasis on issues such as participation and trust. 
This may seem surprising considering the dread with which ministers contemplated 
the spread of revolutionary ideas within Britain. Nevertheless, they went out of their 
way to stress the inclusiveness of the political system, a strategy that it was hoped 
would increase national confidence and defuse any protests against high-handedness 
and wartime blundering. Their emphasis on involvement becomes less startling, 
perhaps, when one recalls how many politicians were convinced that Britain’s 
citizenry was profoundly attached to a polity that guaranteed them an integral place 
in the social hierarchy. Military participation — volunteering, for example — was 
only part of a bigger picture of national endeavour, and those who could not 
themselves take up arms in defence of their country were encouraged to channel their 
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enthusiasm in other ways. This quintessentially British ‘spirit’, it was hoped, would 
enable the nation to oppose the French to the last breath, and would eventually allow 
more offensive strategies to be undertaken abroad by fostering confidence on the 
home front. Meanwhile, the lack of continental opportunities meant that any excuse 
to extol Britain’s spirit of bravery, enterprise, loyalty, or self-sacrifice was exploited 
to the full. According to Sheridan, ‘the spirit of the people’ was ‘above all’ an 
expression of national might.7 The picture that emerged from parliamentary debates, 
periodicals and private correspondence was of a country capable of great things if 
only it could forget its political and social differences. Despite occasional twinges of 
pessimism, the picture was outstandingly upbeat. The difficulty lay in finding a 
scheme of defence which was sufficiently inclusive to override the effects of 
growing government weakness and increasing doubt about the course of the war. 
The first half of this chapter will deal with the ways in which governments 
between 1794 and 1812 sought to maintain the national ‘spirit’. Pitt’s fostered a 
broadly inclusive version of national defence in which most social groups — and on 
occasion both genders — could take part. This vision of defence was buttressed by a 
system of propaganda through the medium of reported speeches, officially 
sanctioned papers, prints, pamphlets, periodicals, and energetic efforts (which 
sometimes backfired) to blacken political opponents as much as possible. Although 
there were very few military victories in the period, the government drew attention to 
successes at sea and in the colonies, while even abortive offensives closer to home — 
such as the frequent attempts on the French coast, and attacks on the invasion flotilla 
at Boulogne — were mined to their full potential. Finally, the government’s talent for 
making the best of a bad situation was nowhere better exemplified than in the 
treatment of the public finances. Despite the uncertain impact of war on the national 
economy, and despite the bank crash of 1797, the annual budget speeches provided 
an excellent opportunity to reassess the nation’s strength, and even heavy taxation 
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was used to demonstrate the indomitable spirit of the British in the face of 
overwhelming odds. 
The second part of the chapter will examine the limitations of these attempts 
to raise morale during a long, costly, and exhausting war. Though the cultivation of 
national ‘spirit’ was enough to carry Pitt and Addington through some difficult 
patches, declarations of trust from about 1803 onwards were alarmingly one-sided 
due to growing instability and the rise of domestic problems that distracted attention 
from the war effort. The occasional foray against the French coast could not conceal 
the fact that defensive warfare was a draining experience, and there was little 
opportunity to turn attention away from political weakness. Addington’s and Pitt’s 
inability to harness the continental situation effectively, the Talents’ decision to 
husband resources, and Portland’s and Perceval’s shaky grip on the political scene, 
all drew attention to the exaggerated simplicity and insufficiency of attempts to buoy 
up national sentiments. Neither government nor opposition could shake off a 
lingering feeling that the social system was straining at the seams, despite boastful 
declarations in parliament of the mutual bond between governors and governed. The 
politicians had effectively lost their hold over the national mind, and dissentient 
thoughts began to be expressed through a resurgence of radicalism. The lack of any 
headway against Napoleon, when combined with near-bankruptcy, famine, social 
unrest, invasion scares, and corruption at high levels, fostered the suspicion that 
Britain was being punished for her sins. This damaged the government’s case to lead 
the nation almost beyond repair. The consequence was that, even when victories 
started to roll in from the Peninsula, the Perceval and Liverpool governments found 
it extremely difficult to regain credibility. 
Propaganda, trust and national involvement 
No ministry could survive so many military defeats and diplomatic setbacks 
without an effort to turn bad situations to its advantage, and both Pitt and Addington 
quickly became adept at this. In 1797, Pitt managed to rouse the house of commons 
into a rendering of ‘Britons Strike Home’, even while fending off accusations of 
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dishonesty and incompetence brought up by the failure of the latest peace 
negotiations.8 His government attempted to cultivate a similar spirit in the nation 
through the periodical and pamphlet press, partly through printing speeches, 
influencing press reports, releasing information selectively, and blackening its 
political opponents. In addition, it attempted to counter accusations of incompetence 
and high-handedness by giving all citizens a palpable role to play in national 
defence. This was difficult in the early 1790s, when the threat of revolution was 
constantly present, but after 1796 it became more acceptable, and by 1803 it was 
commonplace. By being encouraged to defend itself, the nation would not only 
discover its ability to resist the French, but would also find that the government had 
no serious plots to undermine British constitutional freedoms. ‘How could the people 
entertain any suspicion of a design against their liberties on the part of a government, 
which did exactly what a treacherous and designing ruler would be most afraid of 
doing?’ asked Lord Selkirk in 1807.9 
The press offered one of the best and most obvious ways to influence the 
nation’s thoughts about the war, particularly since it had already developed a wide 
readership during the course of the eighteenth century. By 1811 there were 60 papers 
published in London, 112 in the provinces, 40 in Ireland, and 27 in Scotland. Of the 
53 London papers, 17 were pro government, 18 hostile, 15 neutral, and 3 
characterised as ‘wavering’.10 Despite this apparent weighting towards the 
opposition, the government was in a much better position to convey useful and 
authoritative information since many of the periodicals in its pay received privileged 
information, and because of its access to secret service funding. About £5000 a year 
was spent on hiring a number of pamphlets and periodicals, among them the Times, 
the Sun, the True Briton and the Morning Herald.11 In the 1790s the Pitt government 
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had a further advantage over the opposition due to the innovatory nature of its 
journalism. The Anti-Jacobin, for example, was an overt attempt by some of the 
junior members of the ministry to win support for the war through humour, well-
written articles, and the merciless lambasting of Pitt’s opponents. The first issue was 
published on 20 November 1797 and pledged to reveal the ‘falsehood’ of the Foxite 
press, which it proceeded to do in a series of misleading but often hilarious articles. 
The opposition simply could not find a way to respond effectively. ‘I wish as much 
as you do that some paper were set up against the Anti-Jacobin but do not know 
whom to spirit up to it,’ Fox lamented to his nephew Lord Holland.12 In its last issue, 
published on 9 July 1798, the Anti-Jacobin claimed to have sold 2500 papers which, 
assuming that some copies of the paper were lent out to neighbours and friends, 
produced an estimated readership of between 35,000 and 50,000 people.13 It was 
primarily kept up by George Canning, George Ellis and J.H. Frere, but also ran 
frequent contributions by other subordinate members of the government, and 
benefited from a number of financial articles written by Pitt himself.14 
Both government and opposition were accustomed to using the press as a 
means of finding a wider audience for their parliamentary speeches. Rousing orations 
made at times of great stress were reported in the newspapers, albeit with varying 
degrees of accuracy. In addition, on very special occasions, a member of parliament 
would correct a speech especially for pamphlet publication. Once again, the 
government had the upper hand because of its access to special funds. Ten thousand 
copies of Pitt’s speech on 31 January 1799 were printed in Ireland at a cost of £5000 
from the secret service fund, with the intention of persuading the Irish that a Union 
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would be in their best interests.15 The opposition, however, was not behind in 
pamphleteering. Windham, in particular, had strong connections with the press. He 
corresponded with pamphleteer Francois d’Ivernois in the 1790s, persuaded Cobbett 
to back the Grenvillite ‘New’ opposition for a while in the early 1800s, and helped to 
organise a system of shares to fund the Weekly Political Register, which began 
printing in January 1802. Through these connections Windham was able to have his 
speeches on defence published several times. In February 1805, for example, he 
published his speech on the repeal of Pitt’s Additional Force Act, in which he 
discussed an embryonic form of what would later become the Training Act.16 
Despite the fact that such practices were widely accepted, not everyone was 
completely convinced that the press was useful for the circulation of pro-government 
information. Once in the public domain, words spoken were difficult to take back 
and easily misinterpreted. In 1799 Grenville suggested that parliament ought to exert 
more control over printing ‘for the security of the government, and the preservation 
of the constitution’. He called the uncontrolled press ‘this intestine ulcer … [preying] 
on [its country’s] vitals’.17 The government did move towards a certain amount of 
censorship, although at first this was limited to the radical papers. Acts in 1798 and 
1799 required printers and publishers to register their names and addresses and to 
record them on each paper.18 These measures allowed the weeding out of some of the 
more obviously disloyal publications, but did not stop frequent press leaks of vital 
secret information, obviously a consideration in a war for survival. Many politicians 
recognised the seriousness of the issue. Yorke complained to Sidmouth in 1806 about 
the ‘most scandalous & dangerous insertions in the Publick Papers of every 
movement both Naval & Military, which is made or even ordered, in any of our 
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Ports, or Stations’. His suggested solution was to ‘prohibit all such Publications, in 
time of War, with the exception only of the usual mercantile Intelligence’.19 Outright 
censorship does not, however, appear to have been implemented. 
The politicians’ ambivalence towards the press was exemplified by the 
experience of Grenville, who preserved doubts about the dangers and inaccuracy of 
parliamentary reporting long after the war ended. He complained in 1818 that 
speeches were taken to be ‘fair representations of the opinions & arguments which 
they purport to convey’, but this was ‘quite erroneous’, ‘destructive of the truth of 
history’, and ‘highly injurious to public men’. Grenville believed this was because 
the reporters misunderstood fundamental issues and acted under the influence of 
political bias. In such a case, he concluded, it was in fact ‘impossible that such 
reports can be even substantially accurate’.20 And yet he was heavily involved in the 
press, first under Pitt, then as head of the opposition, and finally in the Ministry of 
All the Talents. Ivon Asquith argues that Grenville’s dislike of the press contributed 
to the Whig party’s disorganised and abortive attempts to gain more printed support 
after 1810, but Gayle Pendleton points to Grenville’s prominent role in the 
publication of several government pamphlets in the 1790s. Despite his reservations 
about speech reporting, many of his speeches on foreign affairs were prepared for 
publication. In 1801, moreover, he anonymously wrote a series of letters for 
Cobbett’s Porcupine on the subject of the Armed Neutrality.21 Perhaps it was this 
first-hand experience which convinced him of the dangers of the press later in life. 
As great as those risks were, however, Grenville’s example showed that they were 
obviously worth taking. 
Easier to control (although not necessarily more effective) than the use of the 
press was the government’s habit of portraying the political opposition in an 
unfavourable light. The Foxites’ numerical weakness in the 1790s, coupled with 
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tactical errors and their association with the reform question, laid them open to 
attack. The opposition press, particularly the Morning Chronicle and the Morning 
Post, was labelled ‘the Jacobin Papers’ by the Anti-Jacobin and accused of being in 
the pay of Camille Jourdan.22 Government-sponsored prints went further, and were 
quick to characterise Fox and his followers as actively traitorous. Gillray, who 
received a government pension between 1797 and 1801, liked to portray Fox as a 
sans-culotte, either firing at a target which represented the constitution or simply 
welcoming a French invasion on the shores of England.23 Nor were the Foxites safe 
in parliament itself, where they were frequently accused of being in the pay of the 
French, sometimes more or less directly. Opposition arguments were decried as little 
less than invitations to invasion, which led Fox to complain that this left his 
followers no role at all in the political process: 
If I complain that one part of the country is weak, I may be told — 
Take care; you are doing that which is dangerous; you are 
communicating to the enemy which is the least defensible point of 
the empire. To whom, then, am I to make the complaint? I wish to 
know whether ministers are the only persons to be permitted to give 
advice?24 
 
Numerous errors of judgment did not help. The eagerness of the opposition’s 
front-benchers to defend Arthur O’Connor, a notorious advocate for a French 
invasion of Ireland, at his trial in 1798 was deeply embarrassing. ‘If there is a lower 
political hell than any we before have witnessed, I think the opposition have found it 
out for themselves, by their connection with O’Connor and such worthies,’ Lord 
Carlisle gossiped to Auckland.25 Most damningly of all, the Foxites were unable to 
respond effectively to such challenges between 1797 and 1802 because of their 
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secession from parliament. The practical message of this secession — that parliament 
no longer represented the people — had a flavour of treason about it, and this did not 
go unnoticed with Pitt, who called it ‘as near akin to rebellion as in its most classical 
use’.26 Although a visible snub against the credibility of the government, the upshot 
of the secession was that it was easier to characterise the opposition’s intentions as 
sinister when they were not present to defend themselves, and when their absence 
itself could lend substance to the taunts. The government took full advantage of this 
situation. 
To some extent, of course, the accusations against the Foxites were nothing 
more than rhetoric, since aristocratic Whigs seemed highly unlikely to countenance 
any direct involvement with democratic principles. ‘I do not see how they can well 
go long on together’, Dundas pointed out.27 Despite this, the allegations of opposition 
‘Jacobinism’ did have a serious dimension. The names of the people who attended a 
Scottish birthday dinner for Fox in January 1796 were recorded and sent to Dundas, 
so clearly the government was eager to know who thought the celebrations worth 
attending.28 Following Fox’s toast to the sovereignty of the people at a similar dinner 
in 1798, and for which his name was struck from the privy council, Pitt seems to 
have become convinced that Foxites and radicals were engaged in a tactical 
alliance.29 Roger Wells has in fact argued that Pitt was right, and that the opposition 
was directly connected with the cause of radicalism.30 Whether this was so is 
questionable, but clearly the government felt the need to watch the opposition’s 
every move, although it wished to do so without causing an open fuss. 
The strategy of attacking its opponents was not, however, without risks for 
the government, and it occasionally came off worst from direct confrontations. 
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Wanton misuse of the term ‘Jacobin’ was likely to be reflected back on those who 
employed it. Even Pitt was not immune. Sheridan accused him of ‘mimick[ing] the 
Jacobins’ in 1794, and in 1797 Lansdowne declared that ‘he knew of no such 
practical Jacobins as His Majesty’s ministers’.31 Government members who 
subsequently passed into opposition suddenly found themselves running the gauntlet 
of abuse they had themselves meted out only a few years previously. Grenville, who 
had lambasted the Foxites in the 1790s for their secession, carefully distanced 
himself from the same accusations in the 1800s when he urged that his ‘New’ 
opposition only attend parliament on the most important questions.32 He also found 
himself accused of near-treason in much the same terms that he had once used with 
regard to Fox. The Addingtonian ‘Near Observer’ castigated Grenville’s strategies in 
1803 as ‘popular and factious’ attempts ‘to intercept the resources of the exchequer’ 
and spread ‘discouragement and despondency’. ‘Every cry, and every artifice is 
adopted to discredit the measures of government, and destroy the confidence of the 
country.’33 Unfortunately for Addington, however, the circumstances that had 
allowed Pitt’s government to benefit from blackening its political opponents were 
past. A stronger opposition and a weaker parliamentary majority meant that 
Addingtonian imputations of factiousness were often more harmful to the accusers 
than to their targets. 
By this time, however, the government was less concerned with making itself 
look good in contrast to its parliamentary opponents. During the last years of the 
1790s Pitt had gradually expanded involvement in defence by calling for a range of 
voluntary subscriptions to finance the war effort, and by expanding participation in 
the volunteers beyond the rich and propertied. Part of the effect of this broadening of 
national inclusion was psychological: trusting the people to arm against the external 
enemy made them feel good about themselves and their place within the hierarchy, 
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32 Grenville to the marquess of Buckingham, 1 February 1803, Huntington Library, California, Stowe 
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particularly following the atmosphere of suspicion and paranoia which had existed in 
the early 1790s.34 In any case, by the end of the decade there seemed to be no reason 
to fear public disaffection any longer. Dundas informed the cabinet that there was 
less reason to keep regular troops at home because ‘the public spirit [had been] 
weaned from despondency and disaffection, to a more just confidence in the 
resources of the Country & in the Character of the Government’.35 He hoped that 
arming the nation would foster a sense of loyalty where it did not already exist. ‘If 
any man felt the love of [his country], he ought to be put in a situation to defend it. 
Men got the means of doing so, and he was convinced, that they on that account 
learned to value their country.’36 To make ‘every Man feel that he is bearing a share 
in the defence and Security of his Country’ was, Dundas felt, just as important as 
repelling an invasion.37 Addington was, however, able to reap the fruit of this revival 
of trust more than Pitt, whose government was too closely associated with the 
suspension of Habeas Corpus, the Two Acts, and other harsh measures for such a 
strategy to be fully convincing.  
This did not prevent Pitt from trying new avenues to foster national interest. 
In addition to arming a broader cross-section of the nation, he was keen to encourage 
more direct involvement in the government’s financial policy through public 
subscriptions. The war had greatly increased the level of taxation, and this had 
obvious implications for social unrest, particularly in the circumstances of the mid-
1790s. Pitt was aware of this fact when he suggested to the readers of the Anti-
Jacobin that his exemption of the poor from the Triple Assessment was ‘one of its 
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great recommendations’ as a measure.38 A more practical way to mitigate the impact 
of these wartime disasters, he decided, was to encourage all the king’s subjects to 
subscribe as large a proportion of their income as possible, preferably between a 
quarter and a seventh, to a ‘Loyalty Loan’ of £18 millions, and in return to receive a 
favourable rate in the government stocks.39 This expedient not only recognised the 
taxpayer’s stake in the polity, but also gave him the opportunity to contribute 
personally towards the war effort. The Loan was something of a gamble, since it 
could easily be characterised as yet another means of extorting money from the 
already heavily-taxed nation. The oppositionist Morning Post admired Pitt’s guts in 
aiming to extract up to £10,000 from the richest incomes, but concluded that this 
‘forced loan’ could only be achieved by compulsion.40 It was, however, a success 
without resorting to that. The Times reported that within three hours of the books 
being opened £8 millions had already been subscribed.41 To Grenville’s 
astonishment, even the duke of Bedford, nominal head of the Foxite Whigs, 
subscribed £100,000.42 Only three days later, nearly £17 millions had been 
subscribed, and the books finally closed at eleven o’clock with a total of £18 millions 
having been achieved.43 For ministerial supporters, the success of the experiment 
showed that the gamble had paid off: despite serious financial and military problems, 
a broad section of the nation was still willing to follow the government’s lead in a 
crisis. 
More importantly still, by encouraging the great and the propertied to exert 
their leadership, the Loan had shown that Britain’s political hierarchy still worked 
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well in spite of the challenge of the French Revolution. It reflected the ideal vision of 
the social system: the king and the aristocracy leading the way, and the subaltern 
classes eagerly following. As Pitt recognised, ‘The extent of such a contribution will 
in a great degree depend upon the effect of Example’.44 The stress on this kind of 
national involvement, in which all classes followed the example of the great, was 
emphatic. The Anti-Jacobin exulted in the fact that  
the Menial Servants of Families have voluntarily offered a large 
proportion of their moderate earnings, for the Defence of a Cause in 
which all Ranks are interested. The MECHANIC and the 
LABOURER have proved, that they will exert their slender 
faculties, and contribute, for the sweat of their brow, to maintain a 
System which protects their Industry, and secures to them the Fruits 
of their Labour. The highest and lowest among us, seem actuated by 
one Principle.45  
 
By publicly volunteering large portions of their salaries, the ruling classes showed 
how little they valued pecuniary gain when compared to the well-being of the nation. 
Aristocrats had shown that they were not simply out to drain the nation of its money 
by voluntarily giving up the profits they stood to make, either from office or from the 
war itself. They had also demonstrated their recognition that the war was partly 
fought to defend their privileged status.46 The Loyalty Loan was thus a means to 
redress a social balance upset by the tenets of the French Revolution. 
The Loan’s success moved the government to repeat the experiment in early 
1798. This time Pitt encouraged all men in public stations to give ‘not less than one 
fifth of each Man’s whole Annual Income completed on the largest Scale’ to a fund 
that was christened the Voluntary Contribution.47 The triumph of 1796 was not, 
however, repeated. The Times regretfully reported that nobody at all subscribed on 
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the first day.48 A month later only £730,000 had reached the books.49 By mid March 
the total had crept to just over £1 million.50 The Morning Post was delighted that the 
Contribution appeared to be stillborn. ‘How different the present from the mobbing 
scene of the Loyalty Loan!’ it crowed. ‘Where now the hundred thousand, and the 
fifty thousand men who so eagerly pressed for admittance? Where now the 
disappointed hundreds on the completion of the eighteen millions loyalty 
subscription?’51 Part of the reason for the failure was that the Contribution seemed 
less voluntary to many than its name would suggest. Pitt spent much time and effort 
trying to convince various government members, including the king, to contribute 
generously, and many took offence. Grenville wrote to his brother Buckingham that 
he was against ‘the idea of raising public supplies by voluntary contributions, and 
still less by contributions soi-disant voluntary, but in reality extorted by popular 
clamour and prejudice’. Buckingham himself worked himself up into one of his 
periodic furies at Pitt’s proposal that he should give up his wartime sinecure 
emoluments for the national cause.52 Although the money required was eventually 
raised, the Contribution was less effective than the Loyalty Loan, not because it 
created less of a financial return but because it failed to bring forward a willing 
aristocratic body to set an example of self-sacrifice. 
Like the Loyalty Loan, what the Voluntary Contribution did achieve was to 
encourage a broader cross-section of society to participate in defence. The fact that 
women, for example, were actively encouraged to donate was significant. Colley has 
argued that a broader kind of participation evolved during the period of the French 
Revolution in which women could be included, since definitions of citizenship had 
moved away from an emphasis on owning land or bearing arms (the latter an 
exclusively male domain).53 Women were, of course, still barred from joining the 
volunteers and were not encouraged to bear arms even at a domestic level, although 
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the women of at least one town petitioned Addington to allow them to be armed with 
pikes to protect their children and homes from invasion.54 Financial contributions, 
however, were another matter altogether. The Times called in 1798 for the opening 
of a special book to receive ‘Female Voluntary Contributions’, by which means ‘our 
fair Countrywomen’ could ‘without quitting their fire-sides … contribute to the 
defence of their country’.55 Whether women were able to participate in the Voluntary 
Contribution or not, they were certainly encouraged to donate to Lloyd’s Patriotic 
Fund, which opened a special subscription on their behalf (though it limited the 
contribution to two guineas each).56 If they could not yet take up arms to defend their 
country, financial contributions to aid the war effort provided an opportunity for 
marginal groups, including women, to assert their role in national defence. 
Ultimately, both the Loyalty Loan and the Voluntary Contribution fulfilled 
their immediate purpose. When Pitt reviewed the finances of the 1798 parliamentary 
session in an anonymous Anti-Jacobin article, he noted that a £15 million loan had 
been undertaken on the security of the proceeds from the Triple Assessment 
combined with £1.5-2 million from the Contribution.57 More importantly, a precedent 
had been created of appealing to the whole nation, not just to the aristocracy or the 
propertied, in times of stress. Retrospectively, the two subscriptions were taken as 
indications of national support of government policy. Yorke’s notes in defence of the 
war against revolutionary France, drawn up in 1802, noted that ‘the Nation at large 
supported it by pecuniary Subscriptions’.58 Even if these contributions did not 
translate directly into support for the war, the success of the Loyalty Loan, and to a 
lesser extent the Voluntary Contribution, seemed to show that the nation was willing 
to shoulder enormous burdens when the monarch and the aristocracy showed the 
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way. This was an extremely comforting notion for the governing classes throughout a 
long war, particularly since British victories were few and far between. 
The impact of victory 
Pro-government propaganda was worth very little without periodic military or 
naval victories to buttress the national mood, and by the time of the Voluntary 
Contribution in 1798 the Pitt government had become uncomfortably aware that a 
defensive war provided very few opportunities to raise morale and faith in official 
policy. Such a war was not all bad, of course. It at least focused on matters dear to 
the hearts of Britons, whereas an overseas war was popular only if the victories came 
pouring in, and this was not generally the case prior to 1809. Pitt himself was 
strongly aware of the benefits of focusing on domestic matters at times of diplomatic 
isolation. He wrote to Grenville in April 1798 of his doubts about rushing too 
precipitately into another continental campaign at the height of a fresh invasion 
scare:  
I think I see many symptoms of the spirit of the country awakening 
so much on the idea of meeting and defeating invasion, that I doubt 
much whether they would like to exchange the prospect of that 
conflict for a remote and perhaps lingering war, supported for a 
longer period and without a decisive issue, at our expense.59 
 
If victory was desired, however, the government could not afford to look 
inwards all the time. The balance between defence and offence was a delicate one to 
strike. Defeat could be disastrous, but the government could only benefit from the 
effects of a well-publicised victory. Dundas regretted the need ‘to husband the 
resources of the Country’ in a war that was ‘almost exclusively ... for the defence of 
Great Britain & Ireland’. As a result, he was unable as secretary of state for war to 
propose any offensives that were likely to produce any éclat.60 Relying purely on 
defence was most likely to attract opposition accusations that the government was 
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too weak, or too foolish, to pursue a more offensive strategy. Addington’s ministers 
were attacked for resting ‘their reputations upon their devotion to security’, the ‘idol’ 
to which they had supposedly ‘sacrificed’ too many opportunities for killing blows.61 
A pamphlet written in 1806 attacked Pitt’s government for the same sin: ‘They seem 
to have considered the attainment of a precarious security, as the utmost boundary of 
their humble ambitions’.62 The problem was how to keep the nation’s spirit from 
draining away into apathy, without relying too much on unattainable campaigns or 
being over-cautious. 
Britain’s difficulties in fielding an armed force anywhere on the continent 
meant that, until 1809, the value of any victories was offset by the fact that they were 
often of small strategic importance with regard to the war in Europe. This was 
particularly the case with naval victories, which confirmed British superiority on the 
seas but achieved little else. Fox agreed with Pitt that the Navy’s efforts were 
‘glorious’, but struck a note of realism: ‘with respect to the continental War [they] 
will, I suspect, have no influence whatever’.63 Colonial victories were similarly 
limited in impact, particularly in the West Indies, India and the Mediterranean. The 
string of successes in the West Indies in the mid-1790s were mined to their full 
potential, but could hardly distract attention from the deadlock on the continent.64 
Nor could colonial successes counterbalance the effects of defeat, as the disastrous 
South American expedition to Buenos Aires in 1806 demonstrated all too well. 
Because of this, naval and colonial victories had much more of an impact on morale 
than on strategy. This was not necessarily a bad thing, particularly at times of 
continental isolation. ‘I look upon the fact of a military victory obtained by numbers 
which cannot have been very superior, as much more important than even the 
reconquest of Egypt,’ Grenville declared to his brother Thomas following the news 
of the victory at Alexandria in 1801. ‘I trust that all these successes will give 
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stoutness where we fear the want of it’.65 Victories were usually so scarce that 
whenever they occurred they often made a stronger impact than was warranted by 
their importance. 
The politicians fully recognised the value of any French defeat, even when 
they had no long-term strategic significance, and made several efforts to 
commemorate them.66 A political decision to commemorate military and naval 
heroes in St. Paul’s in 1795 had produced the commission of twenty-six statues by 
1816.67 Holger Hoock has argued that the government aimed to foster patriotism and 
a desire to emulate military and naval heroes through the construction of public 
monuments, from the military ‘pantheon’ in St. Paul’s to an (unimplemented) ‘Dome 
of National Glory’. This ‘state concern with display of national cultural prowess’ 
was, Hoock goes on, an extension of the war ‘by different means’.68 Ministers were 
certainly keen to place value on military and naval service. Part of the 1811 Regency 
Act, which prevented the prince regent from immediately creating peers, had a 
loophole which permitted him to raise naval and military men to the Lords, a fact 
which both reflected the value placed on their service and the political kudos to be 
gained from recognising it.69 One of the most significant ways in which victories 
played a part in the raising of morale, however, was the opportunity to put on lavish 
ceremonials. Scott Myerly points out that the Victorian use of military pageantry to 
inculcate a sense of national pride and patriotism had its roots in regular, militia and 
volunteer parades during the Napoleonic Wars.70 The Thanksgiving celebration in St 
Paul’s in December 1797, to commemorate the battle of Camperdown, was an 
excellent example of the way in which ceremony could be used to reduce national 
despondency at low points of the war. ‘One of the great objects [of the celebration] is 
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the raising people’s spirits,’ Grenville remarked.71 The Thanksgiving also stressed 
the fact that Britain needed no allies on the continent to achieve her goals. As an 
article in the Anti-Jacobin pointed out, Britain had obtained victory at Camperdown 
without assistance. The First Coalition had collapsed, but Britain fought doggedly 
on: ‘In that part of [the contest] in which we have stood alone, our Success has been 
uniform’.72 Outright continental victory might be out of the question, but at least 
Britannia still ruled the waves. 
Without allies, however, the prospect of a long defensive war, in which the 
French seemed more keen to exhaust than invade the British, remained discouraging. 
Under these circumstances the politicians came to favour a pre-emptive strategy by 
which a number of small-scale assaults were undertaken on the enemy coast closest 
to British territory. Raids on French soil were not a new idea: they had been resorted 
to whenever Britain and France were at war at least since the 1690s, when the Royal 
Navy had bombarded the French ports along the coast between the Channel and the 
Bay of Biscay. The tactic had been resumed in the Seven Years’ War, during which 
attacks were undertaken against Rochefort (in 1757) and Cherbourg (in 1758).73 
With the return of war in the 1790s, such attacks once again became highly desirable. 
A large continental war was obviously the best way to distract France from her 
invasion plans, but, failing that, limited coastal raids could prevent her from 
consolidating her forces for an assault on British soil. Terrorising their shore would 
occupy the French and would keep the Royal Navy active and alert. Such activity 
was distinct from the British offensives on behalf of the Bourbon monarchy during 
the 1790s, including the capture of Toulon in 1793, the landing of French Royalist 
forces in Quiberon in 1795, and an abandoned proposal to fund a further Royalist 
invasion in 1800. Although Windham remained convinced that ‘a radical cure of the 
disorder can … never be effected but in France itself’, the ideological statement 
made by such action was too bold for many of his colleagues, and, at least at the end 
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of the 1790s, provoked a great deal of cabinet dissension whenever it was brought 
up.74 Coastal raids undertaken purely in self-defence were much less problematic and 
thus more attractive to politicians who remained unsure about the wisdom of the 
French Bourbon connection, but nevertheless recognised the need to do something. 
‘A demonstration of offensive operations is the best mode of Defence for this 
Country’, a naval officer told Lord Melville in 1803.75 
Upon returning to office as first lord of the admiralty in 1804, Melville 
informed Pitt of the wisdom of anticipatory strikes against the enemy. He 
emphasised that they were necessary to prove ‘almost to a moral certainty’ that 
Napoleon’s project ‘of Invasion from Boulogne by means of a great collection of 
small armed Vessels assembled there’ was ‘impracticable’.76 Pitt agreed, and added 
that a failed attempt on the enemy coast was almost as good as actual success. He 
spoke of the ‘highly satisfactory’ attack on Boulogne harbour in 1804 ‘which as an 
Experiment … tho’ not very important in its immediate Effects is highly so in 
Impression, and in the Consequences to which it leads’.77 In Pitt’s view, it did not 
matter whether the expedition succeeded or not, so long as the impression was made 
that Britain was capable of fighting back against French insults. 
This emphasis on effort rather than outcome was necessary because so many 
attempts were made with so little success. One of the first assaults was made on 
Ostend and Le Havre in May 1798, shortly after the start of a new invasion scare. 
Although the expeditions were abortive, the Times acclaimed them for demonstrating 
that Britain had ‘sufficient strength to attack the enemy’s ports, and also to defend 
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itself’.78 Even the opposition papers were inclined to applaud the initiative, however 
unsuccessful it had proved to be. Another expedition to Ostend in May 1799 drew a 
rather back-handed compliment from the Morning Post, even though a large 
proportion of the force sent out was captured:  
We shall never shrink, as long as any vestige of a free press remains, 
from blaming the Minister, where he appears really blameable. But 
the present measure appears to us to have been boldly conceived, as 
well as most gallantly executed. … Every wise and vigorous measure 
for national defence shall command our honest and cordial applause, 
especially every measure for that most effectual species of defence 
which consists in annoying and crippling the threatened invader. 
When we consider the great importance of such enterprises, not only 
in weakening the enemy, but in supporting our own national spirit, we 
shall not be disposed to censure them without strong appearances of 
gross and scandalous misconduct.79 
 
The Ostend campaign’s failure, however, was only the first of many. An assault on 
Brest took place in August 1801, but reports that Nelson had destroyed French 
gunboats in the outer harbour were found to have been exaggerated.80 Sir Sydney 
Smith led another attack in November 1805 but once again early reports of his 
success were rapidly contradicted.81 A final attack took place in October 1806, and 
was equally unsuccessful.82 In addition to these efforts there were also several 
unimplemented plans to destroy the Boulogne invasion flotilla. Melville’s Admiralty 
papers were full of ideas on the subject, ranging from the mundane — fireships and 
bombardments — to the distinctly whimsical (windmill-propelled boats, sulphur 
bombs to burn the invaders’ lungs, balloons to drop lighted matches into the boats).83 
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Despite all the brainstorming, however, the French invasion fleet remained largely 
unmolested. 
Unsurprisingly, given the high rate of failure, not everyone agreed that this 
desultory method of attacking the French was desirable. An undated memorandum 
referred to lightning attempts on the French ports as piracy, ‘the Extreme base of 
Cowardice’.84 Cornwallis thought such petty warfare, so frequently mismanaged, 
lessened ‘the awe in which our powers at sea have been held’. Lord Barham, 
Melville’s successor at the Admiralty, complained that the Navy’s efforts were 
wasted in ‘this romantic kind of Warfare’, and the king himself doubted the efficacy 
of the pre-emptive strategy.85 Clearly, also, the opposition had changed its mind 
since the Morning Post’s acclamation of the Ostend attempt in 1799. Fox thought 
that Pitt was mad to send an expedition to Boulogne in 1804.86 Disaster could indeed 
be highly risky for the governments undertaking the experiment. An attack on 
Walcheren had been meditated for several years before finally being put into action 
in 1809, but, despite the tactical sense in clearing the Dutch coast of French shipping, 
the well-publicised failure of the campaign almost proved too much for Portland’s 
weakened ministry.87 Most politicians continued to believe that offensive warfare, 
however small-scale, was worth all the potential political and tactical risks entailed. 
One of Castlereagh’s priorities as secretary of state for war in 1807 was to keep ‘a 
large Body of Troops and Transports … prepared for service to alarm the Enemy’ at 
all times, even though it involved an obvious drain on manpower and resources.88 
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Sometimes, it seemed, it was better for the government to do something badly than to 
do nothing at all. 
Financial policy and morale 
A less obvious but nonetheless vital, and in some ways less risky, way of 
rousing the national spirit was through the medium of financial policy and budget 
speeches. At first glance this appears unusual, since at many periods during the war 
the financial picture was distinctly gloomy: the bank crash in 1797, the mounting tax 
burden, and the economic slump around 1810, all seemed more likely to depress than 
to raise morale. These very factors, however, made it even more vital for the 
government to raise faith in national solvency, and to convince the nation that it 
could afford to continue the fight despite such setbacks. It was not a printing error 
when the Anti-Jacobin included Pitt’s plan for redeeming the Land Tax in a list of 
defence measures compiled at the height of the invasion scare in 1798.89 The cost 
charged to the country had to be pitched so as to remain both affordable and 
sufficient to sustain the increased needs of a defensive war. Rose feared that the steep 
increase in taxation during the war meant that the country would ‘hardly be brought 
to bear [new taxes] patiently’.90 Auckland reminded Pitt in 1796 that the financial 
situation depended largely ‘on the dispositions of the people to undertake those 
burdens’.91 It was thus important to maintain confidence in national resources, and to 
rouse the people to such indignation against the French that they would happily face 
steep increases in the demand for revenue. In return, the government had to show 
that it was dealing with the nation’s finances in an effective and responsible way.  
Budget speeches were an excellent platform to turn financial statistics into a 
matter for national self-congratulation and Pitt, particularly, was a master at making 
the numbers work for, rather than against, his government. Behind the scenes the 
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government might have been desperately searching for a recipe for survival, but in 
parliament Pitt’s budget speeches were an excellent occasion for him to give an 
optimistic spin on the state of the nation. In 1796, for example, he managed to turn 
symptoms of the imminent cash scarcity into an example of the nation’s financial 
health: ‘the extent of our trade … had increased a demand for money for the 
purposes of additional speculations … and had called for a large quantity of 
medium’.92 His early approach to war finance was distinctly ad hoc, and it was only 
around 1797-8 that he ceased to finance the conflict solely through large loans, and 
attempted to balance these with higher taxation.93 Such flexibility did, however, give 
an outlet to Pitt’s creative side, and his financial acumen was one reason why his 
government maintained political support in spite of harsh measures, the unsuccessful 
war effort, and backbench rebellions, even after the bank crash in February 1797. 
The diarist Joseph Farington noted in 1799 that ‘the confidence of Commercial 
people in Mr Pitt from the high idea they have of his financiering talents is very 
great’.94  
Even Pitt’s more unpopular plans gave him an opportunity to appeal to 
sentiments of national pride and self-sacrifice. These relatively innovative attempts 
to keep up with the needs of the war took heed of Rose’s and Auckland’s warnings 
about forcing contributions from those who were not capable of paying. The Triple 
Assessment, for example, was a sort of proto-income tax which took the amount each 
person paid under the terms of the assessed taxes as an indication of their income.95 
Pitt took his defence of the measure to an audience outside parliament, and argued in 
an Anti-Jacobin article that it was ‘most likely to shorten the War, and bring our 
proud Enemies to reason’. It was, he was convinced, ‘the most effectual and prudent 
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measure that could be suggested at this crisis for the general preservation’.96 He 
similarly defended his 1798 Income Tax as a measure created by the circumstances 
of a defensive war rather than as a mere money-making venture. It had been ‘adopted 
at a time when the gloom of despondency hung over the minds of the most firm, and 
when fear and apprehension was to be found among the most loyal’. The 
consequence of the new Tax, he argued, was ‘that subsequently to its adoption the 
spirit of the country grew up with rapidity and vigour, its triumphs extended, its good 
fortune, as it were, revived’.97 Its disappointing financial returns did not matter to Pitt 
as much as the fact that it had raised the nation’s confidence in itself. 
This idea that a measure was successful even if it made little financial sense 
was exemplified even more strongly by the Sinking Fund. The purpose of the Fund, 
created in 1786, was ‘to prevent a farther accumulation of Permanent Debt, such as 
might depress the Credit and cripple the exertions of the Country’.98 A £1.2 million 
revenue surplus was set aside annually to purchase stock, the interest of which 
gradually chipped away at the national debt. From 1792 an additional sinking fund 
was established, which used taxes equal to one per cent of the capital of each new 
loan to cancel it within forty-five years.99 The Fund had obvious morale implications 
because its very existence went to prove that the British nation was capable of 
supporting even the heaviest burden of debt accumulation, and this mitigated fears 
that the war effort involved the creation of a debt far too large to repay. In practice, 
however, the Fund relied too much on an annual surplus which evaporated in times 
of war. It forced the government to rely on further loans to top it up annually, which 
of course added to the debt it was meant to repay, often at a higher rate of interest. 
Despite this seemingly obvious flaw, Fox seems to have been one of the only critics 
in parliament to note that ‘if the revenue fails, the charm of the sinking fund vanishes 
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into nothing’.100 Even Tierney, the opposition’s main financial expert, attacked 
Addington in 1802 for apparently deviating from Pitt’s original plan.101  No-one 
wanted to be the first to break with it. 
In fact the Fund’s single greatest flaw, the political determination to stick 
with it no matter what, was at the same time its greatest selling point. It was so 
attractive because it represented a pledge not to throw the responsibility for debt onto 
future generations, and thus provided taxpayers with a feeling that their money was 
going towards a visible and defined object.102 Even though the Fund could not 
initially pay off the national debt entirely, its very existence would encourage lenders 
to continue lending, make the interest payments more manageable, and eventually 
reach a state of parity in which the debt would remain static. Pitt bound his 
reputation up with the Fund, which he promised to maintain as long as possible, in a 
speech reported in the Times:  
Whatever degree of exertion the urgency of the moment might require 
for our own safety, for the general interests of mankind and the 
security of prosperity, … they were not even in that urgency by any 
possible pressure, to lay aside the necessity of adhering inviolably to 
that system which was connected with the preservation and security of 
the country.103 
 
The impact of a long war on interest rates, and the lack of the annual surplus 
formerly used to feed the Fund, did not faze him, since he saw it as the basis of a 
system for paying off war debts in all future wars. He assumed that the impact of the 
Fund on debt would raise interest rates and increase the speed with which it could be 
paid off in peace. Combined with an assumption that the national wealth would 
double over the following ten years, Pitt concluded that ‘In fifty-six years the whole 
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old Debt must be discharged’.104 It was this foreseeable freedom from debt which 
made the Sinking Fund so valuable, and which persuaded politicians to maintain it. 
After Pitt’s death even his political enemies conceived the Fund to be his 
finest achievement. Backbenchers sometimes went into raptures over it, and one of 
them acclaimed it as the measure ‘to which the country owed all its prosperity’.105 
The Talents ‘determined religiously to respect’ it upon taking office in 1806, 
although this came as no great shock to those who observed them embracing the 
Pittite financial system of balancing loans and increased taxation ‘with zeal’.106 Even 
the New Plan of Finance in 1807, which postponed the creation of new taxes for a 
three year period and fixed the annual war expenditure at £32 millions, preserved 
Pitt’s wartime finance system more or less intact, including the strategy of attaching 
new sinking funds to new loans.107 The Talents’ decision to respect Pitt’s financial 
memory was partly tactical, since a number of Pittites still saw Grenville as Pitt’s 
natural successor, but it also reflected the ministry’s mixed ancestry.108 Ironically it 
was Perceval, a Pittite, who first altered the Sinking Fund in 1810 when it was 
discovered that the amount of money raised each year by loan was unlikely to fall 
below £16 millions. Perceval got rid of the mini-sinking fund that came with each 
new loan, and provided for their repayment from the war taxes and a secondary loan, 
each with its own sinking fund attached.109 The spirit of the system, however, 
remained, as a symbol of how much more stock the government set by effect rather 
than result.  
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Continental isolation  
The propaganda discussed in the first half of this chapter could, however, 
only take governments so far. Without any significant victories to back up glowing 
accounts of the nation’s finances or appeals to national spunk, the likelihood was that 
Britain would have to maintain the long and exhausting struggle for the foreseeable 
future. This was an understandably depressing prospect, and it is small wonder that 
by 1804 many politicians were weary of Pitt’s seemingly unfounded optimism. They 
preferred Addington because he ‘disdained to trifle with the feelings of the people, 
by imposing on them a fallacious account of the condition of our finances’.110 If the 
government was to avoid the disillusionment involved in a defensive war, the 
lethargy induced by long periods of inactivity had to be countered. 
The problem was that the circumstances of the war meant that defence was a 
more realistic military option than offence, and not just because the French had an 
invasion flotilla constantly at the ready. Pitt may have emphasised that in matters of 
offensive war the attempt was more important than the result, but not everybody was 
in agreement. Cornwallis, for example, pointed to the ‘enormous’ expense of 
expeditions, and drew attention to ‘the disgrace attending upon ill success’.111 A 
diplomatically isolated Britain was unable to achieve anything beyond her own 
temporary security, and attempts to achieve anything more ran the risk of making 
conditions worse for already unstable governments, as demonstrated by the aftermath 
of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s victory at Vimeiro in 1808. Upon receiving news of the 
victory the government ordered the guns to be fired at the Tower and there were 
celebrations in London, where people sang ‘God Save the King’ and ‘Rule Britannia’ 
in the street. The next day, however, came the news of the Convention of Cintra, by 
which the French soldiers had been evacuated on British ships with permission to 
serve again.112 Wellesley had, it seemed, allowed the French to escape their defeat 
scot-free. The government got through with great difficulty and survived a 
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parliamentary enquiry only by making a scapegoat out of Wellesley’s superior 
officers.113 In the following year the failure of the Walcheren showed how 
devastating the ‘disgrace’ of defeat could be for a weak ministry. The new prime 
minister, Perceval, was defeated in a full house (the first occasion on which this had 
happened since 1805) on a motion for a committee of enquiry into the expedition, 
although he later defeated a subsequent motion of censure by a comfortable margin 
of 48.114 With the consequences of such defeats in mind, it is little wonder that 
defensive strategies were more commonly pursued, even discounting the threat of 
invasion. 
Britain’s lack of continental allies was another reason for the emphasis on 
defence.  Diplomatic relations went through several troughs between 1797 and 1799, 
1801 and 1805, and 1806 to 1809, or roughly half the time Britain was at war. These 
troughs usually coincided with the highest danger of invasion, since France had less 
to distract her elsewhere if Britain’s allies had made peace. Lord Mornington told 
Camden in 1796 that an invasion was ‘certain, if the French by a separate Peace with 
Austria, should be in possession of a large disposeable land force, & by bullying & 
bribery, should become Masters of the Marine of Spain’.115 It was equally recognised 
that the threat of a French assault declined during Coalition campaigns. A 
memorandum on the state of the Army in 1804 remarked that if Britain could 
manage to cobble together a continental alliance, ‘the Invasion of England in force 
must be abandoned & a considerable force will be released’.116 Successive 
governments fell into a circular situation in which offensive operations were 
desirable to relieve the pressure on defence, but impossible to undertake while so 
many troops were required to secure the home base. The frustrations attending this 
situation heightened a growing feeling that Britain owed little to the continental 
powers and would be better off defending herself from outside encroachment, or 
pursuing her own colonial interests. At the end of 1798 Dundas reminded Pitt of the 
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risks of a European struggle at a time when the nation felt that ‘every shilling 
expended is for British security and for British purposes’.117 This attitude, of course, 
merely alienated the prospective powers with which an alliance might have been 
possible, and aggravated Britain’s remoteness still further. 
By 1806, indeed, Britain’s instinct for isolation seemed to have emerged 
uppermost, and for two years her politicians pursued a purely defensive strategy. The 
Third Coalition was considered by the Talents to be the last throw of the dice on the 
continent. Napoleon’s victories at Ulm and Austerlitz, Austria’s separate peace at 
Pressburg, and the invasion of Hanover by Prussia, all convinced Grenville that 
Europe was out of bounds. Although he continued to maintain that a continental war 
was the only way ‘of getting in any tolerable way out of the difficulties of the 
contest’, he added ‘that hope must now be renounced’.118 His policy was to send only 
small detachments wherever an impression might be made, such as Sicily, Naples, or 
Turkey, and otherwise to ‘husband’ British financial, commercial and military 
resources in the expectation of ‘the influx of that overwhelming tide’ from 
Napoleon-dominated Europe, which in March 1807 Grenville anticipated within two 
months.119 The succeeding Portland ministry’s attitude to offensive and defensive 
warfare seemed at first to bear out Grenville’s assessment that continental warfare 
was no longer an option. When the issue of an offensive alliance came up the 
government regretfully decided that it was ‘more advisable, for the interest of the 
common cause, to remain in force at home’, either to harass the French coast or to 
defend against invasion.120 With Austria’s defeat at Wagram in 1809, Britain’s 
separation from the European powers was complete. There was no formal contact 
again until 1812-3, by which time Napoleon had begun to falter and the war had 
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acquired a rather different complexion.121 Until then, ‘husbanding’ resources and 
defence took up most of Britain’s wartime energy. 
The spectre of bankruptcy  
There was good reason for this emphasis on resources. Although J.L. 
Anderson asserts that, far from damaging Britain’s financial health, the war actually 
maintained employment levels and stimulated development, Jeffrey G. Williamson 
has argued that a large war debt led to the ‘crowding out’ of capital saving and 
inhibited industrial growth.122 Long-term effects aside, the early nineteenth-century 
financial picture was certainly disturbing to contemporaries. More than £1500 
millions were raised in loans and taxes to pay for the wars between 1793 and 1815. 
Of this amount, nearly £66 millions had been spent on allies, mostly between 1810 
and 1815.123 Expenditure had begun to outstrip revenue. According to Christopher 
Hall, £29.78 millions was spent on the war in 1804, with a gross revenue of £40.07 
millions, whereas in 1813 £70.53 millions was spent on the war set against a gross 
revenue of £76.69 millions.124 The total outgoing costs in 1813 approached £95 
millions, by which time 25% of the national income was absorbed by government 
spending. By 1815, despite a limited trade revival, expenditure had risen to £113 
millions, and the national debt had grown from £245 millions in 1793 to £834 
millions.125 By 1810 this meant raising £1,350,000 in taxes just to pay off the interest 
of new loans.126 Unsurprisingly, from the mid 1790s onwards many feared that the 
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real aim of the French was not invasion but ‘keeping us in a state of enormous 
expenditure’.127 
The knock-on effects of financial distress became obvious just before the 
bank crash of 1797, particularly among the financiers of the City, most of whom 
supported Pitt’s government. ‘Everybody desponding, & feeling the absolute 
impossibility of raising a Loan for the next Year’, the banker Lord Carrington wrote 
to Camden. ‘In short there seemed a Panic, & it was likely to get worse’.128 The bank 
crash itself damaged the government’s parliamentary support, already low after four 
fruitless years of war and several abortive peace attempts. ‘The attendance is much 
relaxed & a great many of those who have hitherto supported Government I fear are 
wavering’, Carrington lamented. Pitt as usual showed remarkable ingenuity in 
wriggling out of the attacks on his government. Lord Bathurst marvelled at his ability 
to deflect criticism, but was under no illusions as to the immensity of the problem he 
faced: ‘I think they are difficulties which Pitt will get over, but which I am satisfied 
nobody else would’.129 There was after all a limit to his verbal dexterity, and 
Carrington dreaded the day when Britain would discover that Pitt had glossed over 
one unpleasant fact too many. ‘It will be found I fear that the expences of the year 
were much understated in the Budget before Christmas’, he fretted in 1796.130 The 
Morning Post acclaimed Pitt’s talent of concealing the nation’s real financial 
situation in a fake letter of congratulation:  
Although the real situation of the Country may be truly alarming, yet 
the bulk of mankind shall not be able to perceive that so it is … This I 
look upon as a master-stroke of Policy, for next to being in a secure 
state, it is of the utmost moment, that a country should appear to be 
so.131 
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But even Pitt’s skill could not turn obvious financial disasters like the 1797 cash 
shortage to his advantage. His survival was ascribed as much to luck as to ability, 
and neither Pitt, nor any other prime minister, could always be lucky. 
The government did have one major advantage in financial affairs, which was 
that its opponents did not have access to up-to-date figures. Opposition groups were 
only as well informed about the nation’s finances as anyone else who paid attention 
to the published accounts, and only a few members made any effort to become better 
acquainted. ‘Pitt talked very confidently about the state of the Revenue and 
Commerce, but from his own statement I think it impossible he can feel so,’ Fox told 
his nephew Lord Holland, but of course this was only guesswork.132 The lavish 
wartime spending, however, was too good a weapon to abandon, and both Grey and 
Tierney made efforts to master enough financial detail to launch a strong opposition 
attack.133 The Foxites’ brief experience in office as part of the Ministry of All the 
Talents in 1806-7 gave them a better insight into Britain’s financial capabilities. It 
convinced them so fully of the need to husband resources that for years afterwards 
many were unwilling to accept that any offensive war, even in the Peninsula where 
victory might be possible, could lead to anything but total ruin. With the 
circumstances of continental isolation in mind the leading oppositionists, particularly 
Grenville and Grey, became more and more convinced that the only way to survive 
the war was to end the government’s ‘system of improvidence, imbecility, and 
impotence’ by severe retrenchment.134 
The need for this was increased by the impact of the Continental Blockade, 
imposed in 1806 under Napoleon’s Milan and Berlin decrees. Along with Britain’s 
retaliatory Orders in Council and the American Non-Intercourse Acts, the blockade 
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had a strongly negative impact on British trade and inflation. According to Wendy 
Hinde, by 1808 ‘international trade had been practically brought to a standstill’.135 
Although this is an exaggeration, many contemporaries thought the same. The effects 
of the blockade unfortunately coincided with economic depression, social unrest, and 
the revelation that the Peninsular War would be much more expensive than had 
initially been thought.136 William Huskisson, using information from his time as 
Secretary of the Treasury (until 1809), recommended that Britain ought to cut £6.5 
millions from her wartime expenditure, and Rose added that such a reduction was 
‘positively necessary, and most essential to the security and peace of the country’.137 
Although an invasion was by now a less immediate concern, politicians doubted 
Britain’s ability to withstand a long siege if the problems faced by her low credit 
rating were ignored. 
By 1810 Huskisson was convinced that a choice had to be made between 
offence and defence, since both were not financially viable. He was not alone in this, 
as demonstrated by the debates over whether or not to return to the gold standard, 
suspended since 1797. A committee sat from February to April 1810 to discuss 
whether or not the scarcity of bullion was directly traceable to the proliferation of 
paper money and the resulting high prices.138 The debate over the Bullion Report, 
which recommended that cash payments be resumed in two years, revealed a 
suggestive rift between those politicians who felt that continued suspension was vital 
to continue the offensive war in the Peninsula, and those who felt that, since the 
Spanish campaign was unlikely to put an end to the war, the emphasis should be 
shifted onto reviving British credit at home. It also pointed to a growing difference 
between men who saw the war as a war of survival, and men who placed Britain’s 
status as a moral nation above the needs of war, and it was this division that cut 
across established party lines. Perceval and Castlereagh defended the paper currency, 
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which they claimed was vital to the war effort and not subject to inflation.139 
Huskisson and Canning, however, threw their lot in publicly with the bullionists.140 
They argued that the monetary system operated according to specific laws that acted 
independent of wartime circumstances, which put them into direct opposition to 
Rose, Vansittart and Castlereagh, who responded that financial politics ought to be 
pragmatic in times of struggle.141 On the one hand was the obvious need to restrain 
government spending during a war which could conceivably last another five or ten 
years, and on the other, recognition that wartime conditions required higher levels of 
spending. Had the bullionists carried the day, Britain’s offensive abilities would have 
been even more severely crippled than they already were, and her strategy from 1812 
onwards would probably have been very different. It was the same vicious circle that 
had plagued the government since the start of the war, and it was nowhere near being 
solved. 
A lack of trust: famine and insurrection  
An even more serious problem than continental isolation and imminent 
insolvency was a growing suspicion that the social bonds, which made the British 
polity so resilient, were straining at the seams. As argued above, the broadening of 
national involvement had been intended to strengthen the status quo by giving every 
subject something to defend and a role in defending it. The response to the invasion 
threat not only stressed deference to authority, but also encouraged the aristocracy to 
demonstrate their concern for their lower class charges. In practice, however, the 
social bond often seemed little more than rhetoric. Despite official initiatives towards 
extending the people’s involvement in defence, many politicians grew increasingly 
doubtful about the nation’s loyalty. The opposition pointed out that Habeas Corpus 
suspension in the mid-1790s was hard to square with the simultaneous call for a 
nationwide volunteer movement, since it suggested that the people of Britain were 
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not to be trusted. ‘If the present system continues, who is to defend the country?’ 
asked Thomas Erskine. ‘Who, but the insulted people whom you calumniate?’.142  
Then again, there was a suspicion that the French Revolution might have made that 
country an object of attraction to the lower orders. To Rose, the ‘absolute Certainty’ 
that ‘a considerable Number’ of Britons would be ‘willing to see the French landed 
& considering them as Auxiliaries’ ought to be a vital part of any defence 
planning.143 Such an attitude indicated an ambivalence in the ruling orders towards 
the men they professed to see as the nation’s defenders. 
In addition to this, the spectre of Jacobinism remained despite the eagerness 
of several high-profile politicians, including Pitt, to stress that ordinary Britons could 
be trusted with weapons. Although French Jacobinism proper had subsided with the 
downfall of Robespierre, and had vanished almost completely with the rise of 
Napoleon, the term was still commonly used to refer to sedition and republicanism, 
and the politicians continued to fear the spread of ‘Jacobinical’ principles in the 
armed forces above all places. Grenville declared that inciting mutiny ‘was so nearly 
allied to high treason, as to be equally dangerous in its effects and consequences’.144 
The naval mutinies of 1797 were widely ascribed to revolutionaries.145 ‘There is no 
doubt but that the spirit of insurrection, which has manifested itself in our navy … is 
entirely owing to the dark intrigues of our foreign enemies, and of our domestic 
foes,’ the Times declared.146 Would French principles ever spread to the Army? The 
possibility was hardly to be countenanced. When Colonel Despard attempted to 
attack the Tower of London, the Bank and St James’s in 1802, he ‘was uniformly 
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represented as the most active Partizan in corrupting the Soldiers’.147 Similar 
rumours of attempts to infiltrate the Army of Reserve ‘for the express purpose … of 
instilling sedition into the Army’ were reported to the Home Office as late as 
September 1803.148 This fear of the contamination of the military by republican 
elements justified adding an oath of loyalty to several defence Acts.149 Such an oath 
sent a mixed message: on the one hand it could have been a reminder to the people of 
the ties that bound them together, but on the other it could also be interpreted as an 
insulting assumption that not all Britons were loyal to the Crown. When Yorke 
moved to include one in the Training Act in 1806, it was opposed by Windham 
because he ‘apprehended that the proposition … might excite alarm among the more 
ignorant part of the community’.150 The oath was, however, retained, despite the 
argument that the disaffected could perjure themselves just as well as anyone else.151 
Fear of the spread of sedition within the armed forces appeared stronger than the 
need to tighten the bonds of trust that underpinned the defence effort. 
The fear of Jacobinism was aggravated by a series of increasingly serious 
food riots that seemed to bring Britain close to revolt. The average price of wheat per 
quarter rose dramatically from 49s 1d in 1792 to 101s 4 ½ d twenty years later.152 
The connection between want and radicalism was well known and feared: in 1792 
Dundas had already dreaded a ‘wofully [sic] deficient’ harvest in Scotland, a buzzing 
hive of radicalism.153 Near-famines in 1795 and 1800, indeed, coincided worryingly 
with a startling rise in radical activity. In September 1800 a burst of food riots in 
Yorkshire, Lancashire, Derbyshire, London, the Midlands, and even the west, 
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provoked what Roger Wells has referred to as ‘the September hyper-crisis’.154 Wells 
feels that this marked the closest point Britain came to insurrection at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, and he would certainly have found a lot of sympathy for that 
view among the ruling class at the time.155  
The food riots were not always politically motivated, of course, as some local 
magistrates recognised, but it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between 
local and political demonstrations.156 Their nationwide nature was particularly 
alarming to political spectators. John Bohstedt portrays the disturbances of 1795-6 
and 1800-1 as nothing more than a challenge against the failure of local paternalism, 
to the extent of dismissing a leader of the Modbury riots styling himself ‘General 
Bonaparte’ as ‘a kind of “counter-theatre” to the pretensions of the gentry’, but the 
gentry themselves probably interpreted it differently.157 In April 1800, for example, a 
Devonian crowd marched to the local clergyman’s house to protest against tithes 
while carrying ‘a bloody flag’ and ‘calling out Liberty Equality and no Tythes’. This 
was deeply worrying because of its use of revolutionary symbolism, and it was not 
an isolated incident.158 Local disturbances were also liable to be hijacked by radicals, 
and the activity of the United Englishmen during the 1800 scarcity was well noted.159 
Inevitably, many local officials succumbed to the panic. ‘You may depend upon it 
that the most desperate & abandoned Jacobins are now taking advantage of the 
discontent of the People in consequence of the high Price of Corn’, Lord Romney, 
Kent’s lord lieutenant, told Portland in September 1800.160 ‘The coalition between 
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Jacobinism & Distress is really alarming,’ another correspondent wrote two months 
later.161 Rumours flew of an insurrection around Manchester that was due to take 
place around Christmas or the New Year.162 Another scarcity in 1811-2, combined 
with an economic slump and Luddite activity in Nottinghamshire, Lancashire, and 
Yorkshire’s West Riding, led to a further strengthening of the powers of local 
magistrates, although by this time the government had acknowledged that such 
rioting was not usually revolutionary in purpose.163 Even so, the possibility remained 
that political groups might take advantage of the widespread dissatisfaction.  
The scarcities and the demonstrations associated with them dealt a strong 
blow to the ideal of a British political system in which every man knew and 
cherished his place. Bohstedt traces the inability of city magistrates to control crowds 
to the lack of the old local support structures in the new big towns, but it also 
indicated another problem that was more significant to contemporaries: repeated 
famines were destroying the networks on which the social system relied.164 The 
scarcity in 1800 showed that all was not well. Many of the government’s 
correspondents complained that the shortage of food was not due to the harvest but 
the fact that grain was hoarded by farmers, who wanted to drive prices up artificially. 
‘I am sorry to say, the people do not complain without reason,’ Fitzwilliam told 
Portland.165 Sometimes such rumours provoked outright violence between the lower 
classes and their superiors. Clearly something was amiss. The defence measures that 
attempted to inculcate a sense of trust were partly addressed to correct this 
impression, but their impact was blunted so long as that trust remained half-hearted.  
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The limits of participation 
A further problem was that the concept of national participation on which 
most of the government’s defence measures relied was highly questionable. 
Encouragement of such participation was, in practice, often limited to a much 
narrower section of the public than the politicians liked to make out. For example, a 
great deal of the xenophobic propaganda put out on the government’s behalf was as 
liable to attack the Scots, Welsh and Irish as the French, a fact which hardly helped 
to foster a sense of national unity.166 But it was religious affiliation, more than 
anything else, that limited the extent of the nation’s involvement in defence. 
Catholics and Protestant Dissenters were excluded from full participation in British 
political life by the Test and Corporation Acts, which restricted where and how they 
could serve in a public capacity. In 1800 there were about 129,000 Catholics in 
Britain, a number that had risen from 80,000 in 1780, and Ireland was of course 
predominantly Catholic.167 Catholic Emancipation, or the repeal of the Acts which 
blocked the political progress of non-Anglicans, was therefore vital if Britain was to 
unite against the common enemy. The need for it was particularly critical in Ireland, 
given the series of French invasion attempts in the 1790s and the two rebellions in 
1798 and 1803. As Grey noted in a remarkably understated manner in 1807, ‘If 
circumstances of discontent were seized hold of by the enemy, the consequences 
might be importantly injurious’.168 The actions of the various governments, however, 
remained ambivalent on the issue. A few moves were made, and a Catholic Relief 
Act was passed in 1793 for Irish Catholics, but apart from this Emancipation did not 
pass the discussion stage until the 1820s. Feelings on the issue ran extremely high. 
Two governments fell directly on the question — Pitt’s in 1801, Grenville’s in 1807 
— and several others, including Portland’s, benefited from the backlash against it.169  
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To many, Catholics automatically disqualified themselves from any right to 
participate by professing loyalty to the pope rather than to the king. Hawkesbury 
asked parliament in 1806 whether Catholics would receive ‘political power of every 
description, at a time when they refuse to acknowledge the complete authority of the 
state’.170 During the 1790s republican France’s espousal of atheism had driven 
formerly pro-French Catholics back into the British fold, but while they had no 
attachment for republicanism they were also conceived to have no particular 
fondness for monarchy either.171 Napoleon’s Concordat of Bologna with the pope 
simply resurrected the old Protestant suspicions. An anonymous paper noted that 
‘since Bonaparte has restored the Roman-Catholick Persuasion, as the National 
Religion of France ...the Pope is now the mere Tool of His Ambition’.172 Once this 
was accepted it was only a short jump to the assumption that Catholics were pro-
French.173 Nor was this view held simply by the politically uninformed. Lord 
Redesdale, Ireland’s lord chancellor after the Union, kept Addington, Perceval and 
others constantly informed about his opinions of the dangers of repealing the penal 
laws against the Catholics.174 Hawkesbury, too, referred to the connection between 
the Catholics and the French in a speech representing the Pitt government’s point of 
view against Emancipation in 1805: 
Whoever reflects, that almost all catholic Europe … is in subjection to 
France; whoever contemplates the absolute dependence of the pope on 
the will of France … whoever gives due weight to the considerations 
arising out of the nature of the connection subsisting between the 
catholics of Ireland and the pope, and will attend to the circumstance 
that the catholic church of Ireland is under the controul and 
superintendence of a college of cardinals at Rome; must be convinced, 
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that there never was a moment more unfavourable for augmenting their 
political power.175 
 
Because of this, the danger of alienating the Catholic population of the United 
Kingdom appeared to some to be less than the danger of allowing them full 
participation. 
Protestant Dissenters made up another ‘dangerous’ section of the community. 
Despite Britain’s long history of anti-Catholicism, Dissenters fared much worse 
during the early years of the French wars because they were suspected — for the 
most part unjustly — of leaning towards democratic principles.176 Some 
nonconformist sects, indeed, such as the pacifist Quakers, attracted accusations of 
disloyalty by their abjuration of violence. The Quakers’ refusal to take part in loyal 
subscriptions for the upkeep of volunteers led the Anti-Jacobin Review to label them 
the ‘most dangerous members of the community’, on which grounds they ‘ought, on 
the paramount principle of self-preservation, to be silenced or expelled’.177 The 
Methodist connexion, which had recently seceded from the Church of England, was 
also suspect because most of its members were drawn from manufacturing areas and 
from the politically-aware artisanal classes that caused the government so much 
uneasiness.178 In general, however, despite its opposition to the established church, 
Methodism steered clear of radical pitfalls during the 1790s and 1800s, and made 
much of the beliefs and traditions it shared with Anglicanism.179 Other varieties of 
Dissent were similarly keen to keep their heads down and to avoid attracting too 
much attention. Most Dissenters showed themselves willing to defend their country 
if only they could be permitted to do so. Several ministers published sermons 
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exhorting their parishioners to put aside all political feeling and take arms in defence 
of King and Country: 
We wait with patience till a liberal and enlightened policy shall grant 
that which has been asked in vain; and in the mean time, the 
protestant dissenters, of every denomination, will show that they are 
not a whit behind their brethren of the established church in love to 
the country and the king, and in defense of the British constitution.180  
 
Despite its political marginalisation, Dissent was able to muster some significant 
strength in opposition to Sidmouth’s bill to register nonconformist ministers in 
1812.181 Like Catholicism, however, it was always on the periphery of the national 
defence effort, tolerated only so long as it behaved itself, and vulnerable because of 
widespread suspicion of its republican sympathies. 
The government’s stance on arming Catholics and Dissenters along with the 
rest of the country was, consequently, as ambivalent as its attitude to their position 
within the polity. Predictably, in a war which led to a larger proportion of adult men 
serving in the armed forces than ever before, the issue was not long in surfacing. The 
manpower shortage temporarily overrode some peoples’ reservations, and in 1793 
Catholics were finally permitted to serve in the regular services. Otherwise, little 
changed. A new property requirement limited the right to carry weapons to the 
wealthier members of the Irish Catholic community.182 The reactions of the 
government to Catholic offers of volunteer service similarly reflected lingering 
doubts about their loyalty. In 1794 Lord Fife recommended that Dundas deny them 
permission to form a Fencible Regiment because he felt that the Catholic community 
‘had till lately some allowance from forreign Societys [sic]’.183 In January 1797, a 
group of Irish Catholics who offered to enrol as volunteers were informed that ‘they 
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would be accepted in no other form than embodied in the corps already formed by 
their fellow Citizens’, in other words diluted in existing Protestant bodies.184 A 
proposal to allow Roman Catholics to substitute a special oath for the standard tests, 
in order to allow them to serve in the Supplementary Militia and Provisional Cavalry, 
was rejected as the first step on the road to Emancipation.185  
By 1803 the cause of allowing Catholics to help defend Britain seemed 
hopeless. When the militia was called out in March of that year, Lord Stanley 
suggested that they should be permitted to serve as officers, but ‘no answer was 
made to this suggestion’.186 The Addington government was further embarrassed by 
the request of Lord Petre, a prominent Catholic aristocrat, to raise a volunteer corps. 
The government’s refusal, despite a recommendation of good character from 
Viscount Braybrooke, provoked outcry because it seemed to represent an official 
refusal to allow even the most respectable Catholics to bear arms.187 However, it is 
not surprising that Addington should have been reluctant to create a precedent by 
arming a Catholic regiment, given that he had only come into office because Pitt had 
stumbled on the issue of Emancipation. Ultimately, the ideological aspect of 
Emancipation and Test Act repeal outweighed the practical benefits that could be 
drawn from maximising available manpower and uniting Anglicans, Catholics and 
Dissent against a French onslaught.  
Morality and national sin 
Several factors which were outside the government’s control therefore 
counteracted official attempts to cultivate British spirit. Continental isolation and 
stalemate, near-bankruptcy, famines, insurrection, and an ultimately exclusive 
participation in defence, all undermined the vaunted relationship between the 
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governing class and the people. By 1810 the result of this lack of trust had become 
seriously worrying. The fact that Britain appeared to be foundering under the burden 
of a long, interminable war suggested that the nation’s slipping morals, combined 
with perceived incompetence and corruption at the highest levels of government, had 
alienated God’s favour. The series of weak ministries, outright accusations of 
corruption, and the scandal of the duke of York’s affair with Mary Anne Clarke 
fanned the flames further. Gradually, concern for the domestic state of the nation 
overtook the fear of invasion. The scene was set for a resurgence of radicalism, 
which marked definitively the moment when the government lost the initiative in a 
fight for the mind and heart of the nation. 
Morality had been a part of the struggle against France from the start. 
Britain’s fervent Protestantism was portrayed as one of her greatest strengths, and the 
fact that she had remained untouched from continental scenes of destruction 
confirmed her privileged status. ‘Surely the state of England, at this time, amidst all 
the Hurly Burly, is very striking!’ Pitt’s friend the bishop of Lincoln was told in 
1796. ‘Let her be grateful for the protection afforded to her as the principal 
Protestant Nation’.188 God would never abandon the one country which had put up 
such a staunch resistance to atheism, militarily and morally. Since ‘immorality’ was 
‘the principal weapon of Jacobinism’, Britain was sure to triumph over France in the 
end.189 As the war continued, however, doubt crept into such a brash self-analysis. 
By May 1797 the outlook was gloomy: Ireland had been attacked and Wales 
invaded, the banks had crashed, the Navy had mutinied, most of Britain’s allies had 
disappeared, and the French commanded the continent. With these circumstances in 
mind it is hardly surprising that an opposition member claimed that the enemy’s 
‘successes were such, that they appeared almost to exhibit the effects of divine 
retribution’.190 Did the series of invasion scares, continental defeats, disturbances, 
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and jacobinical conspiracies mean that God had turned his back on his once-favoured 
nation?  
The result of such doubt was a conviction that, if Britons wanted to avoid the 
calamity of a French invasion, they had to reform their manners. The French were 
God’s tool for vengeance: the way to deflect an invasion was not through large 
armies or constant preparation, but repentance and religion. With the defeat of the 
Third Coalition and Britain’s diplomatic isolation in 1806, pamphleteer John Bowles 
argued that the only way to avoid calamity was to address what he referred to as 
‘national sin’. This had turned God against the British nation, as a result of which a 
‘national reformation …[was] the best means of NATIONAL SAFETY’.191 Bowles 
was not the only pamphleteer with this conviction. In 1807 a pamphlet entitled The 
Dangers of the Country recommended ‘reformation as an essential basis of national 
safety’.192 A year after that, another pamphlet claimed that ‘IMMORALITY’ was the 
greatest internal enemy against which Britain had to fight.193 The message was clear. 
Instead of training to arms, the nation should be falling to its knees. 
This argument was fed by a suspicion that the government was going about 
national defence in the wrong way, not by its over-reliance on inferior bodies of 
manpower but simply by training the volunteers, the Levy en Masse, or the ‘Trained 
Peasantry’ on a Sunday. Normally this would have been a natural day for military 
training, since it was the only day on which ordinary labourers had a holiday, but to 
those already concerned by the nation’s growing lack of religious feeling, the idea of 
making people work on God’s day of rest was anathema. Pitt protested in vain that 
drilling on Sunday conformed with the Church’s tenets because national defence was 
‘a duty of the most sacred and indispensable nature’.194 He could not overcome 
concern that Sunday training showed how fast Britain was slipping into the abyss. To 
the Anti-Jacobin Review, Sunday drilling indicated an alarming neglect of the proper 
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religious sentiment in the men responsible for the framing of national policy.195 An 
even more serious problem was that it led the men ‘to drunkenness and debauchery’ 
and the officers ‘to profaneness and infidelity’. This dealt the final blow against ‘the 
sense … of moral and religious obligation’ which tied the two together.196  Sunday 
drilling led to a disregard for religion, and therefore increased the instability that 
already existed within the social hierarchy.  
Ominously, a series of unfortunate continental and domestic problems further 
undermined faith in the aristocracy’s ability to govern, and helped accelerate a 
radical revival both inside and outside parliament. A series of short-lived 
governments encouraged the idea that politicians sought nothing but personal 
financial gain from office. Reform, as J.E. Cookson has argued, began to be seen as a 
sort of atonement for national sins.197 The government’s sanction of the attack on 
Copenhagen in 1807, during which the British fleet set fire to the harbour to prevent 
Denmark placing its fleet under French control, outraged some parts of the nation 
and fed the fears of national immorality.198 The bombardment of civilians was 
genuinely shocking, and this incident, combined with fears of government corruption 
and financial irregularity, encouraged many to look elsewhere for political guidance. 
The radicals were well-placed to benefit, since the parliamentary opposition was as 
much tainted with corruption as their government rivals. The Foxites had a 
reasonable track record on reform, but their allies the Grenvilles were both opposed 
to reform and notorious sinecurists.199 Any reformist platform put forward by an 
opposition that included the Grenvilles was unlikely to be greeted with anything but 
scepticism. The moderate oppositionists therefore lost ground to radicals.200 Sir 
Francis Burdett rose to the occasion, as did Lord Folkestone, who moved in 1807 to 
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investigate abuses in the Army and state departments. After 1809 the radicals 
launched attacks against the Victualling Board, abuse of Indian patronage, and the 
increase of public expenditure.201 The days when the Foxites had managed to tame 
backbench fervour on reform were over. Indeed many Whigs, including Tierney, 
found themselves frequently supporting the government against radical initiatives.202 
The Whigs, like the Anti-Jacobin Review, deeply feared the impact of the radical 
resurgence on the national hierarchy. 
The revelation that the duke of York’s mistress, Mary Anne Clarke, had been 
selling commissions in the Army strained the relations that bound governors and 
governed even further. The scandal not only embarrassed ministers and split the 
opposition, but also focused attention entirely on two points which had acquired 
considerable importance by 1809: corruption and moral reform. The attack on the 
Duke was accordingly championed by Colonel Gwyllym Wardle, an MP with radical 
connections. The affair proved to radical satisfaction that something was rotten at the 
heart of the state: parliament refused to punish the Duke directly, which gave 
strength to radical calls for a moral regeneration at the highest levels.203 More 
ominously still, the affair brought to light the scandalous behaviour of several other 
members of the royal family. Melville was warned that the Prince of Wales’s 
neglected wife and string of mistresses were alienating to the vast majority of 
moralistic Britons, who feared that a corrupt royal family would not be worth 
defending. ‘Nothing would so strongly insure our Success as a proper State of Public 
Morals which would induce every man to consider … His King, His Country and all 
its institutions as the stake for which he was fighting’.204 How could Britain hope for 
success in the war if the people only half-heartedly defended their monarch and 
aristocratic government? 
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The most frightening aspect of this concern for national morality, and the 
resulting revival of radicalism, was thus the blow it struck at the roots of the social 
hierarchy. The mutual trust between governors and governed, of which Addington 
and Pitt had boasted in their plans to arm the nation, was seriously compromised by a 
growing suspicion, fed by government weakness, military impotence, and the 
misbehaviour of the royal family. If the aristocracy was too venal to lead Britain to 
victory, then the only remedy was a radical reform of the government. Peter Spence 
notes that ‘to support reform was thus to support the monarchy, the nation, the 
constitution, the romantic patria’, since it became seen as the only way to save the 
nation from divine retribution in the form of a French attack.205 Upper class 
immorality struck at the heart of the social network because it suggested that the 
aristocracy did not deserve their exalted status at its head. An article in the Anti-
Jacobin Review identified the problem as a fundamental lack of respect: ‘Rank, to 
command respect, must first deserve it’. What was needed was ‘a strict conformity of 
conduct to situation’.206 The British citizenry had to be convinced that its government 
and monarchy were virtuous. In 1810, many feared that this was not the case. 
Conclusion 
By 1809 the politicians were so accustomed to defeat and stalemate that, 
when news of the first victories in the Peninsula arrived, many politicians continued 
to view the war in Spain and Portugal as nothing but an unwise distraction from the 
main defensive struggle. Lord Ellenborough wrote to Sidmouth about Talavera, ‘I am 
afraid it will be productive rather of glory to the British Army than of any material 
advantage to British interests’.207 Several historians have agreed that the victories in 
the Peninsula were, in fact, overrated in international terms.208 Significantly, 
however, the defeat of the French in Portugal and Spain showed Britons what they 
were capable of achieving if the French were ever to invade. The Peninsular struggle 
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was easy to fashion into a parallel that must have brought the conflict very close to 
home: Lisbon’s surrender, a pamphlet remarked, ‘would give us a foretaste of the 
sensations which we should experience, if, from Lisbon, with strength and hopes 
augmented, the ravagers should proceed to Cork, Dublin, or LONDON’.209 From the 
politicians’ point of view, the victories in the Peninsula started coming in at just the 
right time. As A.D. Harvey points out, the victory of Salamanca in the summer of 
1812 coincided with signs of economic recovery in Britain, all of which contributed 
to a revival of the war’s popularity — a development which the new Liverpool 
government, struggling against crippling parliamentary weakness, must have 
welcomed.210 Most importantly of all, the war divided Napoleon’s forces in such a 
way that a British invasion became increasingly unlikely.211  
As far as morale and defence were concerned, therefore, the Peninsular War 
was a major turning-point, even if it was not enough to earn Britain a prominent 
place at the peace table. During a long, exhausting conflict, victories such as those 
achieved in the Peninsula, or at Trafalgar, were a breath of fresh air to ministries 
stifled by instability and desperate for the means to restore their credibility. The 
advantages to be derived from them at a domestic level were incalculable. It is a 
mistake to suppose that such victories were pointless because they did not help 
restore the Bourbon monarchy or contribute to the ultimate defeat of the Napoleon. 
British war aims were rarely stated so categorically, and were apt to change 
according to circumstances and to what it was deemed practical to achieve. Victories 
in the Peninsula, at sea, and in the colonies were just as valuable as a decisive 
continental triumph because they strengthened Britain’s heart and mind. The same 
can be said of Waterloo, the only continental battle of international significance in 
which she played a determining part. As Rory Muir has pointed out, both the 
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Peninsular War and Waterloo ‘gave Britain a sense of uniqueness, an inner 
confidence, which lasted a full century until it was shattered on the Somme’.212  
The importance of this national self-confidence in a predominantly defensive 
war was recognised by the politicians, especially Pitt, for whose government the 
series of continental disasters interspersed with invasion scares, scarcities, and the 
threat of insurrection were a real threat. The solution — to give the British a greater 
feeling of involvement in the defence of a nation that gave them so much to fight for 
— dove-tailed nicely into broader trends of national participation. This involved a 
strengthening of the top-down relations through the social hierarchy from the king 
down to the poorest peasant. The problem was that the politicians could not forestall 
the effect of a lengthening, expensive, and exhausting struggle on the British mind 
forever. No scheme for national involvement was inclusive enough, the aristocracy 
and royal family misbehaved, and a series of politically weakened governments set 
the stage for a resurgence of radicalism that had effectively taken the spotlight off 
national defence by the start of the 1810s. Significantly, however, the attempts to 
raise the national spirit showed how a series of governments between 1793 and 1812 
viewed the structure of the nation in times of stress. If the picture in 1810 was 
gloomy, this was largely out of the control of the politicians, who were distracted by 
their own weakness. Other domestic issues — notably reform and retrenchment — 
had taken over from defence. With the continent consigned to Napoleonic influence, 
Britons now mainly looked in rather than out. Meanwhile, across St. George’s 
Channel, the case of Ireland remained as an example of the continuing political 
failure to find a defence policy suitable for the whole of the British Isles. 
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Chapter Five  
Ireland 
 
People’s sense of national identity was not only conditioned by their response 
to a French ‘other’, since factors closer to home were just as likely to play a part in 
determining the extent to which politicians were prepared to strengthen their control 
over defence mechanisms. Ireland, in particular, held a dark mirror to Britain’s 
political, social and religious make-up. Predominantly poor and Catholic, she lacked 
the social hierarchy that drove the centrally-guided defence effort of her sister island. 
This, along with sectarian violence and agrarian disturbances, repelled British 
politicians. Windham spoke for many when he admitted that ‘he did not much like 
tampering with’ Ireland.1 The very difficulties that made her such a prickly 
neighbour, however, also made her the most vulnerable part of the British Isles. 
Radicals in the form of the United Irishmen, and other local or agrarian groups such 
as the Defenders and Whiteboys, were suspected (often correctly) of being in league 
with France. A failed French invasion attempt in 1796, an actual landing in 1798, 
two outright rebellions in 1798 and 1803, and almost constant social unrest, made 
Ireland vulnerable to enemy attack. Habeas corpus suspension and martial law were 
enforced for much of the period between 1793 and 1815. As long as she remained in 
this volatile state, the possibility remained that the French would use her as a base for 
an attack on Britain.  
As such her importance to the British defence effort should not be 
underestimated. Linda Colley has argued that Ireland was too ‘alien’ and too 
Catholic to be integrated thoroughly into Britain, and that predominantly Protestant 
Britain treated her more as an inferior colony than as an equal partner.2 The Irish 
were certainly thought to have a ‘natural disposition’ to be ‘somewhat light, versatile 
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and sanguinary’ — characteristics that were considered to be more French than 
British.3 Unlike Colley, however, the governments led by Pitt, Addington, Grenville, 
and Portland did not have the luxury of ignoring Ireland’s special problems, and 
more recent work has acknowledged this. Murray Pittock, for example, asserts that 
‘to write Ireland out of Britain is to risk serious misrepresentation of the nature of 
Britain and its identities’.4 Pittock is right to stress the connections between the two 
islands, since politicians were more likely to want to force Ireland into a British 
mould than treat her differently. After all, British and Irish political fates were 
inextricably linked by allegiance to the Crown, a common ideological heritage, and a 
number of Acts that made the Dublin parliament subservient to its Westminster 
counterpart. Significantly, also, Ireland’s character and Catholicism were not 
considered automatically to exclude her from a claim to ‘Britishness’. The Irish lord 
chancellor, Lord Redesdale, though vehemently anti-Catholic, thought that, if given 
‘English minds & manners’, the Irish would eventually be fit ‘to receive all the 
benefits of the English Constitution’.5 Although this betrayed the strong English bias 
against Irish ‘primitiveness’, it also demonstrated the strong connection that 
politicians drew between the fates of the sister islands. 
A contemporary observer noted that Ireland was ‘a ship on fire’ that ‘must be 
either cast off or extinguished’.6 Significantly, politicians chose to pursue the second 
option by strengthening the bonds between the two nations. The needs of a war of 
unprecedented scale excused the overriding of local autonomy, and the Anglo-Irish 
Act of Union in 1800 can plausibly be regarded as an extension of the centralisation 
that had gradually been implemented in Britain in response to the security problems 
of the 1790s. The political solution in both cases was identical, and involved 
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establishing greater official control over defence policy, redefining citizenship, and 
searching for a better source of manpower. The Union’s aftermath, however, 
reflected the disadvantages of moving too quickly towards these goals in a country 
that had a much more complex system of social ties than that which existed on this 
side of St. George’s Channel. Difficulties arose, not because Ireland was treated 
differently from any other part of the United Kingdom, but because British policy-
makers, acting from a British point of view and with British objects in mind, failed to 
take account of her special problems. 
Britain and Ireland before the Union: the ‘Sister Island’ 
Prior to the Union the British government had encountered a number of 
difficulties with regard to Ireland, primarily because of the complex system of ties 
that connected the two countries. Nominally, Ireland had its own parliament of over 
four hundred lords and commoners sitting in Dublin, and its own administration, 
consisting of a first lord of the treasury, chancellor of the exchequer, lord chancellor, 
solicitor general, and other positions analogous to their British equivalents. It also 
had its own military and ecclesiastical arrangements.7 Despite these separate political 
arrangements, however, Ireland was by no means free from British interference. For 
most of the eighteenth century her parliament had existed under the terms of the 
Declaratory Act and of Poyning’s Law, both of which asserted Ireland’s almost 
complete subservience to British political dictates. The former decreed that the 
Westminster parliament could pass laws on Ireland’s behalf, and the latter that the 
Dublin parliament could not propose or amend bills, but could only approve or reject 
measures that had previously been approved by the Privy Council.8 The threat of 
disturbance during the struggle with France in the 1770s had resulted in the granting 
of legislative independence in 1782, which had repealed the Declaratory Act and 
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given Ireland some control over important military and naval policy, but this did not 
achieve as much as its supporters had hoped. Poyning’s Law remained largely in 
force, and Britain still retained the power to nominate the highest levels of the Irish 
executive and decide major elements of foreign policy.9 
The most obvious result of the 1782 ‘settlement’, therefore, was that the 
British government now had to devote more attention to Irish affairs than it was 
willing to give. It somehow had to ensure that the Irish parliament passed measures 
congenial to British interests, and Dublin’s politicians showed an alarming tendency 
not to toe the line.10 Although a combination of efficient management and the use of 
patronage generally kept relations smooth between the executive and the legislature, 
a crisis could upset everything. The most recent occasion on which Irish politicians 
had broken ranks had been during the Regency Crisis in 1788-9, when their 
parliament had voted in favour of a regent in direct opposition to the course taken by 
the government at Westminster.11 British politicians were never able to forget that 
Ireland owed no direct allegiance to them. So long as this state of affairs existed 
Anglo-Irish political relations could only be tense. 
Ireland’s only direct official link to Westminster was through the medium of 
the Crown’s representative, the lord lieutenant, who received his instructions directly 
from the home secretary.12 Many holders of the office also enjoyed close links to 
members of the government, and often the prime minister himself. Of the lords 
lieutenant between 1793 and 1810, Lords Westmorland and Camden were both 
personal friends of Pitt, and Lord Hardwicke was the brother of Charles Yorke, 
Addington’s home secretary. The office enjoyed supreme authority over patronage. 
Since the 1770s its military powers had been shared with a commander of the forces, 
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although the two posts were not infrequently combined in times of crisis.13 The lord 
lieutenant’s role was not directly affected by the 1782 reforms, but his importance as 
the main liaison between the Westminster and Dublin legislatures was increased by 
the growing need to ensure the Irish parliament’s continued good behaviour.14 He 
was assisted by the chief secretary, a sort of ‘Irish secretary of state’ whose main role 
was to transact official business in parliament and correspond with local notables on 
the lord lieutenant’s behalf.15 He in turn headed a sophisticated bureaucratic structure 
that evolved with the dual purpose of implementing policy and managing parliament. 
From 1777 two under-secretaries were appointed with the responsibility for civil and 
military affairs.16 The men usually appointed to these positions had very high 
reputations for their knowledge of the workings of the Irish administrative system, as 
a result of which their advice and opinions were frequently sought by politicians in 
London as well as by the lord lieutenant or chief secretary.17 All these posts were 
usually held by British men, appointed in Britain, and charged with upholding British 
interests in Ireland. 
A curious duality, therefore, existed in Dublin, and it complicated the 
relations between Britain and the sister island. On the one side was the Irish 
government and the Dublin parliament, nominally independent and liable to 
demonstrate the full extent of that independence if pressed. On the other was the lord 
lieutenant and Dublin Castle, charged to ensure that the Irish government continued 
to recognise its subservience to Westminster. At the core of the problem was the fact 
that important elements of Irish domestic policy, in particular some military and 
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defence arrangements on Irish soil, remained out of British hands.18 Ireland remained 
a potent problem for British politicians to deal with because it had to be carefully 
managed to obtain the right results, without those results ever being guaranteed. This 
was no trivial issue, and British politicians had been convinced of the unsatisfactory 
nature of the 1782 settlement for some time. A variety of unsuccessful alternatives 
had been proposed over the years, but it took the crisis of the war with France to 
bring any of those plans to fruition.19 
By the mid 1790s, indeed, it had become clear that wartime Ireland could not 
continue to be governed in such a precarious way. The sister island had long suffered 
from domestic unrest that not only made her a target for a French assault but also 
made her a potentially willing recipient of one, unlike England. In 1794 
Westmorland reported to Pitt that, if the French invaded, ‘I fear the defending Army 
would be in an Enemy’s country’.20 Alarmingly, there seemed to be a tacit 
connection between France and the Irish radicals, and sporadic disturbances in 
Ireland during the mid-1790s were frequently traced by the newspapers to French 
sources.21 These rumours had considerable substance, because although they were 
sceptical about defeating Britain on Irish soil, as Marianne Elliott argues, the French 
recognised that fostering the spirit of Irish rebellion was an easy way to attack their 
old enemy.22 The radical connection with France seemed confirmed when the 
invasion attempt at Bantry Bay coincided with numerous disturbances in the north of 
Ireland during December 1796 and January 1797.23 Just over a year later, another 
invasion accompanied the rebellion of 1798. Although this was successfully repelled, 
Ireland remained unsettled and there was no guarantee that a third initiative would 
end so happily. As the weak joint in Britain’s armour, Ireland required constant 
vigilance, the more so given the unpredictability of her political system. When asked 
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who would succeed his father as lord lieutenant in 1801, Cornwallis’s son 
immediately replied, ‘Buonaparte’.24  
What made this lack of direct control even more worrying was that British 
radicals were also deeply involved with Irish republicans. Any self-respecting 
government with an eye on domestic radicalism could not ignore this extra 
dimension to the issue, which, as Roger Wells has argued, hinted at a triangular 
alliance between British, Irish and French revolutionaries.25 The development in 
Britain of several organisations that echoed the structure and name of the United 
Irishmen, notably the United Britons, United Englishmen and the United Scotsmen, 
was tracked anxiously by government informers based in the London Alien Office.26 
These groups were specifically targeted by government legislation following the 
1798 rebellion, as a result of a Committee of Secrecy of the House of Commons 
Report published in March 1799.27 Migration to Britain was also closely monitored 
through a system of spies and passports, particularly after the rebellions of 1798 and 
1803.28 Liverpool was often reported to be subject to swarms of Irish immigrants, but 
other northern towns, particularly Manchester, were not immune, and the Pitt and 
Addington governments recommended that local magistrates and other officials keep 
a watchful eye on their movements.29 Prior to 1801, however, the process of tracking 
the links between Irish and British disaffection was hampered by the complicated 
administrative arrangements that connected the two countries. If Ireland was a 
                                                 
24 15 February 1801, Glenbervie Diaries I, 170. 
25 Ehrman III, 163; Wells, Insurrection, p. xiii. 
26 T. Coke to Portland, 14 March 1801, Home Office MSS, National Archives, HO 42/61 ff. 220-1. 
27 Ehrman III, 303-5. 
28 ‘All persons leaving Ireland are at present required to obtain Passports … from the proper Officer 
appointed to grant them’: Yorke to Lord Hertford, 8 September 1803, Home Office MSS, National 
Archives, HO 43/14 ff. 185-6. See also the King’s Proclamation respecting persons coming from 
Ireland, 18 March 1799, PH XXXIV, 656-7. 
29 Peter Brancker to Major General Gascoyne, 31 October 1801, Home Office MSS, National 
Archives, HO 42/62 ff. 535-6; Mr. Warren-Bulkeley to Pelham, 24 August 1803, Home Office MSS, 
National Archives, HO 42/68 f. 208; Ralph Fletcher to Pelham, 7 January 1802, Home Office MSS, 
National Archives, HO 42/65 ff. 182-3; Pelham to the Mayor of Liverpool, 30 July 1803, Home 
Office MSS, National Archives, HO 42/71 ff. 385-7; Benjamin Roberts to Pelham, 3 June 1803, 
Home Office MSS, National Archives, HO 42/71 f. 462; duke of Gloucester to Addington, 17 August 
1803, Devon RO, Sidmouth MSS, 152M/C1803/79. 
 205 
potential back door for French influence, the British government was not sure that it 
had enough authority to be able to close it. 
A drain on manpower 
Apart from the difficulties involved in controlling her legislature, post-1782 
Ireland also remained a drain on British manpower. She had no regular force of her 
own, and few auxiliaries on which to rely. Both an Irish militia and an Irish 
yeomanry did exist, but her different war experience meant that they were raised, 
deployed and viewed in very different ways from their British equivalents. As a 
result, Ireland’s unsettled domestic state meant that she absorbed a disproportionately 
large proportion of Britain’s regular military force. The frequent French attempts to 
land on the Irish coast seemed to justify such an arrangement, and Ireland became 
accustomed to relying on the backbone of her British regular garrison. As the war 
progressed, however, and Britain lost her allies, the optimal balance of defence 
between the two islands became increasingly difficult to strike. It was difficult for 
the politicians in charge of troop deployment to judge the real state of the sister 
island’s defensive force, and perceived imbalances in Britain’s favour caused friction 
and ill will. 
The weakness of the auxiliary forces was directly traceable to the British 
government’s anxiety not to lose complete control of the Irish situation. The Irish 
volunteer movement of the 1780s, formed in response to a previous French invasion 
scare, had shown how dangerous it was to sacrifice central control in return for 
armed numbers. At its height the Irish volunteers had numbered 89,000, but after the 
peace in 1783 they had remained embodied, while politicians focused on political 
issues such as freedom of trade and the campaign for legislative independence. Their 
increasing radicalisation had led to their suppression by the lord lieutenant, 
Westmorland, shortly after the declaration of war in 1793.30 Because of this bad 
experience Westmorland’s successor, Camden, resisted giving his approval to any 
Irish armed associations until 1796, when it became clear that a government-
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approved Yeomanry was the only way to retain authority over the defence effort.31 
By 1800 there were 54,000 yeomen, and this number barely declined during the 
peace of Amiens, rising to a peak of 83,000 in 1803.32 The Yeomanry was not, 
however, directly analogous to the British volunteers, and the Irish government 
remained fearful that maintaining it at strength would prompt an attempt to follow 
‘the example of the former volunteers’ and ‘turn the armed Force to some political 
Purpose’.33 This fear that the Yeomanry would become over-politicised was 
increased when they became more and more militantly Protestant.34 The government 
was deeply reluctant to condone this deepening of Ireland’s sectarian differences, but 
the lack of feasible auxiliary alternatives forced it to rely on the Yeomanry as a 
defence force more than it would have liked. 
The Irish militia, formed in 1793, might have appeared to be the obvious 
alternative, but its religious basis and questionable quality meant that it was unlikely 
to be much of an improvement. In contrast to the ultra-Protestant Yeomanry the 
militia was highly Catholic, and this led to fears that it might be infiltrated by 
agrarian-based troublemakers such as the Defenders.35 These doubts were matched 
by recognition of the Irish militia’s not entirely undeserved reputation for 
incompetence and cowardice. Officials recognised that it could not be relied on in an 
emergency. During the 1798 battle of Castlebar against the invading French force, 
the Kilkenny and Longford regiments of militia deserted to join the enemy, an act 
that prompted Lord Cornwallis to describe the whole as ‘good for nothing’.36 As late 
as 1803 Lord Redesdale described Ireland’s militiamen as ‘easily open to solicitation 
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or corruption’.37 As a defensive force, therefore, the force was seriously under par. 
The only thing that could be done with it was to draft portions of it into the regulars, 
where the discipline of the Army might solve most of its problems. Drafting was 
consequently a less controversial process in Ireland than similar attempts to encroach 
on the English and Scottish bodies. The Irish militia gradually became little more 
than a resource for recruitment into the regulars when all else had failed. Several 
Irishmen were drafted in March 1805, Castlereagh toyed with a further transfer in 
November 1805, and Windham considered making the force entirely free to enter the 
line in 1806.38 Such decisions did not, however, solve the problem of Ireland’s lack 
of an adequate body of defence. Indeed, it simply made it worse. 
It was consequently vital for Ireland to be manned by a sufficient number of 
regulars in addition to the militia, the staunchly Protestant Yeomanry, and the 
fencible units that were occasionally raised, but this force was usually small and too 
widely dispersed. Just before the rebellion in April 1798 a memorandum calculated 
that Ireland had a total of 42,390 troops, including militia, of which only 31,792 were 
effective and dispersed over an area of two hundred by one hundred and fifty miles.39 
This body of men was enlarged because of the need to quell the 1798 rebellion, but 
by 1801 numbers had collapsed again to just over five thousand regulars, twenty 
thousand militia, and eleven thousand fencibles.40 Even in the wake of the 1803 
rebellion Ireland remained exposed. The number of regular troops made available to 
her increased after Emmett’s revolt, with 16,000 men considered fit for duty, but 
these remained widely dispersed. The biggest force that Castlereagh was told could 
be gathered in any one place with less than twelve days’ notice was 20,000 (and this 
figure included a militia force of 15,000 effectives).41 It was manifestly not enough, 
particularly since the well-known insufficiency of the Yeomanry and militia meant 
that the bulk of defence would fall to the overstretched regulars. The fact that Ireland 
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had such a small regular garrison was particularly ironic considering that her poverty 
and over-population made her a prime recruiting ground for the Army. Recruitment 
there was cheaper because the Irish bounty rate was lower than in Britain, and as a 
result, the island provided a disproportionate number of recruits for Britain’s force 
(Lord Guilford asserted in 1795 that she had provided ‘not less than one third of the 
men for the service of the present war’).42 The problem was, of course, that they 
could hardly ever be used on their home soil because of fears of contamination from 
domestic disaffection. Recruits were most likely to be sent away to the continent or 
the colonies, so that Ireland did not directly benefit from her own high recruitment 
rate. 
After all, the main decisions about troop deployment were made at 
Westminster. From here Ireland was a very long way off, and, not unnaturally, 
British concerns were frequently prioritised. Some lip-service was paid to the 
primacy of Irish claims on troops, particularly after the rebellion of 1798. When the 
Second Coalition plans for the joint Anglo-Russian expedition to the Helder were 
underway in 1799, Dundas reassured Cornwallis that he considered ‘the whole of our 
force as in reality applicable’ to the defence of Ireland, to which other objects ‘must 
all be Subservient & secondary’.43 In reality, however, unless the island was in the 
immediate grip of insurrection, the lord lieutenant was more usually asked to 
sacrifice his precious regulars for offensive purposes elsewhere. Over the summer of 
1795 Pitt wrote to Camden to request ‘three Regiments for the West Indies’, plus a 
fourth regiment destined for the ill-fated Quiberon expedition. A month later he 
added a request for two companies of artillery and some cavalry.44 Camden’s 
successor Cornwallis complained dryly that he only ever heard from Dundas when 
the secretary of state for war wrote ‘to induce me to part with troops’.45 It was not, of 
course, all give on Ireland’s part. Politicians were aware that taking her armed 
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defence force away was not ideal, but they were hard pressed to discover a suitable 
alternative. One idea was to replace lost regulars with volunteer regiments from the 
British militia. This first happened after the 1798 rebellion, but it was not an 
unmixed success. Cornwallis was less than pleased with the quality of the men he 
received, whom he described as ‘sad hash’.46 Part of the problem was that the British 
government overestimated the value of the Irish militia and, therefore, of the Irish 
defence force in general. All Irish politicians were not, however, as understanding as 
Camden or Cornwallis.47 Yorke was threatened by Redesdale ‘with no less than an 
impeachment’ if reinforcements were not immediately provided for Ireland in 
October 1803.48 The difficulty lay in persuading politicians who saw nothing but 
Britain’s immediate need that Ireland, too, lay exposed to attacks. 
This was in fact the main problem. The politicians making the decisions 
were, by and large, too far removed from Irish affairs and viewed them as little more 
than an unwelcome distraction. Cornwallis complained that Pitt’s cabinet was 
ignorant of Irish matters.49 This was a little unfair on a cabinet which, after 1798, 
comprised of three former lords lieutenant and one former chief secretary, but 
certainly Pitt and Dundas, who were, besides Portland, the most important decision-
makers in Irish affairs, were woefully ignorant.50 Camden recalled that Pitt had 
‘candidly acknowledged to me before I came hither that Ireland occupy’s [sic] little’ 
of his thoughts, and Dundas made no attempt to conceal his less-than-perfect 
knowledge of the country’s defence forces.51 In 1798 he admitted that he had ‘ceased 
to occupy my Mind upon the Subject’.52 The effect of this insouciance underscored 
by ignorance was widely visible, and rumours that the government had done nothing 
to prevent the attempted French landing in Bantry Bay in 1796 damaged Anglo-Irish 
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relations. Camden himself, in an uncharacteristic burst of bitterness, accused Pitt of 
unwittingly provoking ‘a great degree of Discontent’ and ‘an impression even 
amongst the best friends of England that the Country has not had all the attention of 
the Fleet which was to have been expected’.53 Ignorance it might be, but Pitt and 
Dundas’s neglect only fed suspicions that Britain would only stir if directly 
threatened herself. 
A division of authority 
The need to provide for Ireland’s defence, and its consequent drain on 
Britain’s manpower, was a source of trouble for a government that devoted little of 
its time to her affairs. Unfortunately for Ireland, too, the dual nature of her 
government and the terms of her legislative independence meant that the 
responsibility for her defence was not well enough defined to persuade British 
politicians of their ultimate responsibility, despite the obvious fact that Ireland 
remained fundamentally dependent on their help. This was not only the case in terms 
of manpower. Although London technically had no business interfering in her 
domestic affairs, Ireland’s straitened finances prompted frequent demands on 
Britain’s overstrained resources. More ominously, the Pitt government could not 
avoid the repercussions of attempts to suppress local disaffection, because any harsh 
measures imposed in Ireland provoked unseemly debate at Westminster. The root of 
these problems lay in the fact that the British cabinet had no way of influencing Irish 
policy except through the lord lieutenant, whose own powers to interfere in the 
country’s parliamentary politics were limited. The only solution to this problem of 
divided authority, which became more and more pressing as the 1790s progressed, 
was a rearrangement of the relationship between the two countries that would give 
the centre a greater degree of control. 
However, the initial instinct was to distance British politics as much as 
possible from Ireland’s problems. Before 1798, politicians avoided tackling them 
head-on by hiding behind the claim that Westminster had no business interfering in 
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the domestic politics of the sister island. When Lord Moira attacked the government 
on the issue in 1797, Grenville protested that Britain had no ‘pretensions for 
watching over the safety of Ireland … This was the duty of its own parliament’.54 
Such an attitude was all very well to fend off short-term attacks, but it angered 
Camden, who complained to Pitt that the lack of any coherent response to opposition 
slurs put his government in a very bad light.55 His indignation was not, however, 
enough to change the official response. The issue of divided authority was only 
really faced by Pitt after the rebellion in 1798, which demonstrated that the previous 
policy of fixing responsibility on the lord lieutenant and the Irish parliament had 
become unviable. In the meantime, opposition suggestions to the effect that Pitt 
ought to take Ireland more firmly in hand were dismissed as ridiculous and 
unconstitutional. 
Unfortunately, not all problems could be dodged so easily, and many returned 
again and again to haunt the government n London. The recurring issue of Ireland’s 
poor cash flow, for example, was particularly pressing in the mid-1790s, at a time 
when the Pitt government was more preoccupied with the prospect of British than 
Irish bankruptcy. The height of Ireland’s crisis occurred between December 1796 
and May 1797, at a time when her vulnerability had been cast in stark relief due to 
the invasion attempt near Bantry Bay. Her demands, however, coincided with the 
attack on Fishguard and the bank crash in England. Combined with the fact that there 
was no direct way to pump money and resources into Ireland without a parliamentary 
inquiry on one or other side of the water, Pitt was unwilling (or unable) to give as 
much aid as Camden wanted. It was only by portraying the financial situation in the 
blackest of lights (and then only repeatedly) that the lord lieutenant could get any 
attention from the prime minister at all. 
Camden’s frantic letters detailed the dangerously low level of specie in the 
Irish bank, which meant an impending inability to pay Ireland’s armed forces. In late 
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1796 he warned that a £600,000 demand on the Irish Treasury could not be 
honoured, and that defaulting would probably draw French attention to Ireland’s 
vulnerability. Unless Ireland was given ‘a Sum as large as the means of Great Britain 
can furnish … the Troops could not march against the Enemy, if they should appear 
upon our Coasts’.56 He further claimed that there were only 20,000 guineas left in the 
Bank of Ireland and asked for a loan of a million pounds on top of a sum of three 
hundred thousand pounds that had already been borrowed the previous November.57 
The French attempt to invade over the New Year increased the stakes, but 
unfortunately Pitt’s response to Camden promising only fifty thousand guineas did 
not take the corresponding change in situation into account.58 Camden reminded him 
that ‘Ireland is now the advanced post thro’ which England is to be attacked’, and 
that it was ‘both becoming & politic in England to enable her to make such exertions 
as can alone render her situation tolerably secure’.59 In mid February Pitt agreed to 
raise the loan to one and a half million pounds, but the money had not arrived by 
mid-March and Camden prophesied imminent ‘mutiny’, ‘a most formidable 
Insurrection’ and ‘Civil War’ if a further three hundred thousand pounds was not 
provided to pay the regulars before June.60 By July he was again pestering Pitt for 
money, and at the end of the year a new petition for £3.5 millions produced a 
promise of only one and a half.61 Ireland’s position on the knife-edge of bankruptcy 
did no good to the government’s standing in either country, but no long-term solution 
was available so long as the British and Irish treasuries remained separate. 
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The harsh measures enacted by the Irish government also caused problems 
for Pitt’s ministry. The Westminster opposition was apt to place responsibility for 
any apparent excess of power in Ireland at Pitt’s door, despite the fact that his 
ministry had no direct say in Irish defence policy. Any serious attempt to seize the 
bull by the horns in Dublin, therefore, ran the risk of forfeiting London’s support, 
since the conviction that Ireland’s problems justified strong measures was often 
overcome by the fear of a political backlash. The Irish Insurrection Act of 1796, for 
example, deeply shocked the cabinet, and Portland wrote to Camden to recommend 
caution in its implementation.62 The government was afflicted with a similar 
uneasiness at the violence exhibited by the Irish militia in suppressing northern 
disturbances in 1797. Camden explained that some militiamen had been tried for 
murder and other offences, but did not deny that his administration ‘meant to strike 
Terror’. He protested ‘that the dreadful state of this Country from the intimidation 
practised by the United Irishmen made it indispensable to take strong measures & to 
employ the Military without waiting for the forms attendant on their acting in quiet 
times’.63 The implication was that London, at a distance, was unable to gauge the 
Irish situation adequately. Clearly, however, neither Camden nor anyone else in 
Pitt’s ministry was entirely happy with the prospect of placing the responsibility for 
invoking martial law and the implementation of curfews and armed searches with 
local authorities. 
From London’s point of view, the inability to control the direction of Irish 
domestic policy was particularly unfortunate. Ireland still remained the weakest part 
of the British Isles, and the events of 1798 seemed to indicate that her separate 
legislature could not deal effectively with the problems of war. She had now suffered 
an invasion attempt, a successful landing, and a rebellion to boot. Widespread 
disaffection remained long after the revolt had been put down and the French chased 
off Irish soil. In September 1799, a full fifteen months after the rebellion, reports in 
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the Times still spoke alternately of tranquillity and fear of renewed hostilities, while 
martial law remained in effect in Waterford and Tipperary.64 Given Ireland’s 
problems over the past five years — her near-bankruptcy, her independent mindset, 
and her drain on precious manpower, not to mention the embarrassment she 
represented to the government in London — all pointed to an urgent need for control. 
‘The only remedy is union — union — union’, Grenville declared.65 By removing 
the Irish parliament, Pitt hoped at a stroke to simplify the communications between 
London and Dublin, break the Irish administration down to its barest elements, and 
concentrate policy-making for the whole British Isles in the cabinet room in 
Downing Street. To him, therefore, the Union was a defence measure, and one 
‘which we cannot lose sight of, but must make the Grand & Primary object of all our 
Policy with respect to Ireland’.66 This reasoning justified the drastic steps taken, and 
all the secret service money spent, to persuade the reluctant Irish houses of 
parliament to vote themselves out of existence. 
Britain and Ireland after the Union: the ‘United Kingdom’ 
A Union between Britain and Ireland had been on the cards at least since the 
mid-eighteenth century, and Pitt himself had attempted to construct a commercial 
bond between the two nations in 1785. By 1798, however, the situation had 
progressed beyond piecemeal attempts at rapprochement. The fraught circumstances 
of the 1790s increased the need for a more secure legislative, commercial, financial, 
and political bond between the two islands. A full union would allow the British 
executive to check the uncontrolled violence with which Irish vigilantes had dealt 
with the disaffection of 1797 and the rebellion of 1798.67 It would also limit the 
overreaction of local authorities that had resulted from the 1796 Insurrection Act: 
                                                 
64 Times, 24 September 1798, 3(a). 
65 Grenville to Thomas Grenville, 7 August 1798, Dropmore MSS, British Library, BL Add MSS 
41852 ff. 31-2. 
66 Pitt to Lord Cornwallis, 26 January 1799, Cambridge University Library, Pitt MSS, Add Ms 6958 
Box 13 No 2436; Geoghegan, The Irish Act of Union, p. 2; Blackstock, ‘The Union and the Military’, 
333. See also Smyth (ed), Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Union, pp. 16, 19. 
67 Memorandum by Castlereagh on the Union, 1800, PRONI, Castlereagh MSS, D3030/1530/2. 
 215 
Castlereagh admitted to the future chief secretary William Wickham ‘the 
indispensable necessity’ following the Union ‘of submitting material Measures, as 
far as possible for consideration in England previous to their introduction here’.68 
The administrative shake-up that would accompany the measure also offered an 
unparalleled opportunity to fix many of the problems the government had 
encountered during the 1790s. In short, union was the magic wand that would make 
all Britain’s Irish problems disappear. The emphasis was, above all, on 
centralisation: ‘the Administration of the two Islands must be one’.69  
Crucially, however, the same selfishness that had often prompted British 
politicians to drain Ireland of her precious troops lay behind their reasoning on the 
Union. The British government remained hampered by its very Britishness.70 
Although in public Pitt declared the Union to be the only way to bond British and 
Irish hearts, in private it was described as a method to ensure that Irish interests 
would not override those of the United Kingdom at large. After the initial upheaval 
created by the Union had subsided, its most obvious results seemed to be official 
chaos, departmental overlap, and a complete absence of system.71 This was not due 
to a premeditated desire to cripple Ireland for good, but was to an extent inevitable so 
long as politicians were unwilling to come to grips with the deeper issues. The union 
made no attempt to address the social problems that afflicted Ireland: welfare, 
education, policing, and economic policy all remained in local Irish hands.72Once it 
was clear that Ireland’s financial and military problems would no longer obstruct the 
British defence effort, interest in Ireland’s problems clearly lapsed.  
The promised benefits of the Union, particularly security and a more efficient 
central control of Ireland’s policy, did not materialise. To many this simply 
confirmed that the measure, though ‘one of the best measures that ever was carried’, 
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pointed ‘more to remote than to immediate advantages’.73 Part of the problem was 
that it had been passed in a hurry, and the implications of such a total reconstruction 
of the Irish government were not fully understood until after the fact.74 This had been 
foreseen in 1801 by Camden, who doubted ‘whether the sort of Establishment for the 
Business now made here will answer’.75 As soon as the Union had been passed, the 
old problems of neglect, miscommunication, and conflicts of interest resurfaced, 
since London and Dublin failed to see eye-to-eye on even the most basic elements of 
the post-union arrangement. The Peace of Amiens offered a short period of respite 
during which the practical problems could be ironed out, but there was little time to 
do much, and the new war with Napoleon brought even more serious problems of 
configuration into the open. The chaos that followed was clearly undesirable at a 
time when a French invasion was daily expected and Ireland was in danger of 
exploding into rebellion at any moment. 
Ironically, the most significant obstacle in the way of forming an effective 
defence policy for the entire United Kingdom was that responsibility for Ireland’s 
government now lay in Westminster rather than Dublin. The first lord lieutenant after 
the Union, Hardwicke, emphasised the importance of giving his office ‘some latitude 
of Action … in any unforeseen Situation … on which he may be prevented by 
circumstances from receiving His Majesty’s Commands from England’, but in 
practice this was not easy. There was an obvious communications problem, in that 
orders from Whitehall took so long to reach Dublin that, by the time they arrived, the 
situation had already changed.76 ‘Whilst the rebel directory is absolute & on the spot, 
the King’s government is restricted, & under the guidance of a distant power, 
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necessarily ignorant of every thing which can guide instant decision’, complained 
Redesdale during the 1803 rebellion.77 The situation in Dublin was hard to gauge 
from a distance: Redesdale’s unequivocal opinion was that ‘the Secretary of State 
will know as much of the government of Ireland as of that of Kamschatka’.78 
Removing the Irish parliament may have ended Ireland’s independence, but it meant 
that policies were now implemented from a distance by men who had little idea of 
the conditions on the ground. 
Even if London had been able to make better informed decisions about Irish 
conditions, the lack of proper definition between the powers of the two executives 
would still have caused difficulties. This was obvious in September 1801, nine 
months after the Union, when Hardwicke sent an envoy to England on a mission to 
urge ministers to come to ‘some Definitive Arrangements’ with regard to the 
relations between the Home Department, the Treasury, the War Office, the 
Ordnance, and the commander in chief.79 Three months later, the powers of the lord 
lieutenant remained ‘unsettled’, and it began to dawn on officers that not very much 
had changed in practical day-to-day terms.80 In 1803 the Irish solicitor general 
decided that ‘His Excellency’s Patent accordingly gives exactly the same extent of 
Powers which were given to his Predecessor before the Act of Union’.81 In 1805 the 
new chief secretary, Charles Long, remarked that even four years after the Union 
nobody in Britain could tell him how the Irish government had changed: ‘They all 
seem to agree that the Union has operated some Change in their offices but to what 
extent does not appear to have been defined’.82 The question of whether Dublin was 
subordinate or equal to Whitehall, and on what issues, remained uncertain for many 
years and resurfaced as late as 1823, 1830 and 1844.83  
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The circumstances surrounding Emmett’s rebellion on 23 July 1803 offered 
the most obvious sign that the Union had failed to deal adequately with the problems 
that had plagued British and Irish relations in the 1790s. The one-day rising in 
Dublin was swiftly suppressed and the leaders, including Emmett himself, mostly 
taken, but the Irish government had taken its time to respond, and had clearly failed 
to anticipate the attack despite the discovery of an illegal arms depot the previous 
week. The spontaneity of the rebellion, the killing of the Irish Lord Chief Justice 
(Kilwarden) in the melee, and a combination of bad luck and bad communication 
between departments which did not yet know for certain how they were supposed to 
interact, all seriously damaged confidence in the ability of the Irish government to 
deal with the kinds of domestic challenges the Union had been meant to address.  
Had Hardwicke’s government been surprised when it learned about the 
preparations for revolt that had been going on right under its nose? The lord 
lieutenant himself admitted that the insurrection ‘was not suspected till the Morning’ 
of the 23rd, in spite of various hints that had been present since the 16th, but added 
that ‘it is now distinctly ascertained that it was only on that day that it was 
determined by the Leaders themselves that an attempt should be made’.84 Few were 
convinced by this or by any other attempt to mitigate the impact made by the 
rebellion on the public mind. Addington and his ministers were inundated with 
despairing letters from politicians such as the chief secretary, Wickham, who 
deplored the ‘outcry and ill humour without End on the subject of the affair of the 
23d’.85 The prospect of an inquiry filled Hardwicke with even more foreboding that 
the opposition would harness the rebellion as a weapon against the governments in 
both countries.86 Whatever the excuses, as Hobart was told by a correspondent, ‘The 
                                                 
84 Hardwicke to John Foster, 27 July 1803, Devon RO, Sidmouth MSS, 152M/C1803/294; Hardwicke 
to Yorke, 25 August 1803, Hampshire RO, Wickham MSS, 38m49/8/93/5. 
85 Wickham to Addington, 12 August 1803, Hampshire RO, Wickham MSS, 38m49/1/45/27. 
86 Hardwicke to Wickham, 17 December 1803, Hampshire RO, Wickham MSS, 38m49/5/30/121; 
notes by Castlereagh on the rebellion, 1803, PRONI, Castlereagh MSS, D3030/1799/1. 
 219 
fact simply is — they were surprised — & it never will be forgiven — Confidence 
will never be restored in the Persons of our present Rulers’.87  
This public outcry was deeply damaging to a government already struggling 
to assert its authority after the Union, which seemed to have rendered the lord 
lieutenant virtually powerless. Initially, the plan had been to replace the lord 
lieutenant with a secretary of state for Ireland based in Westminster.88 Once the 
decision had been made to keep him, the Pitt and Addington governments had clearly 
envisioned him as a slightly more powerful version of his English county 
counterpart. Accordingly, when Hardwicke was appointed, the civilian and military 
parts of the Irish government, formerly joined in the person of Cornwallis, were kept 
strictly separate.89 The bulk of the military powers were bestowed on a separate 
commander of the forces, and the rest were returned to their corresponding 
departments in London, notably to the Transport Board, Ordnance, and office of the 
commander in chief at Horseguards. This was in line with the need to centralise 
military policy for the United Kingdom in London, but created an awkward situation 
in which a good working relationship between the lord lieutenant and the relevant 
London departments was essential. Unfortunately, Hardwicke found it extremely 
difficult to get on with the latter, particularly the Ordnance, which seemed to look 
upon any attempt by him to procure even the most basic information as unwarranted 
interference.90  
The lord lieutenant quickly found himself wondering what role he was 
supposed to play in the new arrangement. Even his channels of communication with 
London had become more straitened since Pelham, home secretary until summer 
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1803, had informed him in no uncertain terms that contacts with any government 
members not directly affiliated to the Home Office could only be unofficial and 
‘informal’.91 Inevitably, this caused friction. Redesdale was particularly angry that 
Hardwicke had been reduced to ‘the chief peace Magistrate of the Country’.92 The 
practical difficulties of this situation were illustrated by the strong dependence of 
Pitt’s second government on information received through the medium of the Irish 
chancellor of the exchequer and first lord of the treasury, John Foster. Hardwicke 
was enraged ‘that the Ministers in England are more willing to attend to the 
suggestions of assuming and interested Individuals respecting Ireland, than to the 
regular & legitimate authority to which the Government is confided’.93 His position 
was considerably weakened by the fact that although the British government was 
under no obligation to deal with Irish policy through him, he on the contrary was 
forced to reach the cabinet through official channels alone. 
The most serious example of miscommunication between London and Dublin 
occurred as the result of a dispute over the authority of the lord lieutenant and the 
Irish commander of the forces, appointed by and responsible to Horseguards in 
London. Inevitably, this caused problems because Hardwicke could not see how 
Horseguards could be capable of judging the military conditions in Ireland well 
enough to give prompt and appropriate orders. His fears about the division of 
military authority were confirmed by the circumstances surrounding the Emmett 
rebellion. The commander of the forces at the time, General Fox, seemed to have 
ignored signs of the imminent disturbance, and had kept the troops in their barracks 
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until the rebellion was well underway.94 ‘Not a man was sent out until half after 
Eleven when the whole was over,’ lamented Wickham.95 Fox became the scapegoat 
for the Irish government’s failure to deal with the rebellion effectively, and the affair 
brought to a head Hardwicke’s frustration about the arbitrary division of viceregal 
authority following the Union. 
Fox was forced to resign, but the situation only worsened when his 
replacement, Lord Cathcart, arrived in October 1803. His instructions, which 
confirmed that he was directly responsible to the commander in chief in Horseguards 
rather than to Hardwicke in Dublin, cut right to the heart of the problem — how to 
establish a centralised system in London without trespassing on the lord lieutenant’s 
ability to deal with special emergencies. ‘You will see at once that the Government 
of the country cannot be carried on at all unless it be distinctly understood where the 
supreme authority rests,’ Wickham informed Addington on Hardwicke’s behalf. He 
urged that it was vitally important that ‘the shew and semblance and the name of 
authority even in military matters should be entirely with’ Hardwicke, and that 
anything else would make the position of lord lieutenant impossible.96 When 
questioned, however, Addington remained firm in his insistence that the military and 
civilian parts of the Irish government ought to remain separate, related only in the 
same way that the king and the commander in chief were connected in Britain.97 This 
was not what Hardwicke wanted to hear, since this not only devalued his authority 
but failed to establish a back-up plan for situations in which there was no time to 
apply to London for orders. 
                                                 
94 Redesdale to Perceval, 16 August 1803, Gloucester RO, Redesdale MSS, D2002/3/1/20; Redesdale 
to Addington, 19 August 1803, Devon RO, Sidmouth MSS, 152M/C1803/83. Vaughan (ed), A New 
History of Ireland V, 15 agrees that Fox deserved most of the blame. 
95 Wickham to Addington, 12 August 1803, Hampshire RO, Wickham MSS, 38m49/1/45/27. 
96 Wickham to Addington, 25 December 1803, Hampshire RO, Wickham MSS, 38m49/1/48/6. 
Redesdale thought that if Cathcart attempted to implement the instructions he would ‘be guilty of 
High Treason’: Redesdale to Addington, 13 October 1803, Gloucester RO, Redesdale MSS, 
D2002/3/1/30. 
97 Addington to Redesdale, 23 October 1803, Gloucester RO, Redesdale MSS, D2002/3/1/17; Eldon 
to Redesdale, [1803], Gloucester RO, Redesdale MSS, D2002/3/1/23. 
 222 
These disputes over the lord lieutenant’s military and political authority 
pointed to a fundamental difference between London and Dublin in the interpretation 
of the lord lieutenant’s role in post-Union Irish politics. The problem was ideological 
as well as practical in scope since it demonstrated what the politicians in Ireland had 
long feared, that defence policy devised from a British point of view, for the whole 
of the United Kingdom, was unlikely to take Ireland’s special conditions into 
consideration. Clearly the two islands could not be governed in the same way. 
Whereas martial law was only applied in Britain as a last resource, for the last four or 
five years in Ireland it had been implemented at various times almost as a matter of 
course. Could Ireland, at almost constant risk of either rebellion or invasion, keep her 
military and civil governments apart in quite the same way as in Britain? The friction 
caused by the disputes over the role of the lord lieutenant was still present in 
November 1805 when Long reported that ‘passions’ were ‘so heated upon this and 
upon other points’ that it had deprived everyone of ‘all rational consideration of these 
Subjects’.98 It was difficult to avoid the conclusion that, as far as bureaucratic 
centralisation was concerned, the Anglo-Irish Union had caused more problems than 
it had solved. 
Ireland’s defence policy after the Union 
The Union was also unable to lay the basis for a United Kingdom-wide 
defence policy. This was ironic, since one of its justifications had been that it would 
allow a more efficient centralisation of the British and Irish defence efforts, but the 
circumstances were just not favourable for the experiment to be made. Many of the 
difficulties that had prevented the extension of British Acts to Ireland in the 1790s 
still existed after 1801. With the resumption of the threat of a French invasion after 
1803, Britain moved further and further towards an ‘armed nation’ with volunteers, 
the levy en masse, and various balloted defence bodies. Ireland, however, could not 
follow the same path, and continued to be defended primarily by a traditional 
combination of regular forces, Protestant Yeomanry and militia. Nor did the Union 
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provide more effectively for Ireland’s defence: the same problems that had existed in 
the 1790s, when British politicians had repeatedly drained her of her defence forces, 
returned tenfold once Napoleon lined the Channel ports with his Armée d’Angleterre. 
Once again, the British bias in policy-making skewed the balance of the defence 
effort against Ireland. 
A United Kingdom-wide militia force capable of serving anywhere in the 
British Isles was widely considered desirable to ensure that no part of it was left 
exposed to attack. Such a force would have particularly benefited Ireland, where the 
prevalence of domestic unrest tied down a large number of regulars. Given the Irish 
militia’s poor reputation, which was not improved by the Castlebar débacle of 1798, 
a joint force operating interchangeably could have improved the situation in Ireland, 
especially as her auxiliary force would have profited from being trained by British 
officers on British soil, away from local seditious influences. This would allow it to 
‘be of real service, in a military capacity’, while the British militia ‘would be a 
certain security for the defence of Ireland’.99 At a stroke, such a United Kingdom 
militia would have achieved three important goals: it would have provided a stronger 
defence for Ireland, both against invasion and internal insurrection; it would, as 
Colonel Craufurd argued, have rendered the Union of England, Scotland and Ireland 
‘more complete’; and it would have concentrated control of the militia force even 
more firmly in the hands of the central government.100 
Unfortunately such a ‘reciprocal’ militia service was not as easy to implement 
as some politicians had hoped. A precedent had been created by sending the British 
militia to defend Ireland in the wake of the 1798 rebellion, but this had required the 
passage of a parliamentary indemnity and had stirred up trouble between the 
government and the county lords lieutenant. Moreover, although an offer from the 
Irish militia in 1801 to serve reciprocally with its British counterpart suggested that 
the goal of a ‘Militia Force of the United Kingdom being liable to serve in all parts of 
it’ might soon be achieved, the peace of Amiens put an end to such hopes for the 
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foreseeable future.101 The government was, in any case, all too happy to shelve the 
idea of further militia reform. Local magnates had already been angered by 
Addington’s 1802 Militia Act, as a result of which too much change all at once was 
not considered wise. Writing from London, Wickham admitted ‘that the system of 
establishing a Militia common to both Countries is not one which Government dare 
to propose at the moment’.102 The time to form such a united force seemed to have 
passed with the peace, causing Colonel Craufurd to regret that it had not been made 
an automatic part of the Act of Union. In fact a militia that was automatically capable 
of serving anywhere in the United Kingdom was not established until 1811.103  By 
then, however, it had become clear that the concept of a United Kingdom-wide 
defence policy was little more than a pipe-dream. 
The reason for this was that the Union had not solved any of Ireland’s deep-
rooted social and sectarian problems. She was considered too Catholic to arm 
voluntarily and too volatile for the implementation of the ballot, and this 
automatically excluded the country from most British attempts to acquire a larger 
defence force after 1803. Irish compulsion was more or less abandoned once the 
initial operation of the militia ballot in May and June 1793 had provoked serious 
riots in Ulster, Roscommon, Leitrim, Wicklow, Mayo, and Sligo.104 Since then the 
government had proved remarkably reluctant to renew the experience. Fear of rioting 
was not, however, the only reason to avoid a ballot: many politicians also hesitated to 
arm and train men whose loyalty might be uncertain. By the time the Union came 
into effect, the foolishness of raising armed Irish bodies by any way other than 
voluntary recruitment had become part of accepted political wisdom. Redesdale 
warned Addington that ‘all balloting I believe to be, except in a very few districts, 
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unwise in this country’, and that the Irish were ‘used to have men raised by 
recruiting, & especially by Irish officers’.105 The ballot was consequently left out of 
Ireland’s 1802 Militia Act, which simply provided for voluntary enlistment by a 
bounty of two guineas per man.106 Most politicians would rather have had a small 
Irish defence force of impeccable loyalty than a large balloted body that incorporated 
disaffected elements and provoked countrywide rioting. 
This tendency to avoid compulsion in Ireland stood out all the more because 
British defence policy was moving closer to the idea of a largely balloted domestic 
defence force in which the militia played only a part. In Britain, the Levy en Masse, 
the Army of Reserve, Windham’s ‘trained peasantry’, and the Local Militia all relied 
on balloting. These Acts were, therefore, clearly inapplicable to Ireland, and separate 
ones were required to tailor the requirements of defence to Irish conditions. 
Compulsion played a much weaker role in the legislation passed for the sister island. 
The Irish Army of Reserve Act, for example, provided for the substitution of 
recruitment by bounty for the ballot in any areas where a General Meeting deemed it 
too dangerous. The immediate peril of a Napoleonic invasion precluded its complete 
disposal, but wholesale balloting was only to be resorted to if voluntary enlistment 
had failed to produce the quota of men within six weeks.107 Similarly, the Levy en 
Masse Act was not immediately extended to Ireland because arming her population 
indiscriminately was considered to be more ‘dangerous’ than in Britain.108 This 
impression was reinforced tenfold by the Emmett rebellion, which reminded 
politicians of the untrustworthiness of the Irish, particularly if they were Catholic. By 
1808 it had become normal to pass separate defence Acts that recognised Ireland’s 
social and political distinctness. Castlereagh preferred not to implement the Local 
Militia Act in Ireland in the first instance since ‘it is perhaps too hazardous either to 
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train or arm the people of Ireland indiscriminately’.109 The Irish Militia 
Consolidation Act of 1809 provided for a militia of roughly 24,000 men preferably 
recruited by voluntary enlistment, although the ballot was recognised as a last 
resort.110 Clearly, such paranoia about balloting and arming the Irish population set 
her defence movement a long way apart from its counterpart in Britain, where a large 
proportion of the male population bore arms, and talk of widespread military training 
was common. 
The Union did not, therefore, allow for Ireland’s full inclusion into a United 
Kingdom defence policy, any more than it stopped the habit of prioritising British 
defence interests that had caused so many problems in the 1790s. The government 
continued to take Ireland’s precious manpower away whenever Britain was directly 
threatened, even when the sister island was equally at risk. Castlereagh warned 
Wickham from England that he should ‘never cease pressing on all your Military 
Wants, as the reluctance to part with any thing from hence is strong in many 
Quarters’.111 It was Ireland’s particular misfortune that the aftermath of the Emmett 
rebellion in 1803 coincided with Britain’s biggest invasion scare since the late 1790s. 
When Hardwicke requested two regiments of reinforcements, Addington explained 
that his reluctance to comply stemmed from the fact that ‘England, & not Ireland 
may be reasonably supposed to be the Object of an Attack in Force’ from the 
French.112 In October Redesdale complained that, although a reinforcement of ten 
thousand men had been promised, only 1400 had been sent, while more than 1600 
had been taken away.113 England, he wrote regretfully to Addington, ‘seemed wholly 
occupied with her own safety’.114 The popularity of the Union had begun to suffer 
because Britain remained reluctant to help the weakest part of the United Kingdom 
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fight off either French invaders or domestic radicals. The most urgent defence 
problems that the measure had promised to address had been neglected. Nothing, it 
seemed, had changed, except that now Ireland was wholly rather than partially 
dependent on an uninterested Britain for her protection. 
After the 1803 rebellion, indeed, she seemed to revert to the patterns of 
domestic unrest that had characterised the 1790s. The Union had not removed the 
fear that Ireland provided a back door for a French assault on Britain. William Elliot 
feared that Emmett had shown that Ireland remained ‘more vulnerable than it has 
ever been’ in terms of ‘organised conspiracy’.115 Although the United Irishmen lost 
their connection with France with the rise of Napoleon, who was less well-disposed 
towards their republican views, this distinction became clear only with hindsight, and 
the British (and some Irish) continued to believe in a direct connection between 
French and Irish radicals.116 In February 1804, half a year after the rebellion, King’s 
and Queen’s counties were still reported as likely to rise in favour of an invasion.117 
A year later, the Times reported that the Brest fleet was due to sail to Ireland at the 
first notice of an insurrection.118 Whatever he felt about Irish republicanism it was 
not in Napoleon’s interests to deny the rumours, and in 1809 his declared intention to 
maintain communication with Ireland’s rebels provoked a call in Britain to renew the 
suspension of Habeas Corpus there.119 In late 1810 the fear that ‘a very general 
rising’ would coincide with a French invasion returned when new disturbances broke 
out in Tipperary, Waterford and County Down.120 By 1811 this unrest had subsided, 
but rumours that a French agent had visited Ireland, and that the Catholic Committee 
under John Keogh was in correspondence with the enemy, caused anxiety.121 ‘A 
rebellion, unconnected with any other circumstances, might be regarded as one of the 
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greatest calamities to the empire,’ Moira warned the prince regent, ‘but we know that 
it could not be unconnected; we know that Buonaparte would not let slip the moment 
of our embarrassment’.122  
Faced with this multitude of problems at a time when most attention was 
already distracted by political divisions in Westminster and the imminent prospect of 
a French assault, the reaction of the government was to return to the 1790s policy of 
repression. With only a brief respite under the Talents, Ireland was once again 
controlled by martial law and the suspension of Habeas Corpus. This return to the old 
policy which had so shocked the Pitt government in the 1790s was approved by 
Addington in a firm and uncompromising statement addressed to Redesdale: 
‘Weaken’d Authority & Danger are synonymous Terms particularly in Ireland’.123 
After many years of serious disturbances, even the political opposition began to view 
Ireland as a threat. By 1807 the Foxites were largely resigned to the fact that harsh 
measures were required to keep that country in check. Although Sheridan continued 
to oppose, Henry Grattan and Samuel Whitbread supported the Irish Insurrection Bill 
of 1807 on a temporary basis.124 In 1809 Grey wrote to Tierney on the Insurrection 
Acts, ‘I hate them as much as any body, but … after what passed in the last Session I 
could not vote for the repeal’.125 Even he had to admit that Ireland could not be 
governed in the same way as Britain. 
The popularity of the Union suffered greatly from these developments. Not 
only had the British government failed to plan an effective post-union structure for 
Ireland’s government, but the problems the Union had been meant to solve — dual 
responsibility for military and defence affairs, Ireland’s vulnerability to French 
assault, insurrection, and the search for a fairer balance of defence within the British 
Isles — remained as urgent after 1801 as before. The chaos that surrounded the 1803 
Emmett rebellion confirmed the impression that the Union, still in the throes of 
implementation, had done more harm than good. As Redesdale feared, many 
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Irishmen who had only been lukewarm friends of the Union were now turned firmly 
against it: ‘Since I have been in this country the Union has never been so unpopular, 
with thinking persons, as at this moment’.126 The return of martial law and other 
harsh measures marked an end to all hopes that Britain and Ireland could be 
governed in the same way. Ten years after its passage, the Union seemed to have 
changed very little about the way the United Kingdom was defended.  
Catholic Emancipation: a ‘real’ Union 
Ireland’s full integration into the British political, civil and defensive policy 
continued to be held at arm’s length, partly for practical reasons, but also because of 
a reluctance to grapple with the deeper issues that underscored Irish disaffection. Her 
Catholicism, in particular, brought issues to the fore that most British politicians 
would rather have left alone. Catholic Emancipation had the potential both to 
mitigate some of the deeper social problems at the root of Irish disaffection, and to 
solve the broader manpower shortage faced by the government, but full integration of 
Catholic Ireland would obviously be difficult at a time when many considered 
toleration to be the most that ought to be given to anyone not a member of the 
Established Church. 
The British fear of Catholics as the natural enemies of the Protestant 
constitution, which had been a primary feature of political life since the fall of James 
II in 1688, seemed less pressing after the collapse of the House of Bourbon. Many, 
including Pitt, felt that the religious threat to the British establishment was negligible 
when compared to the much more relevant problems posed by atheist Jacobinism and 
Napoleonic expansion. ‘Mr. Pitt seems to think the Christian religion more in danger 
than the overthrow of Protestantism by Popery,’ reported Glenbervie in 1794.127 
Surely now, when all of Europe, Catholic and Protestant, were united against the 
French republican menace, was the best time to make common cause with the 
Catholics for the sake of national unity. This attitude opened up several new 
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possibilities for placating Ireland.128 The granting of full citizenship to Catholics, 
both British and Irish, would not only help ensure their support of the status quo, but 
would also encourage a flood of Army recruits to join from Ireland. Emancipation 
would have the further advantage of settling the hearts and minds of the Irish 
Catholic majority. 
The connections between Catholic Emancipation and the special needs of war 
were clear from the start. The declaration of war with France in 1793 coincided with 
the passage of the Catholic Relief Act, which provided for a limited restoration of 
Irish Catholic liberties. Catholics could now sit on juries, attend university, serve as 
magistrates, vote at the county level and in some boroughs, and serve in the armed 
forces up to the rank of colonel, although this only applied to Ireland.129 Further 
concessions were usually mooted at times when Britain experienced prolonged 
continental isolation. Fitzwilliam’s viceroyalty in 1795 coincided with the start of the 
collapse of the First Coalition, which boosted his desire to do something definitive 
for the Irish Catholics. He had only become lord lieutenant owing to the coalition 
between Pitt and Portland in 1794, and he was recalled in disgrace three months later 
after having flouted official orders by his public support for Emancipation. Despite 
the disapproval of his Portlandite colleagues and Pitt’s well-publicised fury, 
Fitzwilliam defended his actions as the necessary foundation for unity in the face of a 
heightened French threat: ‘Any distinction or difference that is suffered to exist, will 
not be simply the cause of disaffection & jealousy to the Catholics but it will 
continue to be what is ten times more mischievous, a cloak to the machinations of a 
very different nature’.130 He was not alone in remarking on the possible benefits of 
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Catholic Emancipation at a time of national isolation. The issue returned to the 
political agenda in 1801 and 1807 under very similar continental conditions. 
One of the major problems with it, however, was that many politicians 
viewed it as an ideological assault on the establishment. This made it difficult for 
politicians like Fitzwilliam, and, later, Pitt himself, to get a fair hearing when they 
urged the practical benefits of such a policy. By his own admission, Pitt ‘had never 
been a violent’ friend to the Test Act, and his devotion to anti-Catholic legislation 
was limited by the circumstances of the aftermath of the Union, and the collapse of 
the Second Coalition on the continent.131 He was more convinced of the danger of 
Jacobinism than Catholicism, and was ready to allow non-Anglicans full citizenship 
because what had previously been a Catholic majority in Ireland was now a Catholic 
minority in the United Kingdom.132 He saw no danger in replacing the sacramental 
oath with ‘a political test … distinctly levelled against Jacobin principles’, and which 
would ‘contain an oath of allegiance & fidelity to the King’s Government of the 
Realm, and to the established Constitution both in Church & State’.133 He laid the 
stress firmly on the advantages of Emancipation in a secular, non-ideological 
sense.134 Of course, this meant Pitt was happy to abandon his support of the issue if 
its practical benefits were blunted by strong opposition. As Patrick Geoghegan 
argues, when he saw that the furore over Emancipation prejudiced the Union and 
divided the political world, he dropped it.135 In his only real public statements on the 
subject in March 1801 and May 1805, he expressed himself in favour of 
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Emancipation under certain conditions, but judged that there was ‘little chance, I 
should rather say I see no chance’, of it succeeding.136  
To Pitt, the transformation of Emancipation into an ideological issue had 
robbed it of its effectiveness. Nor was he alone in that conclusion. His growing 
lukewarmness was an indication of the way the political pendulum had swung. After 
his fall, few succeeding governments were willing to stake their reputation on such a 
difficult question. Distracted by the war effort and increasing internal weakness, they 
were more likely to adopt the easier route of embracing the Protestant interest at 
home and in Ireland than to face the ideological pitfalls of Catholic Emancipation. 
Both the Addington and second Pitt governments adopted this strategy, and ensured 
that Emancipation became an even more unlikely event. The last outright attempt to 
deal sympathetically with the Catholic problem prior to the end of the war was in 
1807, when the heightened defence threat after the defeat of the Third Coalition 
increased the Talents’ desire to grapple with it. 
The Talents’ attitude to Catholic relief had a strongly practical spin dictated 
by its political and military requirements. It took the opportunity of the need to 
forestall a new Irish Catholic petition in 1807 to turn the question to its advantage. 
Tithe and clergy reform, extra money for the government-funded college at 
Maynooth, and a government provision for the Catholic clergy, were proposed as 
concessions to the religious grievances.137 At the same time, the government 
proposed to remove all those remaining restrictions on Catholics in the Army and 
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Navy that had not been removed by the Catholic Relief Act of 1793. The proposed 
measure would have permitted all Catholics to serve in any rank, the benefits of 
which were obvious. It was a natural sequel to the Union, which had ‘imposed … the 
duty’ of fostering ‘a resolution to defend the country against all its enemies’ on all 
inhabitants of the United Kingdom. Emancipation was therefore justified ‘by every 
principle of self-defence’, since unity was called for in the face of imminent 
invasion.138 In addition, the Talents wanted to tap Ireland’s full, unexplored potential 
as a recruiting ground.139 A large number of volunteers might be procured for the 
Army who would otherwise have been reluctant to serve because of the restrictions 
on religious worship or promotion. As Fox noted, a conciliated Ireland ‘would 
present a nursery of brave and excellent soldiers’.140 Moira speculated that an 
unfettered Ireland might provide 100,000 recruits — forces that were now urgently 
needed.141 If ‘the superabundant population of Ireland’ could be coaxed ‘to enter into 
the army and navy’, then the twin problems of overcrowding and low manpower 
would be solved at a stroke.142 
Unfortunately for the Talents, this sensible proposal only politicised the 
Catholic question further. The idea of permitting Catholics closer involvement in the 
armed forces, and by extension in the United Kingdom at large, was swallowed up 
by the controversy over whether or not the king had been justified in demanding a 
pledge from his ministers against reintroducing the subject of Emancipation.143 A 
combination of royal disapproval and backstabbing within the cabinet caused the 
ministry to fall. Thereafter, Emancipation was too strongly connected with the Whig 
opposition to be considered acceptable, even if the political atmosphere had been 
more favourable to it to begin with. This politicisation harnessed the Catholic issue 
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to a party platform, a fact that was reinforced by Grenville and Grey’s refusal to take 
office without it, and by the general election of 1807, in which opposition to 
‘Popery’ became the rallying-cry for supporters of Portland’s new government. From 
1807 onwards the ideological aspect of Catholic Emancipation emerged uppermost. 
Catholicism’s reputation in any case suffered from rumours, however 
unfounded, that it had been prominently involved in the rebellions of 1798 and 
1803.144 Redesdale constantly filled his letters to high political figures in Britain with 
warnings that the Irish Catholics were not to be trusted.145 Addington was told in 
1803 that the priests ‘are continually exasperating them against the Protestants’ and 
that ‘R[oma]n Catholic Ireland will never form part of the British Empire’.146 
Redesdale, and others, believed that the Irish Catholic would never naturally owe his 
first loyalty to the king. Only the pope could be certain of the Catholic’s goodwill, 
and, once Napoleon had signed the Concordat of Bologna with the Vatican, all 
Catholics were potentially connected directly with the Imperial Court in Paris.147 To 
many, therefore, the Catholics were more than ever a threat to the British 
establishment, in which case the Union could be welcomed as a way to block them 
from participation for good.  
The extent of this prejudice was too great for a series of weak governments. 
Any ambitious politician had to bear in mind the rooted resistance of the king and the 
prince regent to any attempt to water down the Protestant establishment. Inevitably, 
more immediate problems took precedence. Ireland was never squarely at the centre 
of the political horizon, which was more likely to be dominated by the course of the 
war abroad, the prospect of imminent invasion, and the likelihood of a radical rising 
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at home. Most of the early advocates of Emancipation ended up admitting that the 
time was not yet ripe for the measure. Both Pitt and Castlereagh justified their later 
opposition to it on those grounds.148 By 1810 even Grenville’s ardour had cooled, 
and though he continued to stand by Grey in public on the issue, he took the 
opportunity of his candidacy for the Chancellorship of Oxford University to publish 
a letter to the leading Catholic advocate, Lord Fingall, in which he distanced himself 
from it, and declared that the time was currently inauspicious.149 Ultimately, the fact 
that the Anglo-Irish Union was enacted from a British perspective ensured that 
British political considerations won out. As with everything else involving the 
Union, Emancipation would only be granted when the British, rather than the Irish, 
politicians saw fit. 
Conclusion 
The thinking behind the Anglo-Irish Union, its aftermath, its advantages, and 
its failures, all illustrated the broader British defence effort remarkably well. 
Ireland’s fate was tied inextricably to that of its sister island and, as such, it made 
sense for the British Isles to consolidate their resources as much as possible. 
However, the attempt to simplify the complicated relationship that had long existed 
between British and Irish executives led to a situation in which decisions were made 
by men who were too far from Ireland to judge her situation adequately. Like the 
attempts to centralise the British defence effort, the Union with Ireland was broad-
ranging and highly ambitious, but was held back by bureaucratic confusion, deep-
rooted conservatism, and a lack of long-term planning. The anticipated beneficial 
effects of the measure were swamped by political weakness, and by the 
government’s inability to maintain control. By 1810, the conviction that Ireland 
could only be effectively ruled by the sword was shared even by many who had 
previously denied it. Across St. George’s Channel, as in Britain, radicalism and 
social unrest gradually became a more immediate problem than the prospect of a 
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French invasion. The danger to the status quo from within now looked more pressing 
than the danger from without. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has shown that the British government’s response to the prospect 
of French invasion was to try to consolidate its military and civil authority as much 
as possible. Despite a widely held prejudice against central control, the scale of the 
emergency convinced many politicians to put aside their scruples and to legislate for 
a greater degree of state involvement at all levels of the defence process. They were 
not motivated by any startlingly new vision of the relationship between governors 
and governed, since the aim was to strengthen rather than destroy the nation’s 
hierarchical bonds, but nevertheless it had important implications for the nation's 
sense of identity. An increased emphasis on military rather than naval defence meant 
greater attention to the performance of the regular armies, while at the same time it is 
clear from parliamentary debates that the militia decreased in importance in political 
circles. These changes set in slowly during the 1790s, and only really took hold when 
the longevity of the war, poor international relations, and domestic troubles 
combined to create an impression of permanence after 1798. Thereafter politicians 
laid their plans more confidently, and intended them to have a long-term effect. One 
question, however, remains to be considered briefly, and that is whether  the crisis 
left any permanent changes in the way that state and nation interacted.  
Given the history of the peacetime years from 1815 to 1848, the answer has 
to be ‘no’. Whatever went on between 1793 and 1815, there is little to contradict the 
assertions of Black, Langford, Clark, Cookson, and others that the postwar political 
system was no more centralised in practice than its prewar counterpart. Despite an 
occasional return to a 1790s style of government (for example the suspension of 
Habeas Corpus in 1817 and the passage of the Six Acts in 1819), the pattern of 
postwar political life bore few scars from the heightened centralisation that had 
preceded it. Why this should have been the case requires some explanation. Part of 
the answer may lie in the circumstances in which the war ended. As has already been 
noted, successful British continental offensives, particularly in the Peninsula from 
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about 1810 or 1811 onwards, helped to strike national defence off the political 
agenda. Even though Napoleon continued to threaten an invasion until shortly before 
he left for Moscow in 1812, defeat in Russia, the creation of a new continental 
coalition, and finally the re-establishment of the Bourbon monarchy in 1814-5, all 
put an end to the threat, and likewise to any need for the strong measures that had 
been passed with a revolutionary or Napoleonic France in mind.150 
This alone, however, cannot explain why there was such a complete change 
of heart in politicians who had previously insisted on the prudence of maintaining 
wartime attitudes in peace. The restoration of the French monarchy, which had yet to 
prove that it had learned any lessons from the past twenty-five years, should not have 
been enough to persuade these men to overturn the defence system they had been 
painstakingly constructing since the mid-1790s. Prior to and even more significant 
than the arrival of peace was the collapse of the government’s authority at home, 
thanks to internal weakness and a number of domestic political crises — the 
Convention of Cintra, Walcheren, the duke of York and Mrs. Clarke. This happened 
just at the point when Britain finally managed to achieve some successful continental 
offensives. The victory at Talavera in 1809 was the first of several in the Peninsula, a 
campaign which led to the invasion of France through Spain and the eventual 
reopening of diplomatic relations between Britain and the continental powers. 
Without this improvement in the international situation, the government’s critics 
might have been more restrained in their political attacks. 
The most vociferous of those critics were the parliamentary radicals, the 
revival of whose agenda in 1807-8 had marked the beginning of the end of Britain’s 
centralising experiment. The radicals castigated the degree of centralisation that had 
taken place since 1793, and one the aims of their proposals for parliamentary reform 
was to correct the resulting imbalance of power between state and locality.151 Even 
more ominously, the rise to prominence of Sir Francis Burdett, Lord Cochrane, and 
other independent radicals who enjoyed widespread national popularity, was 
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particularly worrying for ministers because it suggested that the political initiative 
was passing to extra-parliamentary bodies. The formation of the Friends and 
Advocates of Parliamentary Reform in May 1809, which included Burdett, 
Cochrane, Colonel Wardle, and other notorious radicals among its members, created 
a situation that was alarmingly reminiscent of the early 1780s, when a countrywide 
reform network had virtually dictated domestic policy to the government. For a while 
the government was able to stave off short-term demands for reform by taking the 
initiative out of the hands of the local pressure groups. When the county MP John 
Christian Curwen brought forward a mild measure to combat electoral corruption in 
1809, ministers took the bill out of his hands and amended it beyond recognition.152 
However, such a tactic could not conceal the fact that the radical programme was 
undermining a crucial element in successive governments’ assumptions about society 
and politics, upon which the defence systems of the 1790s and 1800s had been built. 
The radical revival confirmed once and for all that governments could no longer 
boast about the smooth workings of the social hierarchy. 
By 1810, therefore, ministers had already begun to lose their hold over the 
national mind. How strong this hold had ever been is, in any case, debatable. British 
society betrayed few signs that any of the political rhetoric about militarism had 
taken root outside parliamentary circles. Although the volunteer movement would 
never have succeeded as well as it did without widespread national participation, its 
peak membership of 400,000 men occurred over a very brief period in 1803-4 and 
declined rapidly thereafter. As A.D. Harvey notes, ‘the majority of British people 
experienced the war as an audience, not as participants’.153 And however loudly 
some politicians might have been arguing about the need to foster a martial spirit in 
the people, the fact remains that the literature of the period suggests a lack of general 
interest in military life. Jane Austen’s works, for example, do not give the impression 
that ordinary Britons were over-concerned about the war, and the occasional 
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appearance in her novels of militiamen and naval officers is of romantic significance 
only. All too often former officers on half pay and pensions were represented in 
fiction as footloose and downwardly mobile social misfits. One is therefore forced to 
conclude that, without an external threat to necessitate the bearing of arms, there was 
no widespread interest in maintaining Britain's newly-won identity as a military 
nation. 
As time went on, indeed, British politics became even less centralised, and 
her identity even less militaristic. Whatever central control the executive had 
acquired in wartime seemed to have been lost for ever with the repeal of the Test and 
Corporation Acts in 1828, Catholic Emancipation in 1829, and the Reform Act of 
1832. All three measures helped to create a much larger and more diverse political 
nation in which the old ideal of a strong, aristocratic government had little place.154 If 
the fiscal-military centralisation survived at all it was in the colonies, where — as 
C.A. Bayly argues — many former soldiers and displaced aristocrats attempted to 
build a more centralised, authoritarian imperialism.155 At home, however, the trend 
was moving in the opposite direction. Compared to the rest of the world, Britain in 
the 1820s and 1830s was remarkable for its lack of enthusiasm for all things military. 
Pacifism was a very widely adopted political position, especially among 
nonconformists — the main political beneficiaries of the legislation just referred 
to.156  Parliamentary radicals like Richard Cobden and John Bright vehemently 
opposed high military expenditure and strong central government alike. At the same 
time the profile of the military, which had risen during the war, fell back again. Scott 
Myerly points out that the army had become little more than a ‘spectacle’ designed to 
provoke feelings of patriotism in the nation.157 The return home of the demobilised 
soldiers, who were unemployable because of their lack of training for anything other 
than a military life, was an additional and unpleasant reminder of the social problems 
that came with having too large an army. Britain’s neglect of these veterans strongly 
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suggested that neither Windham nor Castlereagh had managed to achieve their goal 
of overcoming national distaste for the military profession. Indeed it was the navy, 
rather than the army, which triumphed as an international symbol of Britishness in 
the postwar years. Men like Nelson were acclaimed as heroes, whereas Wellington’s 
entry into politics made him an extremely unpopular, and even hated, public figure. 
It should in any case not be forgotten that, although this thesis has focused on 
the case for centralisation and an increase in military might, there were many 
politicians who never subscribed to such a view. Some expressed more support for a 
colonial, naval, and global vision of Britain’s role in the world, and in many ways it 
was this alternative vision that triumphed in the postwar years. As Chapter Three 
argues, Dundas and a number of other statesmen felt that it was still possible for 
Britain to develop both its military and naval capabilities, both its agrarian and 
commercial resources.158 To them, no hard choices had to be made, and therefore 
increasing Britain’s military potential could do no harm. By 1810, however, around 
the time of the Spence-Mill debate as to whether Britain should develop in an 
agrarian (physiocratic) or a commercial direction, a younger generation of politicians 
was becoming less comfortable with the idea of allowing defence to dictate Britain’s 
new identity.159 One rising star in the political world, George Canning, was 
particularly impatient with the insular, inward-looking policies proposed by his 
contemporaries.160 When pushed to support a party line his views on defence were 
unremarkable, and he was clearly much more excited by the political ‘opportunity’ 
offered by opposition to the Training Act than he was by the issue itself.161 Perhaps 
Canning’s lack of interest stemmed from his vision of Britain as a proud moral 
power, justified (even compelled) by this circumstance to exert herself in global 
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affairs.162 Far from endorsing the self-sufficient and, above all, military vision 
emerging from defence policy, Canning was much more sympathetic to the 
cosmopolitan, commercial and industrial attitude that characterised postwar Britain. 
His prominent role in post-war politics accordingly reflects the weakness of 
militarism’s long-term hold over the national psyche. 
Clearly the experiment of a much more centralised and martial Britain, 
planned to counterbalance excessive French military power, was only transient. 
Nevertheless, despite the preference expressed for weak central government after 
1815, and the almost obsessive localism of propagandists like Toulmin Smith, there 
continued to be occasional increases in the authority of the state. These were deeply 
reluctant responses by politicians to an internal, rather than an external, threat — the 
domestic unrest that arose from continuing industrialisation, and the poverty, hunger, 
and disease that came from postwar depression and urban sprawl. The result was a 
series of practical moves towards centralisation, approached in a roundabout way by 
men who often professed to dislike what they were doing.163 Yet it would be wrong 
to say that the strengthening of the state through health legislation, the establishment 
of police forces, and the passage of Poor Law reform reflected a completely new 
tendency in British political debate. The latter, in particular, was reminiscent of Pitt 
and Whitbread’s earlier proposals to take poor relief out of the hands of the local 
magistrates and place it under the remit of a central commission. In some ways the 
centralising trends of the 1830s and 1840s were unsurprising. As Peter Mandler 
points out, Grey and his followers may have deliberately intended the 1832 Reform 
Act to ‘strengthen the hands of the Executive’ by a form of ‘responsible aristocracy’, 
which would restore trust in a parliament governing with the support of a broader 
cross-section of the nation.164 Few of the politicians responsible for the Act would 
have interpreted their actions as closing the door for good on the old system, and 
developments in the two following decades may simply have reflected this fact. 
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Without an external threat to act as a catalyst, however, such processes were 
much less strongly driven than they had once been. The lack of interest in 
maintaining the changes recommended by wartime politicians has in fact led some 
historians, such as Edgar Feuchtwanger and William Philpott, to conclude that there 
was an ‘absence of any central machinery for making defence policy’ in the mid-
nineteenth century.165 However, this is surely an exaggeration since, as this thesis has 
argued, the prolonged defensive warfare of the 1790s and 1800s had created just 
such a machinery. It is therefore particularly interesting to note that, when a 
sustained external threat returned in the early 1850s, mid-Victorian politicians 
immediately reverted to the precedents set by their Georgian counterparts.  
During the course of the 1850s and 1860s, the British once more began to 
fear the possibility of a French assault on their soil. The danger had been mounting 
since the late 1840s, but Napoleon III’s seizure of something approaching absolute 
power in 1851 brought the anxiety to a head. When he attacked Austria during the 
war of Italian unification, British observers no longer doubted the similarities 
between uncle and nephew. Men who had experienced the war against the first 
Napoleon found the new situation particularly disturbing. To Palmerston, who had 
been Secretary at War from 1809 to 1827, Napoleon III’s entire raison-d’etre was to 
exact revenge on his uncle’s behalf: ‘his formerly declared intention of avenging 
Waterloo has only lain dormant and has not died away’.166 Although Napoleon III 
was accepted as an ally against Russia in the Crimean War, it was felt that his 
greatest ambition was to accomplish what his predecessor had never managed: the 
invasion and subjugation of the British Isles. The opinion that ‘every Frenchman 
living dreamt both by day and by night of humiliating’ Britain remained prevalent.167 
By the end of the 1850s, both politicians and people were once again agreed that 
France presented an immediate danger. ‘[An] attitude of armed watchfulness should 
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be the only one possible for prudent states,’ advocated the Saturday Review in 
1859.168 
As a result of the experience of the war with the first Napoleon, the 
government had a broad range of defence Acts at its disposal, and indeed many of 
the measures of the 1850s followed a line of thought that Castlereagh, Dundas and 
Windham would have approved. The 1852 militia bill, for example, owed more of a 
debt to Castlereagh’s Local Militia than to the original militia system of the 1750s. 
Even more obviously, the government again made a call for volunteers under the 
terms of Addington’s 1804 Volunteer Consolidation Act. The Victorian ministries 
did not, however, limit themselves to drawing inspiration from the measures their 
predecessors had enacted. Many of the attitudes towards the regular army that had 
been absent over the intervening years of peace now returned. This was in part 
because the Navy had become even more overstretched in the post-1815 world than 
it had been previously. Disturbances in the Near East and India, and a border dispute 
with America over Canada and the West Indies, all emphasised the need for constant 
vigilance. Fears were expressed that Britain’s fleet was falling behind that of France 
in size and technological development. By 1859 France had her first ironclad, La 
Gloire, and was fast developing the use of steam power. Clearly, a ‘blind and entire 
reliance on the Channel and our navy’ was as perilous in the 1850s as it had been 
half a century earlier.169 The solution to the problem was the same as that which had 
been advocated by Windham, Castlereagh, and many others: the need for more 
manpower. ‘What we most want and what we grievously do want is men’, 
Palmerston was told as early as 1846.170 At one stage between 1857 and 1858 there 
were only 14 battalions of regulars left in Britain, most of the others having been sent 
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to deal with the Indian Mutiny. Politicians now became aware of the need to reverse 
the process of stagnation that had been affecting the army since 1815. The Derby 
government was informed in 1858 that of the 153,285 regulars available to Britain, 
only 42,000 of them were fit for duty. Some military men estimated that it would 
take up to six months to train any new regular recruits to face an invasion or similar 
emergency.171 
The manpower shortage once again provoked recognition of the need to 
increase the nation’s familiarity with, and fondness for, military life. This factor 
became even more important later in the century, with the rise of Prussia’s influence 
in continental affairs. To avoid lagging behind European military development, the 
Victorians emphasised the need to raise the moral and physical quality of the troops 
they recruited.172 They recognised that a citizen who had been exposed to military 
imagery and activity virtually from birth was more likely to become reconciled to the 
idea of the Army as a suitable profession. Accordingly, military hymn-singing and 
discipline were drummed into children from an early age in much the same way as 
Dundas, Windham and others had recommended national service a generation or two 
previously. As in 1798 and 1803, volunteering opened up the life of a soldier to a 
whole new national audience. Finally, the experience of the Crimea also allowed for 
the ‘Christianisation’ of the soldier and a corresponding militarisation of Christian 
groups at home (for example the Salvation Army), all of which raised the Army’s 
profile even further.173 
What is particularly interesting about these developments is that governments 
were much less afraid to go further than their predecessors in many areas of defence 
policy. No doubt the creeping centralisation on social policy that had taken place 
since 1832 made life easier for them, but it is equally clear that the politicians of the 
Victorian period had learned several lessons from the large, sprawling, locality-based 
volunteer movement of the Napoleonic era. Windham would have been delighted to 
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see mid-to-later nineteenth-century governments relying more on a centrally-
controlled militia than on the volunteers, which remained limited in size and local in 
emphasis. Not even Windham, however, would have dared do what the Cardwell 
Reforms did in 1870, which was to tie the organisation and training of the volunteer 
force more closely to that of the regular army. From that moment onwards the 
independent nature of the volunteers was lost, and they became much more 
obviously military in complexion. They were later made subject to the Mutiny Act 
and by 1872 had become a reserve rather than an auxiliary force.174  
These were unpopular moves, but they were the logical development of ideas 
that had been forming in the minds of the politicians between 1794 and 1812. 
However, there was one crucial difference between the two periods, and this 
difference made the process of militarisation much easier than had been the case 
before 1815. By the second half of the nineteenth century there was a much more 
cavalier attitude towards the social networks that had been so important to politicians 
during the war against the first Napoleon. Of course this change was slow in gaining 
ground, and many older politicians still viewed the volunteers as a gauge of national 
loyalty in much the same light as, say, Pitt had done. Palmerston, in particular, was 
keen to emphasise that if the volunteer units did have to exist, then they ought to 
mirror traditional social hierarchies and emphasise the connections binding the 
people to the aristocracy.175 Likewise conservative commentators longed for the 
somewhat romanticised days when everyone had known and cherished his place in 
the order of things. Sir George Tomkyns Chesney, author of The Battle of Dorking, 
published in 1871, partly ascribed the success of a fictional invasion of Britain to this 
lack of social harmony: 
Power was then passing away from the class which had been used to 
rule, and to face political dangers, and which had brought the nation 
with honour unsullied through former struggles, into the hands of the 
lower classes, uneducated, untrained to the use of political rights, and 
swayed by demagogues … The rich were idle and luxurious; the poor 
                                                 
174 Cunningham, The Volunteer Force, pp. 14-5, 153-5; Beckett, Riflemen Form, pp. 10, 12-3, 130-
1260; Salevouris, Riflemen Form, pp. 130-1. 
175 Ridley, Lord Palmerston, p. 665. 
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grudged the cost of defence. Politics became a mere bidding for 
Radical votes, and those who should have led the nation stooped 
rather to pander to the selfishness of the day, and humoured the 
popular cry which denounced those who would secure the defence of 
the nation by enforcing arming of its manhood, as interfering with the 
liberties of the people.176 
 
To Chesney, all preparations against an invasion were futile in the absence of the 
social networks that had previously united government and people in the defence 
effort. ‘Truly,’ he concluded ruefully, without them the ‘nation was ripe for a fall’. 
The fact was, however, that for all Chesney’s railing, since 1832 such paternalist 
conceptions of the state had gone into in decline. 
This thesis has argued that the debate over national defence at the turn of the 
nineteenth century shows three things. Firstly, the eighteenth-century British political 
system was capable of a degree of centralisation that allowed the executive 
government to play a much stronger role in the defence process than many historians 
have supposed. Contrary to the opinions of Cookson, Colley, Langford, and Clark, 
who are united in their depiction of eighteenth-century Britain as a deeply traditional, 
decentralised society, the government tried to strengthen, and to a considerable 
extent did strengthen, its central position through a combination of defence 
legislation and increased national participation. Declarations of mutual trust between 
governors and governed underpinned this official vision of the status quo, and most 
of the defence measures passed after 1798 emphasised the primacy of the executive. 
At the same time, developments in the gathering of intelligence, and practical 
attempts to restructure the upper levels of government, made this concentration of 
authority easier to implement. The result was not an overt change of direction 
towards nineteenth-century bureaucracy, but a more subtle development of existing 
trends galvanised by the needs of war on the model of Brewer’s fiscal-military state. 
Secondly, the fact that the war against France was largely defensive affected 
the political portrayal of the nation. Since the war appeared likely to last for many 
years in a state of deadlock, Britain had to adapt to the likelihood of a long-term 
                                                 
176 Chesney, The Battle of Dorking, pp. 47-8. 
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threat to her security. Too much constitutional change was obviously to be avoided, 
but as the danger mounted politicians became less and less afraid to face up to the 
need for serious developments with determination. The most obvious sign of this 
hardened attitude was the creation in 1801 of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, and the subsequent, not always successful, attempts to seek a united 
defence policy for the British Isles as a whole. Less obvious but nevertheless 
important changes included the extent to which the threat of invasion altered the 
balance in defence priorities between the Navy and the Army, and between 
volunteering and compulsion. The growth of the professional soldier, and the 
increasing distinction between soldier and citizen, contributed to the unlinking of 
political participation from the issue of national defence. What emerged from this 
redefinition of identity and terminology was a picture of Britain as a united state, 
capable of a strong, focused, and national response to French encroachments. 
The problem was that this picture was idealistic and did not reflect political 
reality. The third point of this thesis has been to argue that defensive war rested 
overmuch on the maintenance of national morale and trust in the government, and 
that these commodities declined as the war dragged on. Disillusionment in a long, 
defensive war, near-bankruptcy, depressions, and famines, all took their toll on the 
relationship between the nation and the executive. At the same time, the governments 
themselves lost credibility as they became weaker and weaker in the parliamentary 
lobbies. By 1804 governments had come to rely on defence measures to acquire 
legitimacy; by 1809, they were hardly even given a chance to pass any measures at 
all. Such instability was increased even further by the return of political radicalism, 
which took the spotlight off the defence effort and forced weakened governments 
simply to fight for their lives. After the tide began to turn against Napoleon on the 
continent between 1809 and 1812, defence disappeared almost entirely off the 
agenda, and did not reappear again until the threat of a French invasion returned in 
the 1850s and 1860s. By then, however, the political milieu in which Pitt, Addington, 
Grenville, Portland, Perceval, and Liverpool had legislated was fast disappearing. 
The decrease in the importance of the volunteers, the rise in militarism and the 
 249 
further development of bureaucratic government, all moved Britain’s military and 
political mind closer to conscription, the one expedient no eighteenth-century 
politician had wanted to implement. The loss of the social network, relying upon 
which had been vital to make previous initiatives towards centralisation more 
tolerable to the eighteenth-century political mind, made the acquisition of further 
control much easier, but it also undid much of what politicians such as Pitt, 
Addington and Windham had wanted to do. It is ironic, therefore, that their plans 
could only truly succeed after the removal of the one factor they had considered to be 
so important. 
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Appendix I 
British Regular and Auxiliary Forces 1793-1814 
 
Date Army 
(global) 
Militia Volunteers Army of 
Reserve 
Additional 
Force 
Local Militia 
1793 
(peace) 
47,3951      
1794 105,0542 32,0003     
1795 151,1444 39,7155     
1796 164,0846      
1797   18,0007    
1798 161,2608 76,3979 116,00010    
1799 148,22211 72,94612     
1800 135,93213 68,00014 144,80015    
1801 149,40316 60,63117 146,00018    
1802  167,82319 72,86920     
1803 
(peace) 
95,37521      
1803 
(war) 
101,79122 63,04723 335,10924 34,33625   
1804 134,89926 85,51927 324,56828 38,70829 561730  
1805 145,01331 89,80932 360,81433  828834  
1806 165,57335 74,65336 308,97337  23,72038  
1807 196,08139 76,15940 295,16041    
1808 222,87642 67,67743     
1809 219,87444 65,52445    195,16146 
1810 262,69747 46,36448     
1811       
1812 272,44649 103,00050 68,64351   240,00052 
1813 314,53153 93,41054    193,91255 
1814 209,15856      
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Appendix II 
Defence and Recruitment Acts 1794-1813 
 
DATE ACT DETAILS 
April 1794 Volunteer Act Government calls for volunteers to be kept up by local 
subscription and under local control. Pitt describes their 
purpose as ‘to preserve internal tranquillity’ in case of 
invasion.57 
March/April 
1795 
Quota Acts Set district quota on parishes to recruit men for Navy (in 
addition to impressment). Scotland receives separate Act. 
Another Quota Act passed October 1796 to provide 15,000 
seamen against invasion.58 
March 1796 Irish 
Insurrection 
Act 
Provides for the disarming of Ireland in districts proclaimed 
to be in a state of rebellion. Arms to be registered or 
confiscated. Magistrates can impose a curfew between sunset 
and sunrise, conduct searches, break up suspected meetings. 
Also provides for suspects to be tried under martial law 
without suspending regular judicial operations.59 
1796 Supplementary 
Militia 
Provides for an additional 60,000 militiamen to be raised by 
ballot. Extra men not to be embodied immediately, but 
trained 20 days a year by rotation.60 
July 1797 Scottish Militia 
Act 
Introduces the militia ballot to Scotland, though ballot 
dispensed with where men volunteer in sufficient numbers. 
Lord Grenville describes it as an ‘experiment’. A number of 
militia riots result over the summer.61 
April 1798 Defence Act Government undertakes a mini-census of the nation's 
population and resources.62 
1798 Provisional 
Cavalry 
One man and one horse levied for every ten horses kept by 
gentlemen. Only six regiments Actually embodied, and 
mostly absorbed into yeomanry by 1800.63 
1798 Government 
Circular 
Calls for more volunteers. 
1798 Militia Draft 10,000 men proposed to be drafted from militia into Army, 
but this fails.64 
March 1799 Suppression of 
Rebellion Act 
Following the 1798 rebellion in Ireland. Allows Irish 
Executive to take emergency measures without consulting 
British parliament first. Extends Irish Insurrection Act. 
Lapses with peace in 1802, but renewed July 1803 for six 
months following Emmett's rebellion.65 
1799 Militia Draft About 10,500 militiamen volunteer into line to serve in 
Holland.66 
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DATE ACT DETAILS 
June 1802 Militia Act Restructures the militia. Provides for 50,000 ‘Old’ militia to 
be called out in case of war, and a further 25,000 
‘Supplementary’ militia in an emergency (75,000 total, 
including 15,000 from Scotland). Men aged 18 to 45 to be 
balloted on county quota system. Substitution permitted, 
Militiamen serve five years and forbidden to enlist in 
regulars.67 
June 1803 Government 
Circular 
Renews call for volunteers. 
June 1803 General 
Defence Act 
Similar to 1798 Defence Act. Calls for returns from all able-
bodied men aged 15 to 60 except those already in armed 
service. Additional details required on vehicles, horses, boats, 
cattle, food, forage, etc. Partly to prepare the country for 
‘driving’, or the process of sending all necessary provisions, 
cattle, and people unable to fight as far away from invading 
forces as possible.68 
July 1803 Army of 
Reserve Act 
Three separate Acts passed for England, Scotland and 
Ireland. 50,000 men to be balloted, 34,000 from England, 
6000 from Scotland, and 10,000 from Ireland. Substitution 
permitted. All men aged 18 to 45 eligible to serve for 5 years. 
To be officered by men on half pay, or East India Company 
officers, or fencibles who served in Ireland. Men encouraged 
to enlist into regulars. Act produces only 37,000 effectives by 
May 1804, and suspended.69 
July 1803 Levy en Masse 
Act 
Lords Lieutenant of counties to produce lists of all men aged 
17 to 55 divided into 4 classes depending on marital status, 
number of children, and age. The first three classes to be 
trained in arms for two hours a week between March and 
December. Depots of arms to be placed in all parishes.70 
March 1804 Volunteer 
Consolidation 
Act 
Consolidates all legislation regarding volunteers. Limits 
volunteer exemptions and stops volunteers electing own 
officers.71 
June 1804 Additional 
Force Act 
Combines Army of Reserve and Supplementary Militia into 
force 79,000 strong. Reduces British militia to 48,000. Each 
parish given a quota of men to raise for second battalions 
attached to local regular regiments, on pain of £20 fine. Fixes 
bounties for entering regulars.72 
1805 Militia Draft 9000 men taken for Army from Supplementary Militia 
(17,000 hoped for).73 
1806 Militia Draft 4000 men taken for Army from Irish militia.74 
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DATE ACT DETAILS 
July 1806 Training Act Part of a broader plan to increase recruitment. Divides able-
bodied men into 3 classes and provides for balloting of 
200,000 men aged 18 to 40 to be trained to arms for 26 days 
a year for three years. Diminishes militia and volunteers, who 
lose their government pay. Additional measures to improve 
recruitment include introduction of limited service for 
renewable terms of 7 years, a rise in salary, and better 
pension schemes for veterans and widows.75 
1807 Militia Draft 27,500 militiamen taken for Army.76 
June 1808 Local Militia 
Act 
Provides for a maximum force of 320,000 men and 70,000 in 
Ireland (6x original militia, which is kept separate) either 
volunteered or balloted, who serve for 4 years and train 28 
days a year. Encouraged to enlist in regulars. Volunteers 
allowed to decline as Local Militia expands.77 
1808 Militia Draft Act passed to allow a certain proportion of the militia to 
enlist into regulars, with new ballot to replace enlisted men. 
28,500 militiamen enlist.78 
1811 Militia Draft 11,500 militiamen enlist into regulars.79 
1812 Militia Draft 10,000 militiamen enlist into regulars.80 
1813 Militia Draft Act allows maximum of 30,000 militiamen to enter 
regulars.81 
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Appendix III 
British Naval Logistics 1793-1815 
 
DATE 
TOTAL 
VESSELS 
SHIPS OF 
LINE 
FRIGATES SEAMEN 
179382 132 25 28 45,000 
179483 311 87 81 86,102 
179584 375 97 96 90,946 
179685 444 112 124 110,000 
179786 479 120 124 120,000 
179887 540 122 127 120,000 
179988 587 134 133 120,000 
180089 473 131 141 110,000 
180190 562 119 141 123,879 
180291 561 139 163 70,000 
1803 (peace)92 251 34 94 50,000 
1803 (war)93 469 89 106 82,708 
180494 511 93 106 104,223 
180595 535 96 122  
180696 590 107 130  
180997  108 150 145,000 
181098  152  145,000 
181199    145,000 
1812100    145,000 
1815101  126  85,000 
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Appendix IV 
Offices with responsibility for the armed forces, 1794-
1814 
 
 
1794-
1801 
Prime Minister William Pitt 
 Home Secretary Duke of Portland 
 Foreign Secretary Lord Grenville 
 War Secretary Henry Dundas 
 First Lord of the Admiralty Earl Spencer 
 Commander in Chief 
Lord Amherst (until 1795) 
Duke of York 
 Secretary at War William Windham 
1801-4 Prime Minister Henry Addington 
 Home Secretary 
Duke of Portland (until July 1801) 
Lord Pelham (until August 1803) 
Charles Yorke 
 Foreign Secretary Lord Hawkesbury 
 War Secretary (and Colonies) Lord Hobart 
 First Lord of the Admiralty Earl St. Vincent 
 Commander in Chief Duke of York 
 Secretary at War 
Charles Yorke (until Aug 1803) 
Charles Bragge 
1804-6 Prime Minister William Pitt 
 Home Secretary Lord Hawkesbury 
 Foreign Secretary 
Lord Harrowby (until Jan 1805) 
Lord Mulgrave 
 War Secretary (and Colonies) 
Lord Camden (until June 1805) 
Lord Castlereagh 
 First Lord of the Admiralty 
Viscount Melville (Dundas) (until May 1805) 
Lord Barham 
 Commander in Chief Duke of York 
 Secretary at War William Dundas 
1806-7 
(All the 
Talents) 
Prime Minister Lord Grenville 
 Home Secretary Lord Spencer 
 Foreign Secretary 
Charles James Fox (until September 1806) 
Lord Howick (Charles Grey) 
 War Secretary (and Colonies) William Windham 
 First Lord of the Admiralty 
Lord Howick (until Sept 1806) 
Thomas Grenville 
 Commander in Chief Duke of York 
 Secretary at War Richard Fitzpatrick 
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1807-9 Prime Minister Duke of Portland 
 Home Secretary Lord Hawkesbury (Lord Liverpool 1808) 
 Foreign Secretary George Canning 
 War Secretary (and Colonies) Lord Castlereagh 
 First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Mulgrave 
 Commander in Chief 
Duke of York (until March 1809) 
Sir David Dundas 
 Secretary at War 
Sir James Murray-Pulteney (until June 1809) 
Lord Granville Leveson-Gower 
1809-12 Prime Minister Spencer Perceval 
 Home Secretary Richard Ryder 
 Foreign Secretary 
Earl Bathurst (until Dec 1809) 
Marquess Wellesley (until March 1812) 
Lord Castlereagh 
 War Secretary (and Colonies) Lord Liverpool 
 First Lord of the Admiralty 
Lord Mulgrave (until April 1810) 
Charles Yorke (until March 1812) 
Lord Melville (Robert Dundas) 
 Commander in Chief 
Sir David Dundas (until May 1811) 
Duke of York 
 Secretary at War Lord Palmerston 
1812-5 Prime Minister Lord Liverpool 
 Home Secretary Lord Sidmouth (Addington) 
 Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh 
 War Secretary (and Colonies) Lord Bathurst 
 First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Melville 
 Commander in Chief Duke of York 
 Secretary at War Lord Palmerston 
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Appendix V 
Lords Lieutenant of Ireland and their Chief 
Secretaries, 1794-1814 
 
 
1794-1801 Prime Minister William Pitt 
 Lord Lieutenant 
Earl of Westmorland (until Jan 1795) 
Earl Fitzwilliam (until March 1795) 
Marquess Camden (until June 1798) 
Earl Cornwallis 
 Chief Secretary 
Sylvester Douglas (until 1794) 
Viscount Milton (until 1795) 
Lord Pelham (until 1797) 
Lord Castlereagh 
1801-4 Prime Minister Henry Addington 
 Lord Lieutenant Earl of Hardwicke 
 Chief Secretary 
Charles Abbot (until Feb 1802) 
William Wickham (until Feb 1804) 
Sir Evan Nepean 
1804-6 Prime Minister Pitt 
 Lord Lieutenant Lord Hardwicke 
 Chief Secretary 
Sir Evan Nepean (until March 1805) 
Nicholas Vansittart (until Sept 1805) 
Charles Long 
1806-7 Prime Minister Lord Grenville 
 Lord Lieutenant Duke of Bedford 
 Chief Secretary William Elliott 
1807-9 Prime Minister Duke of Portland 
 Lord Lieutenant Duke of Richmond 
 Chief Secretary 
Sir Arthur Wellesley (until April 1809) 
William Wellesley Pole 
1809-12 Prime Minister Spencer Perceval 
 Lord Lieutenant Duke of Richmond 
 Chief Secretary William Wellesley Pole 
1812-5 Prime Minister Lord Liverpool 
 Lord Lieutenant 
Duke of Richmond (until June 1813) 
Lord Whitworth 
 Chief Secretary Robert Peel 
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